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ABSTRACT – DELUSION AND AFFECTIVE FRAMING 
Clinically significant delusion is a symptom of a number of mental illnesses.  
We rely on what a person says and how she behaves in order to identify if she 
has this symptom and it is clear from the literature that delusions are 
heterogeneous and extremely difficult to define.  People with active delusions 
were interviewed to explore what it is like to develop and experience delusion.  
The transcribed interview data was analysed to identify themes and narrative 
trajectories that help to explain the phenomenon.  Results showed that 
delusions can sometimes provide pragmatic (protective) benefits and that the 
genesis of some delusions can be characterised in terms of the enactivist 
notion of affective framing.  Affective framing is a term that captures the 
background emotions that enable know-how in terms of goal directed action 
and cognition.  If a person’s affective frame alters the world is no longer 
understood and know-how is lost.  The way in which a person relates to her 
environment can be highly anomalous thus requiring her to find an 
extraordinary explanation.  I argue that delusions arise as a result of a 
breakdown in affective framing and offer a conceptualisation of delusion 
supported by empirical findings.   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
______________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Background 
I am a person-centred psychotherapist working in private practice with a 
particular interest in experience – that is, I am interested in ‘what it is like’ to 
be another.  Individual differences abound and yet human beings are similar 
enough that we can communicate our differences and they can be understood 
and even empathised with by another person. 
I embarked on a broad study around the philosophy of psychiatry and became 
interested in delusion as it seemed particularly difficult to pin down.  In the first 
instance I thought that an interrogation of the literature would show me what 
the significant features of clinically significant delusion are and would tell me 
something about how delusions are formed and maintained.  Whilst this did 
help me to understand more, I found out that delusions are a heterogeneous 
group and are notoriously difficult to define.  I also became aware that 
decontextualized quotes from historical phenomenological enquiry were 
repeatedly used in the philosophical literature to support novel and varied 
conceptualisations relating to mental activity.  These decontextualized quotes 
did not seem to capture experience and I found myself wondering what it is 
really like to experience anomalous mental activity? 
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I resolved that my study should include empirical work as I felt that I might 
better grasp the nature of these experiences if I listened to what people had to 
say about them.  Whilst this is not a thesis about phenomenology I felt that I 
needed a grasp of how phenomenology might be used in empirical enquiry.  I 
have attempted to integrate some ideas about phenomenology, qualitative 
empirical study and conceptualisations relating to the enactive approach and 
affective framing as they relate to delusions within this thesis. 
1.2 Overview 
In chapter 2 I briefly examine some of the philosophical and psychological 
literature in relation to the difficulty we have (and have had historically) when 
trying to define delusion.  The way in which we understand delusions and 
delusion formation has implications for prevention, research, treatment and 
stigma.  I hoped that I would get a clearer idea about what it is I am studying 
and perhaps identify important features or characteristics of delusion that 
relate to the definition.  However, I soon came to realise that delusions are a 
heterogeneous group and, whilst I might be able to list features that have 
been identified as being important, this did not seem to help me understand 
the phenomenon as it might be experienced.  Because the external features 
of clinically significant delusion, once formed, share many features with other 
psychiatric symptoms (eg: overvalued ideas) and with ordinary features of 
experience (eg: religious faith, believing in ghosts etc.) I wondered whether 
the significant features might be better understood in terms of genesis or 
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onset.  This meant that I needed to undertake a more detailed 
phenomenological enquiry which included data about context and onset. 
In chapter 3 I examine some of the literature on first person description and 
on phenomenology.  It quickly became clear that phenomenological enquiry is 
on the decline and psychiatric diagnosis has been reduced to ever-shorter 
checklists of symptoms or features. This means that important features of 
experience are lost and we might treat people in the same way who would 
benefit from different treatments.  I also use my own examples to help 
elucidate why first person description is important and how we might use 
phenomenological methods to expand our understanding of the delusional 
experience.  I conclude that a full phenomenological enquiry is the best way to 
capture all the relevant factors that make up this experience.  We can capture 
information about the form or structure of the delusional experience and gain 
an understanding of any meaningful content the delusion might have in 
relation to a person’s history, personality, culture and values.  
Phenomenological enquiry can also tell us about the genesis of the delusion, 
that is, the context in which it arises and how this is experienced as well as 
what factors contribute to the maintenance of the delusion.  
In chapter 4 I set out my methodology for my empirical work.  I interviewed 
four NHS patients with clinically significant delusions (as identified by NHS 
staff) for approximately two hours each.  I used a semi-structured interview 
and in the first one hour interview I asked about history and onset and in the 
second one hour interview I asked about what the experience was like at the 
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time of interview.   The interviews were recorded and transcribed.  I then 
analysed the data.  In this endeavour I was influenced by narrative methods 
and by Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) which aims at 
understanding the meaning that a particular experience has for a particular 
person as well as identifying themes that might relate to a number of 
individuals undergoing a similar experience.  Two broad themes stand out in 
the empirical work: 1) radical alterations in lived experience and 2) guilt, 
justice and doing the right thing.  Understanding how a person might come to 
terms with injustice and a radical alteration in lived experience gives context 
that shows how environmental factors make a contribution to psychiatric 
illness.  I conclude that an attempt at grasping what it is like for a person to 
live through this experience has ethical implications in terms of ensuring that 
epistemic justice is done as well as implications for stigma reduction, 
prevention, early intervention, treatment and research. 
In my analysis of my empirical data stress and intense emotions as well as 
affective and/or perceptual anomalies characterise the onset of the delusions 
for all four of my research participants.  In chapter 5 I examine some of the 
literature on percept, affect and emotion in relation to psychiatric illness and 
delusion formation.  I then link the findings from my empirical work to the 
literature to show how these features are present prior to and/or at the onset 
of the delusional experience in each case.  I speculate that this might be a 
significant sub-set of delusions characterised by the affective, perceptual or 
emotional tone at onset.   
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In chapter 6 I look at some of the literature on the protective nature of 
delusion and show how some of my data can be analysed in terms of short-
term protective or adaptive outcomes.  Three of the people that I interviewed 
could be described as protecting themselves from unbearable psychological 
distress and perhaps even suicide through the development of their delusions.  
Again, I suggest that if we understand delusion formation as sometimes being 
protective or even adaptive this enables us to reduce stigma.  How can we 
think that a person who is responding to radical and distressing alterations in 
lived experience in an adaptive way has something ‘wrong’ with them?  This 
might also have implications for treatment.  Understanding the ways in which 
we might help someone who has developed a protective delusion must take 
her individual experience into consideration. 
In chapter 7 I introduce the enactive approach which posits that cognition is 
an emergent property arising from a dynamic embodied system embedded in 
an environment with which it is constantly interacting.  This conceptualisation 
of cognition can capture all the features that relate to what it is like for a 
person to live through an experience.  It recognises a person as an 
autonomous dynamic system embedded in an environment and recognises 
that mental experience (and thus mental distress and delusion) is constituted 
through the brain, the body and the environment.  I call this system the 
brain/body/world system (BBWS).  I cite research that shows how various 
factors relating to the body as well as factors in the environment influence 
what we think and feel and how we respond.  I also cite a number of studies 
that show how certain environments correlate with adverse mental health 
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outcomes.  I conclude that the enactive approach is the only way to fully 
account for all the factors that might be involved in delusion formation. 
In chapter 8 I introduce the notion of affective framing and how this might be 
used to capture how affect, percept and emotion are involved in negotiating 
the world and in decision-making.  I take the notion of affective framing further 
than its originator and posit that, in line with the enactive approach we must 
take seriously the idea that affect is also an emergent property of the BBWS.  
When the affective frame breaks down, which can have its origins in 
endogenous and/or exogenous processes, a person’s ability to negotiate the 
world is altered and new strategies are required.  Know-how is compromised 
and this might result in delusion formation.  I provide a short description of a 
tentative conceptualisation of a sub-set of clinically significant delusions which 
is supported by the literature and my empirical evidence. 
In chapter 9 I conclude and summarise my thesis in terms of the 
conceptualisation of cognition within the enactive approach, how a breakdown 
in affective framing can capture the process of delusion formation in some 
cases and how my empirical research supports this.  I also summarise the 
implications of these findings in terms of prevention, early intervention, 
treatment, research and stigma reduction and seeing that epistemic justice is 
done. 
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CHAPTER 2 - ON THE DIFFICULTY OF 
DEFINING DELUSION 
______________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine some of the philosophical, psychological and 
psychiatric literature on the definition of delusion.  I also consider my 
experience of my own mental activity and experiences from my therapeutic 
work as a person-centred counsellor.  Through examining the literature and 
reflecting on my experiences it becomes clear that current definitions of 
delusion are unsatisfactory, they are extensionally inadequate as they do not 
capture all and only those things which are delusions.  I suggest that further 
research is needed to clarify the phenomenology (or more likely the 
phenonmenologies) of delusion.  This chapter will shed some light on the kind 
of considerations that might be relevant for a more adequate understanding of 
delusion. 
In section 2.2 I look at the context in which the definition of delusion is used.  
In section 2.3 I briefly look at some of the problems there are when trying to 
understand delusion as well as different approaches to our understanding and 
identify some of the features or characteristics of delusion.  In section 2.4 I 
look at doxasticity, rationality and normativity.  In section 2.5 I look at 
impossibility, plausibility, amenability to revision and whether some delusions 
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are un-falsifiable.  Finally I summarise my findings and the implications of 
these findings (Section 2.6). 
2.2 Context 
I have chosen to examine clinically significant delusion1 in the context of the 
psychiatric literature as, certainly in Britain, a person seeking help who is 
experiencing clinically significant delusions is likely, at least in the first 
instance, to seek help (or have help sought on his or behalf) through the 
National Health System (NHS) which is likely to involve referral to a 
psychiatric team.  Those seeking help are then (usually) given a diagnosis 
and treated in accordance with their diagnosis, a diagnosis made by 
psychiatrists, based on psychiatric criteria.  Whilst I recognise that there are 
other approaches to an understanding of the kinds of problems that might 
lead to delusion (such as those referred to in the British Psychological Society 
on understanding psychosis and schizophrenia (Cooke, 2017)), in clinical 
practice and in research they are less influential than the psychiatric 
approach.  I use the term psychiatric illness simply to denote those 
experiences that cause a person to seek psychiatric help (or have help sought 
on their behalf) that result in intervention or treatment by a psychiatric team.  
Research into psychiatric illnesses is usually done using psychiatric 
diagnoses found in diagnostic manuals such as DSM 5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) and ICD 10 (World Health Organization, 1993b).  Where 
psychiatric illnesses are concerned diagnosis is made based on identifying 
                                            
1 See section 2.2 for a definition. 
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symptoms which manifest in terms of mental distress and problems with 
functioning.  There is often no discernible aetiology and as such it is 
theoretically possible to group symptoms that seem to co-occur in any way 
that we choose to give a syndrome which, once named, takes on a life of its 
own as a disease entity.  Research and treatment currently hangs on these 
named ‘diseases’.  As the current version of the American Psychiatrists 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5) 
puts it: 
 “… in the absence of clear biological markers or clinically useful 
measurements of severity for many mental disorders, it has not been 
possible to completely separate normal and pathological symptom 
expressions contained in diagnostic criteria.” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p.21). 
The most important features that might cause a person to seek psychiatric 
help (or have help sought on one’s behalf) can be understood in terms of the 
impact experience has on that person’s wellbeing.  My own experience (of 
myself) and some (anecdotal) analysis of client experience tells me that there 
may be no clear line between the mentally well and the mentally ‘ill’ (for 
evidence supporting this see Bentall, 2004).  I do not propose to examine the 
details of this problem in depth here.  It is worth noting, however, that there is 
a growing consensus within psychiatry and psychology that research and 
interventions may be more productively focused upon understanding specific 
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symptoms and the interactions between them rather than on ‘illnesses.’2  I 
align my work in this thesis with this view, and consider delusions to be 
important phenomena in their own right.  At the same time I do not propose 
that delusion should be isolated from other features of experience that might 
be relevant to our understanding. 
Delusions are a significant feature of a number of distressing psychiatric 
problems and it is widely recognised that delusions are a heterogeneous 
group (Maher, 2001).  To develop and improve approaches to research and to 
treatment, it is important to have a working definition of delusion which is 
consistent with the phenomenology of delusional experiences.  Given the 
broad spectrum of such experiences this has proven difficult.  If we can gain a 
more accurate understanding of the delusional experience and why it is 
problematic we might use this information to identify novel therapeutic 
intervention and perhaps identify different classes of delusion which warrant 
different treatments.  
2.2.1 Karl Jaspers and DSM 5 
The difficulty in describing delusion has a long history in psychiatry. In Karl 
Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, originally published in 1913, he describes 
delusion as follows:  
                                            
2 For example in 2008 the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
began to develop the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) in contrast to DSM 5 
which aims at identifying individual psychological constructs or concepts 
relevant to human functioning, behaviour and mental disorders in terms of 
units of analysis such as genetics, neurobiology, physiology, and self-report 
(NIMH, 2017).  
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“The term delusion is vaguely applied to all false judgments that share 
the following external characteristics to a marked, though undefined 
degree: (1) they are held with an extraordinary conviction, with an 
incomparable, subjective certainty; (2) there is an imperviousness to 
other experiences and to compelling counter argument; (3) their content 
is impossible...  We can then distinguish two large groups of delusion 
according to their origin: one group emerges understandably from 
preceding affects… The other group for us is psychologically 
irreducible…” (Jaspers, 1997, pp.95–96). 
For Jaspers the first group (with understandable origins) are delusion-like 
ideas and the second group (where the delusion is psychologically irreducible 
and therefore not understandable) is known as delusion proper.  He goes on 
to say: 
“If incorrigible wrong judgements are termed ‘delusion’, who will there be 
without delusion, since we are all capable of having convictions and it is 
a universal human characteristic to hold on to our own mistaken 
judgements.  Nor can the prolific illusions of entire peoples and persons 
be given the title of ‘delusion’, since this would mean treating a basic 
human characteristic as if it were an illness.” (Jaspers, 1997, p.195).  
Whilst Jaspers’ General Psychopathology was not published in English until 
1968 we can see that, whilst it does not distinguish between delusion proper 
and delusion-like ideas, the current diagnostic definition (from DSM 5) is close 
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to Jaspers’ original definition.  I set out the two definitions together (below) in 
order to highlight the similarities and differences:   
“A false belief [Jaspers’ – “false judgement(s)”] based on incorrect 
inference about external reality that is firmly sustained [Jaspers’ – “held 
with extraordinary conviction”] despite what almost everyone else 
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof 
or evidence to the contrary [Jaspers’ – “imperviousness to other 
experiences and compelling counter arguments”]. The belief is not 
ordinarily one accepted by other members of the person’s culture or 
subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith) [Jaspers’ – “…nor 
can the prolific views of entire nations be given the title delusion…”].  
When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a 
delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.819; Jaspers, 1997, pp.95–
95 & 195). 
So, the term delusion is ‘vaguely’ applied to false beliefs held with conviction 
despite the availability of counter evidence.  However, as Jaspers well knew, 
we do not routinely think that religeous, spiritual or certain other supernatural 
beliefs are necessarily problematic or symptomatic of illness and it is a very 
ordinary human trait to hold unexamined mistaken beliefs.    
A person might seek psychiatric help as a result of distress because she 
believes that she will go to Hell due to her past actions.  If it is know that she 
is Catholic, even if others think she is mistaken about the existence of Hell 
	 13	
this would not be classed as a clinically significant delusion.  It is, rather, a 
culturally normal belief that is perhaps overvalued or that she has become 
obsessed with resulting in psychological distress.  This kind of problem might 
mean that a person is described as delusional in one culture but not in 
another.  So what is it that differentiates a delusion that might turn out to be 
clinically significant from other kinds of mistaken beliefs?  Debates around 
impossibility, falsifiability, plausibility doxasticity, rationality, normativity and 
un-falsifiability abound and I briefly explore these debates in sections 2.5 and 
2.6. 
In the next section I lay out some assumptions and terms that I will use in 
order to explore this further. 
2.2.2. Assumptions and Terms 
My starting position when engaging with this project is that I take the person’s 
explanation seriously and will not ‘explain away’ peculiarities in terms of ‘the 
way things normally are’.  A person experiencing anomalous mental activity 
has access to information about that experience that others do not have and it 
is incumbent on any researcher to take this seriously3. I acknowledge the 
obvious problems of lack of first person access to the experience of another 
person – exacerbated by the problems associated with the peculiarities of 
psychopathology. That is, I accept that perhaps some experiences 
(perceptual and otherwise) are beyond the scope of ordinary (more typical) 
human experience.  Further, I do not assume that all things classed as 
                                            
3 I will say more about this in chapter 3. 
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delusion take the same form or have the same aetiology (this is a matter for 
empirical research - perhaps cognitive neuroscience coupled with 
phenomenological research) and I agree with Brendan Maher: 
“The principle of parsimony would seem to demand that the implications 
of accepting the patient’s reports of his experience should be exhausted 
and found fruitless before turning to interpretive theoretical formulations.” 
(Maher, 1974, p.109). 
This quote was written over forty years ago and, in some ways, the patient’s 
experience is undoubtedly taken more seriously now.  However, we still have 
problems with regard to the decline of the use of phenomenology4 and we 
certainly have not exhausted the possibilities of this form of analysis.  
Partly because the accepted definitions only vaguely apply to the 
phenomenon that I am trying to study we find that, within the literature, 
different writers use the term delusion differently.  In this thesis, I use the word 
delusion in the following way(s): 
1. Delusion – all idiosyncratic beliefs that are firmly maintained despite being 
contradicted by what is generally accepted as reality and/or by rational 
argument, including those beliefs maintained by people in the ‘normal’ 
population. This would include everyday folk psychological use of the term, 
such as ‘he’s delusional if he thinks he’s going to pass that exam,’ as well as 
extreme bizarre clinically significant delusions and everything in between. 
                                            
4 I discuss this further in chapter 3, section 3.6. 
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2. Clinically significant delusion – I adopt the term ‘clinically significant 
delusions’ to denote those delusions broadly meeting the DSM 5 criteria that 
give rise to significant functional, emotional or cognitive problems and lead a 
person to seek psychiatric help or to be forced to have psychiatric treatment.  
This term is used in preference to ‘pathological’, which might imply a disease 
entity and perhaps a biological underpinning or aetiology.  As we cannot say 
for sure that delusions have any such common ‘cause’ I prefer (like Jennifer 
Radden) to use the term ‘clinically significant.’ (Radden, 2011). 
In what follows I look at some of the different approaches that we can take 
and some of the problems we have when trying to apply the clinical definition 
of delusion to case examples and how this relates to other mental 
phenomena. 
2.2.3. Approaches and Problems 
In the vast majority of cases of clinically significant delusion, there is currently 
no identifiable biological underpinning.  This is also true for most psychiatric 
illnesses (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.21).  This means that 
psychiatrists must rely on symptoms as presented and must endeavour to 
understand when these represent significant problems. 
There are, of course, illnesses with identifiable biological underpinnings that 
are associated with delusion formation.  For example, Alzheimer’s disease, 
associated with protein build up and plaque formation in the brain which 
interferes with neuronal connections, is linked with delusion formation (Green, 
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2017).  Capgras syndrome5 (or the Capgras delusion) is the delusion that 
loved ones or relatives have been replaced by imposters.  This syndrome can 
be associated with brain damage as well as dementia and can also be 
associated with people who have no obvious brain damage but have acquired 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Edelstyn and Oyebode, 1999).  This highlights 
the problem that we have with regard to understanding symptom expression 
in terms of form (a false belief held with conviction) and content (‘my relatives 
have been replaced by imposters’) alone.  Capgras syndrome is unusual.  It is 
rare, monothematic6 and has been extensively researched compared with 
other delusions.  The fact that the external characteristics of the syndrome are 
similar in the case of the person with dementia, the person with brain damage 
and the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia suggests that delusion is not 
only heterogeneous but also multiply realised (perhaps biologically and/or 
psychologically).   
In the next section I take a more fine-grained look at some of the 
characteristics associated with delusion. 
2.3. Characteristics 
There are many different delusions and they are normally categorised in 
relation to the kind of content of the belief (see table 1). 
                                            
5 I say more about this in chapter 5, section 5.4.2. 
6 Monothematic delusions have just one theme (as opposed to, for example, 
the elaborate polythematic delusions sometimes associated with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia).  
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Table 1.  Commonly reported themes of clinical delusions (Bell et al., 2006, p.220) 
Defined by DSM 
 
Persecutory 
 
Grandiose 
 
Jealous (Othello 
syndrome) 
 
Erotomania (De 
Clerambault’s syndrome) 
 
Somatic (e.g. delusional 
parasitosis/Ekbom’s 
syndrome) 
 
Bizarre 
 
 
Misidentification 
 
Capgras syndrome  
 
 
Fregoli syndrome 
 
Reduplicative paramnesia 
 
 
Mirrored self-
misidentification 
 
Other 
 
Thought 
insertion/withdrawal 
 
External control 
 
 
Guilt  
 
Religious 
 
Cotard delusion 
 
Lycanthropy 
 
Examples: 
 
“My food is being poisoned by the police” 
 
“I have the power to heal all illnesses” 
 
“My partner is cheating on me” 
 
 
“A famous pop star secretly signals her love to me 
over the radio” 
 
“I am infected by tiny parasites” 
 
 
 
“My mother’s thoughts are being carried on raindrops 
that fall on the air conditioner” 
 
 
 
“My relatives have been replaced by identical looking 
impostors” 
 
“The same person is disguising himself as others” 
 
“My present location exists in two places 
simultaneously” 
 
“The reflection in the mirror is another person” 
 
 
 
 
“Thoughts are being inserted into/withdrawn from my 
mind” 
 
“My mind/body is being controlled by an external 
agent” 
 
“I am responsible for the AIDS epidemic” 
 
“I am the reincarnation of Solomon” 
 
“I am dead/do not exist,” or “My body is decaying” 
 
“I am/have transformed into an animal” 
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At first glance these seem as if they might take a similar form (although the 
content is quite different) in that they share some of the external 
characteristics of delusion as defined by DSM 5. 
At first glance one might say these delusions are:  
• False and made through inferential error about external reality 
• Doxastic (or belief-like) 
• Strongly held against counter argument/evidence 
• Culturally/sub-culturally abnormal  
But our first impression may not hold on closer inspection.  Currently there is 
disagreement about what delusions are which highlights the inadequacy of 
the definition.  They might be thought of as manifesting as a series of 
measurable dimensions or characteristics (Garety and Hemsley, 2013; Jones 
and Watson, 1997) and their origins might be described in terms of perceptual 
anomaly alone (Gerrans, 2002; Maher, 1974) or perceptual anomaly plus 
cognitive deficit (Davies et al., 2001; Coltheart, 2007).  They can also be 
understood as: doxastic (Bortolotti, 2012; Bayne and Pacherie, 2005); 
irrational non-doxastic acceptances (Frankish, 2012); imaginings mislabelled 
as beliefs (Currie and Jureidini, 2001); irrational, un-falsifiable, personally 
significant emotionally salient beliefs originating from trivial occurrences 
(Leeser and O’Donohue, 1999); fundamentally incomprehensible (Heinimaa, 
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2002) or un-understandable (Gorski, 2012).7  I briefly explore some of these 
conceptualisation in what follows.  
When the definition (above) is consulted and compared with the literature and 
with different examples of clinically significant delusions it becomes clear that 
the definition given may not be sufficient to differentiate between clinically 
significant delusions and non-clinical delusions or to distinguish between 
delusions and other psychiatric symptoms.   
2.3.1 Clinical Significance 
One could argue that Jaspers’ wording is not intended to account for the 
experience of clinically significant delusions as it only ‘vaguely’ applies8.  One 
could also argue that the definition of delusion in DSM 5 is not intended to 
fully account for clinically significant delusion.  In order to identify those 
delusions that are clinically significant one must also include the criteria for 
mental disorder.  On attempting to qualify ‘clinical significance,’ the DSM 5 
introduction states: 
“…. a generic diagnostic criterion requiring distress or disability has been 
used to establish disorder thresholds, usually worded "the disturbance 
causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning." The text following 
the revised definition of a mental disorder acknowledges that this 
                                            
7 This list represents a small number of the theories deemed relevant to this 
project, the literature is vast and it is not possible to cover more here. 
8 I return to this in chapter 5, section 5.2 
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criterion may be especially helpful in determining a patient's need for 
treatment.” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.21). 
This means that unless there is significant impairment or distress there may 
be no need to treat (and perhaps those whose ‘delusions’ meet the other 
DSM 5 criteria but who are not distressed or suffering from impaired function 
would not seek or attract psychiatric help).  As Bill Fulford suggests, there is 
always a value judgment made where clinical significance is concerned 
(Fulford, 1989).   
Here, I suggest that the noteworthy dimensions of clinically significant 
delusion relate to impairment in function and distress. 
2.3.2 Other Dimensions or Characteristics of Delusion 
We might also want to establish other characteristics of delusion that impact 
directly on these two dimensions (impairment in function and distress) and 
these might be used to help establish the clinical significance or severity of 
the delusion and perhaps help to differentiate between delusions and other 
kinds of beliefs and psychiatric phenomenon.  Characteristics of delusion that 
are deemed subjectively measurable have been identified and scales to 
measure them have been developed by Edgar Jones and J.P. Watson and by 
Philippa Garety and David Hemsley amongst others. 
Jones and Watson compared the beliefs of those with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia who had clinically significant delusion, those with a diagnosis of 
anorexia and those with strong religious conviction to try and identify 
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significant differences.  The characteristics they measured were: degree of 
conviction, degree of influence on behaviour, degree of influence on other 
thinking, degree of objective truthfulness, degree of personal importance, 
frequency, degree of acceptability to others, degree of imagination required, 
speed of formation, degree of perceptual evidence involved, degree of 
focused thought involved and degree of affective content.  These 
characteristics were measured using a self-report on a five-point scale with 1 
being correlated to absolute agreement to the characteristic and 5 being a 
total absence of the characteristic (for example, in the case of conviction, 1 
would correspond to ‘I absolutely believe’ and 5 would correspond to ‘I do not 
believe.’).  They found that those with anorexia did not think their beliefs about 
their body image were actually true from an objective standpoint (yet still 
acted on them).  Whilst those with religious beliefs and those with clinically 
significant delusions had equally strong convictions that their beliefs were 
objectively true.  They also found that imagination was heavily involved in 
belief formation for those with religious conviction but not involved in belief 
formation for those with clinically significant delusion (Jones and Watson, 
1997). 
Garety and Hemsley have written comprehensively about the various 
measuring tools used to try to capture important characteristics of the 
delusional experience as well as undertaking their own study.  They used a 
scale with eleven belief characteristics drawn from the literature that could be 
assessed by the subject (as opposed to assessed by an observer) and used a 
visual analogue scale where each patient was asked to mark along a line the 
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degree to which they experienced the different characteristics.  The 
characteristics they measured were: Intensity of belief, preoccupation with the 
belief, degree to which the belief interferes with behaviour, desire to resist 
thinking about it, ability to dismiss the thought, absurdity of the belief, self-
evidential nature of the belief, reassurance seeking behaviour with regard to 
the belief, degree of distress or worry associated with the belief, degree of 
happiness in relation to the belief and degree of pervasiveness or intrusion of 
the belief. 
They found that conviction was the only characteristic that received a high 
score from all the participants.  Two thirds of the sample showed high 
resistance and some other factors were variable and surprising, for example, 
interference and pervasiveness proved the most difficult for subjects to rate 
and showed little correlation with other variables.  Again this serves to 
highlight how little we really understand about the nature of delusion as it is 
experienced.  They conclude that their findings support previously examined 
research and literature suggesting that delusions are multidimensional 
(Garety and Hemsley, 2013). 
This method of thinking about what delusions are, combined with undertaking 
longitudinal studies might be useful for differentiating between delusion and 
other psychiatric symptoms as well as perhaps identifying appropriate 
therapeutic interventions and the timing of these interventions.  Whilst these 
methods might capture some of the features of delusion and contribute 
something to our understanding of the experience I suggest that they do not 
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go far enough and there are other features that might inform us about the 
experience.  Commensurate with some more recent psychological accounts 
about delusion formation (such as those explored in Cooke, 2017; Gumley et 
al., 2013) I suggest that we need more context relating to lived experience of 
a person prior to the onset of delusion such as history and other mental and 
emotional experiences as well as changes at onset and what it is like once the 
delusion is formed.  This will enable us to grasp the nature of the experience. 
2.3.3 More Problems 
Another key issue is that the DSM definition does not adequately distinguish 
between delusions and other kinds of peculiar beliefs or belief-like states.  It 
may also be the case that some delusions do not meet the (vague) criteria of 
the definition at all.  For example, a delusion that is unstable (not continuously 
held with conviction) and does not engender the behaviour one might expect 
of a belief might still seem to have the signature of a problematic or clinically 
significant delusion.  It is also the case that the definition is so general that it 
allows us to count different phenomena as if they were the same kind of thing 
(perhaps this applies to the Capgras delusion described in section 2.2.3) thus 
leading to potential problems for treatment and research. 
There are other significant problems that might, in part, be associated with the 
inadequacy of our understanding of delusion.  For example there are racial 
disparities in psychiatric diagnosis with black and ethnic minorities as well as 
immigrants acquiring diagnoses of schizophrenia more frequently than their 
white counter-parts (Schwartz and Blankenship, 2014).  Exactly why this 
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happens is not fully understood but there is some speculation that 
misunderstandings in relation to cultural differences might be a significant 
factor (Balsa and McGuire, 2003).  This might mean a clinician will over-treat 
if, perhaps due to bias or cultural incompetence, she fails to understand the 
cultural significance of a strongly held belief.  It might therefore be useful if we 
could understand delusion in terms that do not require a clinician to be 
culturally competent with regard to all cultures that she is likely to come 
across.  This might help to pick out real features of delusion and make the 
clinician’s job easier.  Over treatment should be avoided due to the risks 
attached to treatment.  Taking neuroleptic medication (often prescribed for 
psychotic illnesses) has many side-effects and can create dependency 
(Moncrieff, 2006) and acquiring a psychiatric diagnosis gives rise to stigma9 
and is detrimental to social capital and thus to life opportunities (Webber et 
al., 2014). 
I now turn to the philosophical literature about delusion in order to further 
examine the ways in which the definition can be vague or inadequate.  In the 
following two sections I propose to briefly examine the notions of doxasticity, 
rationality and normativity, as well as the concepts of falsifiability, plausibility, 
impossibility and amenability to revision.  I will examine how these ideas fit 
with examples as well as looking at what others have to say about these 
concepts. 
                                            
9 I will say more about this in chapter 4, section 4.4.2  
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2.4. Doxasticity, Rationality and Normativity 
If a person says she believes something then I am inclined to take this at face 
value.  A person usually holds many mundane unexamined or implicit beliefs 
(e.g.: I believe that when I turn a tap on water will come out) as well as 
examined or explicit beliefs or opinions (e.g.: I believe that liberal democracy 
is the best political system).  Against this background of other beliefs, it is not 
appropriate to ‘second guess’ a person about her own experience or about 
the belief status of what she says.  Not everyone would agree with this and 
some would argue that delusions do not meet the criteria for beliefs as they 
are irrational, do not necessarily affect behaviour and often do not cohere with 
other beliefs.   
2.4.1 Are Delusions Beliefs? 
According to the clinical definitions cited above delusions are beliefs.  
However, some argue that they do not meet the standards required to qualify 
as beliefs.  However, this depends, to a large extent on how belief is defined.  
Lisa Bortolotti argues that beliefs have relations with a person’s other beliefs 
and intentional states, are sensitive to evidence and impact behaviour. They 
can be occurrent (explicit) or dispositional (implicit), can vary in stability as a 
result of many factors (environment, mood and affect) and may or may not be 
attended to in any given situation (Bortolotti, 2012) and this notion of how 
beliefs operate is consonant with the social psychology literature (see for 
example Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
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The general ‘vagueness’ of the definition of delusion leaves an expandable 
term that can be widened to include a myriad of different experiences.  There 
is also a problem of circularity in that examples are used to try to clarify the 
definition – yet the examples already have the label ‘delusion’.  If we were to 
undertake detailed phenomenological examination of experiences described 
as delusions, we might find that the broad label covers more than one ‘kind’ of 
phenomenon.  For example, if some delusions are not beliefs, then the fact 
that the definition includes the word belief leads us to assume that a person 
with a delusion believes the content of her delusion.  
Greg Currie and Jon Jureidini propose that a person with a delusion fails to 
identify an imagining as being self-generated (the person is in some sense not 
the agent of the imagining). This mental activity is then mislabelled 
(representationally) as a belief and somehow ‘given’ as true.  So the 
delusional person has a thought with content P.  He does not believe P.  He 
imagines P.  And then he believes that he believes P.  For Currie and 
Jureidini some delusions are imaginings with a strong feeling of subjective 
conviction. (Currie and Jureidini, 2001).  This is an intriguing way of describing 
some delusions and it helps us explain why some people do not seek to 
integrate their delusions into their lives or to act on them (we do not routinely 
act on our imaginings)10.  However, there are problems here – the most 
                                            
10 Some argue that imagination can play the same motivational role as belief 
and belief is distinguished from imagination and other attitudes by the fact that 
it aims at tracking truth (Shah and Velleman, 2005).  Children often act on 
their imaginings in games of make believe (eg: I am Luke Skywalker and I am 
fighting my father, Darth Vader, in the ultimate battle of good versus evil.  I still 
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obvious being that there are many examples of people acting on their 
delusions and integrating them into elaborate belief networks that pervade the 
rest of their lives - for example, the person who believes he is a millionaire, a 
general and a senior psychiatrist who regularly phones the bank to check on 
his millions, attempts to arrange to inspect local military bases and applies for 
a job as the chief executive of a hospital (Bentall, 2004, pp.295–296). 
The other problem arises from establishing how Currie and Jureidini’s 
characterisation of delusion differs from the experience of people who do not 
have delusions who are ‘believers’.  It is easy for me to say that I believe 
something, compartmentalise it and not act on it – does this mean that it is not 
a belief?  Would others say that I do not believe it?  I doubt it.  They would be 
more likely to say that I am just not very good at acting on or following through 
on my beliefs.  If this argument is used as a way of showing dis-continuity with 
ordinary (more typical) mental activity or the typical way in which we 
sometimes hold beliefs it does not hold up to scrutiny.  Our normal 
propositional attitudes can be manifest as beliefs, which we may not act on, 
which may not be integrated into the rest of our beliefs and which may also 
appear to be irrational.  For example I might say that I believe smoking kills 
people and I do not want to die sooner than necessary, yet I continue to 
smoke.  This series of un-integrated beliefs might include an unexamined 
belief (or sub-clinical delusion) that I am special and the detrimental effect of 
smoking will somehow not have an impact on me.  If questioned about it I 
                                                                                                                             
retain the belief that I am not Luke Skywalker but in the game I behave as if I 
am). 
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would probably concede that the (weakly held) belief that I am special is not 
true, yet I am unlikely to change my behaviour.  Or I might simply be 
accessing the belief smoking relaxes me and ignoring the belief smoking kills 
at times of stress or craving.  Further, one could successfully argue that my 
behaviour and my thinking in this case is irrational but it is unlikely that one 
would question the belief status of my statement about smoking. 
Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie defend the doxastic conception of 
delusion.  Their starting position is that belief is multi-dimensional in nature 
and not defined by rationality constraints.  Ideal (normative) rationality is not 
consistent in human beings and perhaps complete normative rationality is not 
even possible.  Therefore one cannot deny the doxastic nature of delusions 
simply because they are sometimes irrational (Bayne and Pacherie, 2005).  
For Keith Frankish, delusions are not beliefs because they are only subject to 
some of the norms of rationality some of the time.  Frankish calls them non-
doxastic acceptances which might be formed for pragmatic reasons, including 
sub-personal reasons (that the person is not self-consciously aware of).  They 
are not always integrated with other beliefs so they fail to meet the norms of 
procedural rationality.  They are not always acted upon, so they fail to meet 
the norms of agential rationality.  And they are not formed on the basis of 
sufficient evidence, so they fail to meet the norms of epistemic rationality 
(Frankish, 2012).   I, like Bayne and Pacherie, would question if it is possible 
to differentiate this class of non-doxastic acceptances from what we ordinarily 
understand beliefs to be.  Frankish focuses on the normative desirable kind of 
rationality that we ought to adhere to which is clearly not the kind of rationality 
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that human beings always follow (see the smoking example above).  It is too 
strict and does not reflect our ordinary understanding of belief, nor does it fit 
with the concepts of other theorist.11  However, if we agree that non-doxastic 
acceptances are an ordinary form of mental activity, different from a strict 
normative definition of beliefs in the way that Frankish describes, then 
delusion might be a kind of non-doxastic acceptance.  This also means that 
most of the mental activities that we currently describe as beliefs are in fact 
non-doxastic acceptances and we have not said anything significant that 
helps us differentiate delusions from other forms of mental activity. 
It is also completely normal for people to come to believe things that may 
have started as imaginings.  Consider the X-factor 12  hopeful who has 
rehearsed in front of a mirror with a hair brush as a microphone imagining the 
roar of the crowd, praise from the judges and her name up in lights.  She 
comes to believe that she is a good singer (even though she is not), tells all 
her friends and family that she is going to win X-factor and enters the 
competition.  When she fails, others can that see she is mistaken in her belief 
(and perhaps she cannot see it - preferring to think that the judges have made 
a mistake rather than accepting that she is not a good singer).  We don’t 
question the belief status of her conviction that she is a good singer, she does 
believe it, she is simply mistaken.  It is also possible that this person does not 
ever enter the competition but continues to ‘practice’ and tells everyone she is 
                                            
11 As mentioned in 2.4.1 above 
12 X-Factor is a television program where unknown singers compete against 
each other and are judged by experts and the television audience to win a 
record contract. 
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as good as any of the competition winners.  Again, she does not act on her 
conviction (she does not seek fame or enter the competition) but we would 
still say she believes that she is a great singer who could win X-factor. 
Bortolotti argues that delusion ascription is a species of belief ascription. 
Therefore delusions, like beliefs, have relations with the subject’s other beliefs 
and intentional states, are sensitive to evidence, impact behaviour and can be 
explicit or implicit.   She recognises that these features do not give us 
necessary or sufficient conditions for belief and that they do not distinguish 
beliefs from other kinds of mental activity.  She terms her view on delusions 
as ‘modest doxasticism’ and holds that whilst delusions share some 
characteristics with beliefs this does not tell us everything we need to know 
about delusion and leaves open the possibility that some delusions are not 
instances of belief (Bortolotti, 2012). 
Whilst it might be true that some delusions are not beliefs this does not alter 
the fact that our ordinary conceptualisation of beliefs sometimes seem to have 
the same external characteristics as the phenomenon that Currie and 
Jureidini describe as imaginings mistaken as beliefs and that Frankish 
describes as non-doxastic acceptances.  Of course, as we are unable to 
consistently and accurately define or describe beliefs or imaginings, I cannot 
say more about it here.  However, beliefs that people sincerely state they are 
committed to can vary depending on all sorts of factors such as mood, 
audience and pragmatic constraints and we often behave in ways that are at 
odds with our stated beliefs.  Further, the way in which belief and imagination 
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interact suggests that beliefs and imaginings are complex overlapping forms 
of mental activity. 
If people experiencing delusions describe them as beliefs it is incumbent on 
psychiatrists and others to take this description seriously. Whether all 
delusions are beliefs is an empirical question and descriptive phenomenology 
can help us answer it.  As it stands, we cannot say if people with delusions 
ordinarily think of the thoughts and feelings that are associated with the 
delusion as a belief or if this experience has the same kind of status as other 
beliefs that they hold.  We do not ask these kinds of questions of them.  
Perhaps we should.  I speculate that the high level of conviction suggests that 
people who have delusions might (subjectively) experience these thoughts as 
more akin to knowledge13 than to belief. 
The dimensions highlighted in this sections – rationality, integration with other 
thinking and integration with behaviour - might be important when trying to 
understand delusion and perhaps to differentiating between different kinds of 
delusion.  Two of these dimensions have already been highlighted as 
potentially relevant when characterising delusion (see section 2.3.2).  We 
might also think that rationality is an important characteristic too.  Perhaps a 
third party can say how rational a belief seems in terms of plausibility of 
reason giving.  So, for example a delusion that is impossible or 
incomprehensible might be termed completely irrational and a delusion that 
                                            
13 I am not suggesting that delusional beliefs are knowledge just that they are 
subjectively experienced in the same (unquestioning) way that we usually 
experience knowledge 
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was entirely possible and had a strong degree of likelihood (yet was untrue) 
would be termed relatively rational.   
The degree to which a person’s delusion is integrated with other thinking 
might also be important.  If, for example, a person says that she is being 
observed by the government through the air conditioning vents at work, yet 
she has no other thoughts or beliefs connected to this idea then integration 
might be said to be low.  If, however, the person also says that the 
government has information about her, will use it against her, blackmail her or 
share it on the internet and also says that a letter that she received from her 
local MP recently is personally salient in relation to this government 
surveillance, then one would say that the degree of integration with other 
thinking is high.  If the person continues to go to work and her behaviour is 
unaffected by her delusion, one could say that it has no affect on her 
behaviour (in this instance perhaps she would not seek psychiatric help).  If, 
however, the person seals up the air conditioning vents or refuses to go to 
work and reports the intrusion to the police then the delusion could be said to 
have a large impact on action or behaviour.  As interference and 
pervasiveness proved difficult for people to rate on self reports (see section 
2.3.2) the feature of impact on behaviour might be better judged by a 
combination of self-report and third party observer report. 
Whilst both Jaspers and the DSM 5 definition hold that delusions are not 
amenable to revision by counter argument I suggest that if they are 
continuous with ordinary (more typical) beliefs then perhaps they are 
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amenable to revision.  It is often (but not always) possible to change one’s 
belief when presented with evidence that contradicts that belief.  It is also true 
that some beliefs (those with a faith-like quality) are un-falsifiable and perhaps 
some delusions are of this kind and therefore there is simply no available 
counter argument.  I now turn to the literature and some examples to develop 
this point. 
2.5. Impossibility, Plausibility, Un-falsifiability and Amenability to 
Revision 
2.5.1 Impossibility 
There are differences between the modern DSM 5 definition of delusion and 
Jaspers’ original 1913 definition.  Here, I focus on the idea that content of a 
delusion is (or might be) impossible.  One of Jaspers’ three criteria for 
delusion is stated as follows: 
“The term delusion is vaguely applied to all false judgments that share 
the following external characteristics to a marked, though undefined 
degree:…. (3) their content is impossible...” (Jaspers, 1997, p.195). 
It seems obvious that a delusion need not have impossible content since 
there is often a degree of likelihood so the content of delusions could range 
from the unlikely to the impossible.  However, the use of the term impossible 
might tell us something about certain kinds of delusion.  Maybe some do have 
impossible content.  
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The DSM definition does not refer to impossibility of content and instead 
refers to incorrectness.  The DSM definition is stated as follows: 
“A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality…” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.819) 
If I believe that something is false then this might be because I am simply 
incorrect.  For example, if I believe that my cup of coffee is hot and on picking 
it up to drink I find out that it is cold I have simply made a mistake.  Others 
would think that it is reasonable to believe that the coffee is hot.  It is 
plausible, and I have judged that, because it was hot when I made it and I 
only poured it a few minutes ago, it is still hot.  The belief is plausible – coffee 
is usually hot – yet the belief was false, I was mistaken - my belief was 
incorrect.  In this example the question of plausibility arises and a judgment is 
made.   
Contrast this with the belief that my cup of coffee contains a full-sized live 
elephant.  This is a false belief too.  However, it is not plausible.  Further, it is 
not (nomologically/physically) possible either (just as a matter of basic physics 
an elephant will not fit in an ordinary coffee cup) 14.  In this example the 
question of plausibility simply does not arise.   
In both examples I am mistaken, my belief is false and I am incorrect.  In the 
first example I (and others) can consider the plausibility of my belief and make 
                                            
14 I am not interested here in metaphysical or logical possibility as it is not 
relevant to this project. 
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a judgment. In the second example, the question of plausibility (for a third 
party) is simply not relevant because the belief is impossible. 
2.5.2 Falsity 
It is possible for the content of a delusional belief (or belief-like state) to be 
(accidentally) true.  So falsity of content in itself cannot define delusion.  
Consider the oft cited example of the man who believes his wife is having an 
affair because the fifth lamppost on the left is unlit (Oyebode, 2015).  If we 
were to establish that his wife was actually having an affair we might still think 
that there was something wrong.  Even if the content of the delusion is true 
(his wife is having an affair) there is something wrong with the grounds for 
coming to this conclusion – it seems odd that the fifth lamppost somehow 
imparts the information about the wife’s affair (assuming that I have 
established that he literally believes that the lamppost not being lit is the sign, 
reason, grounds and/or explanation for the belief that his wife is having an 
affair, i.e.: he is not using this as some kind of metaphor).  Whilst the belief (or 
belief-like) content of the delusion is true, this man’s overall experience might 
best be described as incomprehensible and the grounds for his belief might 
be best described as impossible – it is impossible (in this world) that the fifth 
lamppost somehow imparts the information about the wife’s affair.15. 
                                            
15 This does not mean the delusion is meaningless and, if we had more 
context and explanation from the person experiencing this delusion, we might 
find that it ceases to be incomprehensible (I will say more about this in 
chapter 4). 
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2.5.3 Implausible or Incomprehensible? 
Markus Heinimaa analyses the role of the DSM definition of delusion and its fit 
with notions of mistakes or incorrectness compared with the notion of 
incomprehensibility.  He examines the distinction between the implausible - 
which requires a degree of likelihood in order to be implausible - and the 
incomprehensible (or as Jaspers puts it the un-understandable) - for which 
plausibility is simply not a factor (Heinimaa, 2002).  Strangeness alone does 
not imply impossibility, just unlikeliness (or implausibility).  It is entirely 
conceivable for a strange delusion to be possible, for example: I am 
descended from the Russian aristocracy and was shipped to England in a 
Faberge egg.  This is very unlikely and therefore implausible (it would’ve had 
to be a very large Faberge egg even if I was shipped here as a baby) but it is 
not impossible. 
Heinnima rightly points out that Bizarre delusions, which are defined as 
implausible and incomprehensible (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
p.87), cannot be both.  If something has a degree of plausibility it cannot be 
incomprehensible.  If a person can weigh plausibility then there must be 
something comprehensible about the delusion (Heinimaa, 2002).  Perhaps 
there is a class of bizarre delusion which are incomprehensible (perhaps with 
impossible content) and these might be like the example in table 1: ‘My 
mother’s thoughts are being carried on raindrops that fall on the air 
conditioner’ which is impossible (in this world) and incomprehensible.  In this 
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case, with regard to bizarre delusions we have no need of the concept of 
plausibility or implausibility. 
For Heinimaa, it is certainly true that some (but not all) delusions are 
incomprehensible (ibid).  I would not, however, conclude (as Heinimaa has 
done) that psychiatry is better served by a focus on incomprehensibility 
except in the case of ‘bizarre’ delusions (see the example above taken from 
table 1) and perhaps with regard to the grounds cited for certain other 
delusions (such as the lamppost example above).  Many delusions are 
understandable and I would suggest that perhaps only a subset of delusions 
can be described, in some sense, as incomprehensible.16 
Perhaps Heinimaa is drawing a distinction here between delusion-like beliefs 
and delusion proper.  If so delusion proper might be the true domain of 
psychiatry and other kinds of ‘understandable’ delusions are the domain of 
psychology.  In this case an incomprehensible delusion would be compatible 
with Jaspers’ notion that some delusions (delusion proper) are psychologically 
irreducible.  
These days, it is not fashionable to distinguish between Jaspers’ delusion 
proper and delusion-like beliefs (Jones et al., 2003) yet when one examines 
the literature it is entirely possible that there are different classes of delusion 
with different characteristics and that Jaspers’ distinction is an important one. 
                                            
16  Again, I caution against incomprehensibility being conflated with 
meaninglessness – human experience is complex and context is required to 
understand what elements of an experience are incomprehensible and what 
elements hold meaning (I say more about this in chapter 4) 
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In the next section I examine the notion of falsifiability in relation to delusion to 
establish if it is an important characteristic of delusion. 
2.5.4. Un-falsifiability 
As Karl Popper tells us a theory can only be said to be scientifically valid if it is 
falsifiable. If, for example, I have only ever seen men with red hair I may 
therefore conclude that all men have red hair.  This is an entirely reasonable 
conclusion based on my experience and the empirical evidence that I am 
aware of.  Whilst it is not logically true for me to say that all men have red hair 
I would tend to believe (and behave as if I believed) that it were true in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary.  The theory is falsifiable because it 
would only take one instance of a man with different coloured hair to disprove 
my theory that all men have red hair.  If a theory does not have this kind of 
quality – the possibility of being disproven – then it is un-falsifiable and it 
cannot be said to be scientifically valid (Popper, 1998, chap.1). 
If a belief is un-falsifiable then it is not responsive to any kind of counter 
argument.  This applies to many of our everyday beliefs, the most obvious 
being religious beliefs.  If I have faith that God exists then, whilst one could 
reason that there are counter arguments to this, one can never prove that 
God does not exist.  One could say the same about ghosts or telepathy – how 
can one prove that ghosts do not exist or that telepathy is impossible?  As 
William O’Donohue and Jaimie Leeser would say: 
“A significant portion of delusional beliefs… are of the sort that lack any 
clear empirical content.  In other words there is no clear way to 
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determine the truth or falsity of such beliefs.” (Leeser and O’Donohue, 
1999, p.687). 
In their paper on the epistemic dimensions of delusion they argue that 
delusions are, by their very nature, un-falsifiable and they list six factors that 
are significant in regard to clinical examples that give these beliefs a ‘faith-like’ 
quality.  They explore how a sufficiently robust irrationality criteria (which in 
ordinary (more typical) thinking hangs on understandable justification and 
reason giving) negates the need for the falsity criterion and reduces the need 
to weight the cultural (or sub-cultural) element so heavily (Leeser and 
O’Donohue, 1999).  If I were to apply their criteria to the lamppost example it 
is likely to meet all of them.  It is a non-basic, protected, un-falsifiable, 
emotionally salient belief originating from trivial occurrences interpreted as 
highly significant, it is not of a particular variety of scientific belief and it (may) 
prompt complex un-testable explanations when challenged (Leeser and 
O’Donohue, 1999). 
In some sense this kind of belief (if indeed it is a belief) can be said to be 
neither true nor false.  It is simply un-provable either way.  No third party can 
have access to the ‘evidence’ cited by the person experiencing the belief as it 
is, in some sense, purely experiential and subjective. 
In the lamppost example the subject of the belief is unable to give a rational 
justification that can be understood by others and this would be the case 
whether the belief (that his wife is having an affair) were true or not.  Whilst I 
can see how this negates the need for a falsity criterion (in Leeser and 
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O’Donohue’s terms) I’m not convinced it would reduce the need to weigh the 
cultural element.  For example, if we lived in a culture where lamp posts were 
worshiped as deities this might alter our clinical interpretation of the man who 
says the lamppost being unlit is grounds for the knowledge or belief that his 
wife is having an affair. 
Whilst I have no doubt that some delusions are of this kind, not all are.  One 
of my own clients had a history and diagnosis of depression and paranoid 
delusions although she was relatively well for the period that I was seeing her.  
She told me how she was brought up in a very strict and unloving family 
where she had to compete for attention, that she had been in a violent 
relationship for several years, then lived next to a very anti-social neighbour 
and that formal complaints about her situation and her housing problem had 
been written off by the local housing association and council because of her 
‘mental health issues’.  She began to think that everyone she met was going 
to do her harm and she felt she needed to avoid contact with others and 
protect herself aggressively from any attention from others.  It is no wonder 
she developed paranoid delusions.  If the people around you really are doing 
you harm and the local authority that is meant to help you refuse to do so it is 
completely understandable that you would extend this idea to the wider 
population and behave accordingly. This is certainly understandable and 
might even be thought of as appropriately adaptive self-protective behaviour 
given her experience and her immediate environment.  
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Maybe Leeser and O’Donohue are also talking about differentiating between 
Jaspers’ delusions and delusions ‘proper’ (above)?  I suspect that their 
definition is only representative of a small sub-class of clinically significant 
delusions and that other classes of delusion may not fit with their stated 
phenomenology.  I recognise that if this phenomenon is not satisfactorily 
defined in the first instance then there will inevitably be debate about what we 
should include or not include.  If we are to take up Leeser and O’Donohue’s 
definition then other abnormal beliefs which loosely meet the DSM criteria and 
are a bit like (but not exactly like) their definition of delusions and in some 
instances cause people to seek psychiatric help, will need another (separate) 
definition.  Perhaps what they are saying is that there is more than one class 
of delusions and this class (the one characterised by their criteria) is the one 
they are interested in.  Others, such as Mike Gorski, cite Jaspers’ delusion 
proper as a separate kind of psychiatric phenomenon due to the fact that by 
(Jaspers’) definition the genesis of the delusion is psychologically irreducible.  
This means that the psychic state that a person experiencing delusion has at 
the onset of her delusion, that is, the subjective feel of this experience is 
inaccessible to other (non-delusional) people (Gorski, 2012, p.100). 
In other words ‘delusion proper’, which is incomprehensible, un-
understandable (or impossible) and psychologically irreducible, should be 
termed ‘delusion’.  Everything else would be delusion-like belief and perhaps 
would need a different, separate definition. 
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Many delusions are difficult to understand but are not incomprehensible.  
Some features relating to delusion formation might, in some sense, be 
incomprehensible.  My concern about a focus on incomprehensibility, 
impossibility and psychological irreducibility is that we might conclude that 
delusions with these properties are therefore meaningless.  I think this is 
highly unlikely.  If something is incomprehensible (in the sense that it takes 
the form of the lamppost example above and meets the criteria set out by 
Leeser and O’Donohue) it does not follow that it is meaningless.  However, at 
the same time, I want to resist the temptation to explain away strange 
phenomenology by insisting that it is understandable.  Perhaps there really 
are cases where elements of experience are un-understandable or 
psychologically irreducible.   
Un-understandability, impossibility or incomprehensibility (appropriately 
defined) might be a real feature of some delusions (or as Jaspers would have 
it delusion-proper).  In the lamppost example one could argue that it is not 
possible (in this world) that the lamppost being unlit is indicative of the man’s 
wife’s affair.  Yet the content of his new belief might be an expression of the 
fear that his wife might leave him, and this is an understandable phenomenon.  
Its attachment to the sign of the unlit lamp is more difficult to understand and 
this might be psychologically irreducible17.  As stated above, this is probably 
an example of a delusion that has a faith-like quality and is un-falsifiable.  
After all, if there is no reason to believe that the man’s wife is having an affair 
                                            
17 If we knew more about he context of the development of this delusion we 
might be able to say for certain whether it is psychologically irreducible. 
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(except his own experience that it is true) then there is no argument to be had 
about the reason – how can one argue with the ‘given’ knowledge received 
when seeing that the lamppost was unlit?  
This may only turn out to be important if the statement made by the person 
(that his wife is having an affair because the fifth lamppost remains unlit) is 
granted belief status.  We may demand some understandable explanation, 
reason or grounds for holding the belief.  If the statement does not have belief 
status, understandable grounds or reasons may not be required. If, for 
example, it is a feeling which the subject cannot shake, or a future which the 
subject has often imagined, then different criteria may come into play. 
Perhaps a person can feel or imagine anything he chooses, even if that thing 
is not currently possible in the world in which he lives. 
2.5.5 Amenable to Revision? 
The current DSM definition is similar to Jaspers 1913 description of delusions 
regarding amenability to revision through evidence and counter argument. 
Delusions are: 
1)  “…firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence 
to the contrary…” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.819) 
 2)  “…held with extraordinary conviction… there is an imperviousness to 
other experiences and compelling counter arguments…” (Jaspers, 1997, 
p.195) 
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For Jaspers, delusions are impervious to experience and counter argument.  
The use of the word ‘impervious’ implies that counter argument is impossible 
and perhaps this means they are un-falsifiable (see section 2.5.4 above).  The 
DSM 5 definition states that delusions are firmly sustained despite proof to the 
contrary.  There might be differing degrees to which a belief may be ‘firmly’ 
sustained.  Perhaps one delusion can be less firmly sustained than another. 
2.5.5.1 One factor or Two? 
In 1974, Brendan Maher challenged the accepted idea of the time that some 
paranoid delusions result as a consequence of an underlying thought disorder 
resulting in an inability to make reasonable inferences from information or 
data.  He postulated that sensory input is distorted such that the evidence 
available to the subject is altered and this evidence is therefore powerful 
enough to resist counter arguments.  He is very specific that, if this theory 
holds water, it is likely to only apply to a subset of delusional experiences.  At 
the time of writing there was no strong evidence that the thought processes of 
people with delusions were any different from the ordinary population18.  So, 
for Maher, the person employs ordinary cognitive processes to explain 
perceptual anomalies and this results in delusion.  The person is no more 
rational or irrational than would be ordinary in the general population and 
there is no clinically significant cognitive deficit (Maher, 1974).  
If the experience of a person provides or includes the evidence for a delusion 
and the experience is anomalous (outside more typical experience), then a 
                                            
18 I say more about this in chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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third party cannot hope to fully grasp the person’s explanation.  These 
experience are primary and have the irreducible quality of sensory 
experiences (Maher, 2003, p.18).  Further, there is no point of intervention in 
any ordinary sense to dispute the subject’s delusion.  Addressing the 
apparent irrationality or implausibility of the delusion by, for example, 
presenting a person with counter evidence will be unlikely to have any impact.  
If Maher is correct then maybe this is a different class of delusion with 
perceptual ‘grounds’ (which are perhaps un-falsifiable) and requiring different 
treatment from delusions that have been developed over time due to readily 
understandable cognitive processes.   
There is now neuro-scientific evidence that this kind of ‘perceptual’ 
explanation applies to the Cotard and the Capgras delusion (see table 1 
above) (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999)19 .  There is still, however, 
debate about whether perceptual anomaly alone is where the clinical 
significance lies in these (and perhaps other) delusions, or whether other 
cognitive anomalies are required as well.  These two different ways of thinking 
about the ‘cause’ of delusion are usually described as the ‘one factor’ model 
(perceptual anomaly alone) (advocates include Gerrans, 2002; Vosgerau and 
Newen, 2007) and the two-factor model (perceptual anomaly plus cognitive 
deficit) (advocates include Coltheart, 2007; Davies et al., 2001). 
I cannot say here whether delusions with different characteristics and different 
aetiologies respond differently to different therapies (although I think this 
                                            
19 I say more about this in chapter 5, section 5.4.2 
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would be an interesting area for research), as we do not fully understand the 
phenomenology of the myriad of different kinds of delusions let alone their 
aetiology. However, whether delusions are formed through perceptual 
anomalies, cognitive anomalies or a combination of these and other factors 
(biological, psychological, environmental and/or affective), we do know that 
delusions are sometimes amenable to challenge.   The understandable 
paranoid delusions of my client (as described in section 2.5.4 above) and the 
behaviour associated with them were improved by (among other things) 
examining the psychology of the formation of the problem and identifying 
people who were not trying to do her harm.  Further, there is now evidence 
that some delusions respond to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
research is continuing in this area (see Hutton and Taylor, 2014; Williams et 
al., 2014). 
Some delusions have faith-like qualities and are perhaps un-falsifiable in the 
sense that it is impossible to prove that they are not true (see section 2.5.4 
above) and perhaps the Capgras delusion is of this kind.  If the evidence of a 
person’s experience (the absence of the sub-personal perceptual ‘feel’ of 
‘familiarity’) tells a person that her husband is an imposter in the Capgras 
delusion then how is it possible to dis-prove this? 20  For example, if a woman 
who has the Capgras delusion and believes her husband is an imposter was 
shown evidence that he is her husband perhaps this would simply highlight 
                                            
20 One could argue that her delusion could be proved false through DNA 
testing but I suspect the person with Capgras delusion would cite DNA results 
as evidence of how good the replication is.  Her evidence is a ‘felt sense’ that 
something is wrong, it is subjective and is not accessible to others.  
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what a good imposter he is.  If she looked at photographs and discussed 
shared memories with him, yet she knew he was not her husband, she might 
simply think that he had prepared incredibly well for the role.  Nothing about 
this kind of intervention directly alters her direct subjective perceptual 
experience in the presence of her husband.  It is, of course, possible that she 
could come to understand that the ‘unfamiliarity’ of her husband was due to 
this anomalous perceptual response but she would need to employ cognitive 
effort to override the evidence of her direct subjective experience every time 
she interacted with her husband.  The evidence she has (that her husband 
does not seem familiar even though he looks like her husband) is not 
available to others and a third party must use their imagination to grasp the 
difficulties that this subjective alteration in experience poses. 
It seems that some delusions may be impervious to counter argument 
perhaps because they are un-falsifiable in the sense described above.  Other 
delusions may be less firmly held and therefore open to revision through 
counter argument and other evidence.  I propose that these characteristics – 
intensity of belief or degree of conviction and amenability to revision through 
counter argument and evidence are significant factors (as discussed in 
section 2.3.3).  Further, a delusion might be described as un-falsifiable which 
may mean that amenability to revision by ordinary cognitive methods is 
impossible.  Perhaps in this case novel alternative therapies might be 
required. 
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2.5.6 Interim Summary 
I propose that where delusions are concerned we use the term ‘impossible’ (in 
preference to incomprehensible or un-understandable) and recognise that this 
is a feature of some delusions.  A delusion with some impossible features 
(content, stated grounds for formation or both) can still retain meaning and it 
is incumbent on the researcher, clinician or therapist to explore any meaning 
the delusion might hold for a person.  I also suggest that there is a close link 
between the un-falsifiable and the impossible.  If the grounds for a delusion 
are impossible they are likely to be un-falsifiable.  In the lamppost example, it 
is because the grounds are impossible that we cannot make a counter 
argument and this renders the delusion un-falsifiable. 
Whether delusions are meaningful can only be established if we engage with 
the content, so a privileging of form over content (advocated in psychiatric 
texts such as DSM 5) is inappropriate.  If the content of the delusion is 
ignored how will we know if it is meaningful (in the context of the subject’s life 
history, environment, culture and personal psychology)?   
Deciding whether someone requires treatment might be independent of the 
incorrectness/impossibility debate and properly hangs on distress and 
problems with functioning (as already mentioned above).  However, the kind 
of treatment a person ultimately receives might be dependent on such 
distinctions.  It might also depend on other characteristics and on the 
phenomenology prior to and relating to the onset of the experience.  Perhaps 
understandable mistaken beliefs give rise to different kinds of delusions from 
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impossible beliefs.  Maybe these are two separate subsets of what we 
ordinarily class as delusion.  So beliefs where the content of the belief or the 
grounds for forming the belief are impossible might correspond to Jaspers’ 
delusion-proper and some psychologically understandable mistaken beliefs 
are delusion-like beliefs and are different from delusion proper. 
I suggest that we have here two distinct dimensions of delusion – plausibility 
and impossibility.  The degree of likelihood or plausibility of a delusion might 
be a significant factor when trying to understand the severity of a delusion or 
perhaps trying to establish if it warrants attention from psychiatric services at 
all.  A highly likely or plausible belief is unlikely to be classed as a delusion 
even if it is false.  Impossible delusions might be of a different class. 
2.5.7 Impossible to Define 
In his paper On the Impossibility of Defining Delusion, Anthony David 
considers two vignettes to inform his writing.  In these vignettes the two 
people have a similar onset of a kind of religious conversion.  One goes on to 
have a normal life and the other goes on to attempt suicide as a response to 
‘voices’ and attracts a diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia.  David 
identifies possible ways of conceptualising delusion in order to attempt an 
explanation of the difference between the first scenario and the second 
(David, 1999).  If we simply look at the external characteristics as compared 
with the (DSM 5) definition we cannot really distinguish between the two 
scenarios.  Further, in this kind of scenario, it is possible that neither of the 
two subjects would seek nor would they attract psychiatric help until they were 
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experiencing serious problems.  On the other hand, if they are both referred to 
a psychiatrist at the onset of the delusion, how would one decide if treatment 
were necessary? 
David concludes that clinically significant delusion might not be definable:  
“…delusions exist in a world of values, assumptions, prejudices, 
incorrect inferences, superstitions, wishful-thinking and paranoia… this is 
what makes delusions possible and also what makes them impossible to 
pin down.” (David, 1999, p.19). 
We may need to include something about the history of the subject and the 
formation of the delusion in order to differentiate between clinically significant 
delusions and other delusions or strongly held beliefs.  The cultural 
component of a working definition of delusion may be important but may also 
become less significant if other criteria are better defined and understood.  
Perhaps an understanding of the context in which a delusion develops and 
the history of the person experiencing it might give us grounds to recognise a 
delusion as problematic without the need for evaluating cultural normalcy.    
Notwithstanding the possibility of a better definition it still may be the case, as 
Tim Thornton puts it, that tacit knowledge is required and the details of what 
constitutes ‘problematic’ history and ‘problematic’ delusion formation and 
maintenance are part of the body of skills in medicine in general and therefore 
in psychiatric diagnosis which are implicit and ineliminable (Thornton, 2006).   
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2.6. Summary and Conclusion 
I suggest that the dimensions discussed here might all be significant and 
should be considered when trying to understand a person’s experience of 
delusion.  When I embarked on this research, I thought that perhaps I would 
identify characteristics that are measurable in some way.  Factors such as 
degree of cultural normalcy as well as the degree to which a person’s affect, 
history, upbringing, personality and recent environment contribute to the 
formation and maintenance of the delusion all seem relevant.  I now see these 
factors as intermeshed in ways that are not readily separable or measurable 
and that the phenomenological enquiry required to grasp what experiences 
might be significant in relation to delusion formation and maintenance is far 
from complete.  
I suggest that a detailed phenomenology of a person’s lived experience might 
give us a better understanding of delusion.  If David and Thornton are correct 
then we cannot hope to define delusion comprehensively (David, 1999; 
Thornton, 2006).  It is unlikely that we will be able to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to count as a delusion.  Still, there are 
some important dimensions we might consider when trying to understand 
delusion.   
Based on my exploration in this chapter I suggest that some noteworthy 
dimensions of clinically significant delusions could include: 
• An attempt to explain or make sense of perceptual anomalies 
• Degree of impairment to functioning 
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• Level of distress 
• Degree of preoccupation 
• Degree of Pervasiveness 
• Plausibility or likelihood  
• Impossibility (perhaps impossible delusions are a different class than 
plausible ones) 
• Rationality and understandability (is the delusion understandable to a 
third party?) 
• Degree of integration into other belief systems 
• Degree to which the delusional influences behaviour 
• Intensity or degree of conviction 
• Amenability to revision through counter argument and evidence (if a 
delusion is described as un-falsifiable this may mean that amenability 
to revision by ordinary cognitive methods is impossible) 
• Degree of cultural normalcy 
• An understanding of the way in which a person’s affect, history, 
upbringing, personality and recent environment contribute to the 
formation of the delusion 
• An understanding of the way in which affect, history, upbringing, 
personality and recent environment contribute to the maintenance of 
the delusion 
Whilst we can say that delusions share at least some characteristics with 
normal beliefs it has become increasingly clear that delusions are a 
	 53	
heterogeneous group having different dimensions and perhaps different 
aetiologies.  It is clear that researchers would need to undertake detailed 
phenomenological enquiry in order to understand how these dimensions 
impact a person’s experience and to perhaps identify similarities and 
differences between delusions. 
I suggest that further phenomenological research is needed which focuses on 
the lived experience of the person experiencing delusion and thus might 
capture the dimensions listed (above) as well as other factors.  Assessment 
based on pre-defined dimensions alone might mean we ignore important 
features of the experience.  There may be other dimensions that are involved 
in delusion formation and maintenance and some might say these can be 
categorised and measured in order to understand the nature of delusion (see 
for example Garety and Hemsley, 2013).  However, dimensions of delusions, 
once formed and stripped of context in relation to history and onset in 
particular might mean that we are missing vital factors about the experience.  
These factors might point out different ‘classes’ of delusion and help identify 
different therapeutic interventions as well as informing us with regard to 
further research and perhaps early intervention or even prevention.  
In the next chapter I look at phenomenology and first person description in 
order to elucidate the importance of this approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 - PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF FIRST PERSON 
DESCRIPTION 
______________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction 
Saying what a delusion is by describing its external characteristics cannot 
capture the experience.  Further, the ever-narrowing lexicon of signs and 
symptoms used in psychiatric diagnosis give an impoverished understanding 
of the delusional experience and thwart research and treatment.  
Philosophical and empirical enquiry might help remedy this.  In this chapter I 
discuss the importance of first person descriptions and the methods we might 
use to capture data about the human experience in relation to delusion.   
I will first look at how we understand ourselves and others through the 
language of folk psychology (section 3.2).  Secondly, I will ask what is ‘mental’ 
about ‘mental illness’ and how this concept relates to expressions of 
subjective experience (section 3.3).  I then consider how folk psychology and 
our understanding of mental illness relate to the developing science of the 
mind (section 3.4), the introduction of the bio-psycho-social model (section 
3.5) and the decline of phenomenological enquiry (section 3.6).  Finally, I 
suggest that a return to Jaspers’ phenomenology can improve our 
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understanding of the delusional experience (section 3.7) and I summarise the 
chapter (section 3.8). 
3.2 Folk Psychology and the Intentional Stance 
In philosophy of mind the concept of folk psychology is used in a number of 
different ways.  Here I use the term folk psychology to refer to those cognitive 
capacities that ordinary people endorse, including the assumption that others 
have a mental life (that others experience thoughts and feelings) as well as 
such capacities as the ability to predict and explain behaviour and the ability 
to infer mental experience (such as thoughts and feelings) from observable 
behaviour (Ravenscroft, 2016).  When we use everyday folk psychological 
rules, we assume that a person is broadly speaking rational: that is, she acts 
and speaks with a degree of regularity and predictability.  On this basis, a 
third party can then identify what another person’s beliefs and desires might 
be, based on knowledge about her place in the world and her intentions and 
thus predict her rational goal-seeking behaviour.  This is perhaps the most 
practically useful way of thinking about the behaviour and mental activity of a 
person.   
Folk psychology does not always deliver accurate predictions of people’s 
behaviour, but it is ‘good enough’ and makes mutual coordination and 
cooperation possible from a practical point of view.  Things can go wrong, of 
course: a person may sometimes behave irrationally or unpredictably, we 
might base our prediction on incomplete knowledge of the other or the 
environment or some other influential factors may be neglected.  
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Notwithstanding the potential for error, this method of understanding others 
has huge predictive power.   
In the next section I illustrate the practical utility of folk psychology using 
Daniel Dennett’s notion of the intentional stance. 
3.2.1 The Intentional Stance 
Daniel Dennett illustrates how a Martian lacking in the skills of human folk 
psychology but with perfect physicalist knowledge of the world would be able 
to predict the closing balance of the Dow Jones in two days time using this 
knowledge.  Processing physicalist knowledge means identifying every 
physical cause and effect pertaining to this situation at the level of atoms.   
This Martian would need to process vast amounts of information in order to 
make this prediction.  The Martian would also inevitably recognise patterns in 
the world of human beings whereby infinitely complex and differing physicalist 
states and processes could give us the same behavioural outcome (e.g. a 
person could buy 500 shares in General Motors in any number of different 
ways).  What Dennett highlights is that the Martian would need vastly more 
information than a human being uses to make these everyday predictions 
because he would not be able to use folk-psychological rules.  The pattern 
emerging in people’s behaviour can be understood in terms of Dennett’s 
intentional stance.  The intentional stance is an attitude we adopt when we 
want to understand and predict people’s behaviour which relies on the 
assumption that people are rational. For instance, a person who wants to 
make money believes that buying shares in General Motors is desirable for 
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her purposes and, being rational, acts on her desire to make money by buying 
the shares.  The exact way in which she does this, and all the physical 
underpinnings of this action, make no difference to the outcome.  What is 
important here is that we see a real pattern in the world, which gives us great 
predictive power without needing to rely on the knowledge of the physical 
processes underlying people’s behaviour (Dennett, 1989). 
We can explain our hopes, desires, beliefs, and actions as well as how we are 
feeling or what we are thinking using (in most cases) everyday folk 
psychological language.  Dennett’s intentional stance shows us how the folk 
psychological notions of basic assumptions about rationality and knowledge of 
a person’s goals (and perhaps how these might be guided by drives and 
feelings 21 ) enable us to predict a person’s behaviour.  People usually 
(although not always) have explanations for their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour and feel they are able to predict their own behaviour.  People can 
also predict the behaviour of others based on knowledge about the beliefs 
and desires of the other as well as being able to infer beliefs and desires of 
others from their behaviour.  For example, we can predict that a person will 
buy a slice of carrot cake in a coffee shop if she has told us that her favourite 
cake is carrot cake.  Conversely, we might infer that a person’s favourite cake 
is carrot cake if we have observed the person buying carrot cake on a number 
of occasions.  These predictions and explanations are readily understood and 
used by people in everyday interactions. 
                                            
21 I will say more about this in chapters 5 and 8 
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I suggest that it is vital that we understand this kind of goal directed behaviour 
and sense or meaning-making as a basic attribute of human beings.  It is this 
capacity that is sometimes called into question when people become mentally 
ill.  In the next section I look at what is ‘mental’ about mental illness. 
3.3 What is ‘Mental’ about Mental Illness? 
In mental illness the problem lies with the mental.  That is, any of the person-
level or sub-personal processes involved in the psychology or cognition of the 
individual could be described as either not working as they ordinarily would do 
and/or interacting with the world in a way which is highly anomalous and/or 
distressing to the person.  The mental is private in the sense that only I have 
direct access to my own mental activity.  If I am mentally ill I might experience 
peculiar thoughts, feelings, or perceptual experiences that have a detrimental 
effect on my wellbeing (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.21).  
When a person is psychologically distressed or when she experiences 
significant changes in her mental activity she might seek medical or 
psychiatric help or help might be sought on her behalf.  Mental illness is 
something that is experienced at the personal level.  A person lets us know 
(directly or indirectly) if she is mentally ill.  That is, some people identify 
problems with their own mental activity and seek help as a result.  Other 
people may not recognise or acknowledge their mental illness yet people 
around them (such as friends, family, healthcare workers, and others) 
recognise changes in their behaviour which can be conceptualised as 
changes in their mental life.  We are only able to do this because we notice 
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that a person is no longer behaving in a relatively straightforwardly predictable 
way (as described in section 3.2). 
There might be some underlying identifiable physical or biological causal 
contributions to some mental illnesses.  However, discrete identifiable 
physical or biological causes, in most cases, have yet to be identified.  In any 
case, physical or biological factors must be correlated with the mental 
experience in order to count as possible causal contributions.  This is because 
it is the mental experience that lets a person know that there is a problem.  It 
is only if the person has anomalous or peculiar underlying thoughts, feelings 
or perceptual experience that she is a candidate for a diagnosis of some kind 
of mental illness.  There are a vast number of ways of being human and, as 
such, the things that make us mentally ill are not fixed in symptomatology.  In 
order for an anomalous mental experience (or set of mental experiences) to 
be problematic clinical criteria must be met.  As I have already mentioned in 
chapter 2, it is not possible to separate normal and pathological symptoms 
within diagnostic criteria and distress and disability such as impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning are used to 
establish whether a problem is clinically significant and, therefore, if a person 
is in need of treatment (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.21). 
If we want to understand the way in which mental illness is experienced we 
must take peoples’ descriptions of their own experiences seriously.  This is 
because mental illness is manifest at the level of the person and (usually) 
relates to the perceived violation of epistemic, moral, emotional, or social 
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norms (Broome and Bortolotti, 2009; Banner, 2013).  Brain anomalies alone 
tell us little about mental illness.  If a benign tumour is identified in the brain it 
is described as benign because it is not growing and it has no effect on brain 
activity.  If a tumour is found which is impeding an important brain activity then 
we will know that this is the case because the person is unable to perform this 
activity as they usually do.  In order for any useful correlation (or causal 
contribution or link) to be identified we first need to know what the impediment 
is.   
With regard to self-consciously experienced mental activity a person has 
subjective privilege to this and I discuss this in the next section. 
3.3.1 Subjective Privilege 
Whilst there might be observable objective signs and symptom indicating 
mental illness, person-level (as opposed to sub-personal) mental activity itself 
can only be directly accessed by the person experiencing it (aspects of it can 
only be inferred by a third party on the basis of observation and psychological 
tests)22. 
What I mean here is that a person can introspect on her own mental activity 
and has the potential to identify aspects of that experience that may not be 
observable in other ways.  For example, I might smile and behave kindly 
towards a person I despise for the sake of appearances or because I am 
                                            
22  There are, of course, many processes that underpin person-level 
knowledge that are not accessible through introspection, they arise out of 
non-conscious process and are best understood through inference in relation 
to behaviour (for a detailed exploration of this see Wilson, 2002) 
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pursuing some particular goal that requires me to show kindness.  In this 
case, the other person might not be aware of my feelings of contempt.  It is 
possible that the person notices my micro-expressions  (facial changes which 
might be associated with contempt) and senses that my behaviour is 
disingenuous.  It is also possible that a third party notices this and identifies 
my real feelings.  It is therefore possible for others to correctly infer aspects of 
my mental life through observation.  But the complex thoughts and feelings 
that I have relating to this experience are only directly accessible to me.  In 
this sense I have privileged access.  I might have reasons (rational or 
otherwise) for not liking a person; I might have goal directed thoughts about 
moderating my behaviour; I might be in a particular mood; I might have 
memories about previous interactions with the person I despise.  All of this 
information is directly available to me and is not available to anyone else 
unless I decide to share it.  Some of this information (about my mental 
activity) might, of course, be indirectly available to others through inference 
relating to observable behaviour. 
There is some sense in which I cannot make a mistake about how I 
experience myself (in the moment).  I can, of course, have false beliefs about 
the experience as I can have false beliefs about the world, and I can change 
my mind about things. My moods, thoughts, and feelings have varying 
degrees of stability.  I might, with hindsight or through further introspection, 
realise that I was mistaken about the person I despised.  She then no longer 
seems despicable to me.  I might even be incredulous that I felt that way.  
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None of this alters that fact that, at the (previous) time of introspection, I had 
the thoughts and feelings of contempt described above. 
We can, of course, behave in ways that appear to contradict our stated beliefs 
and I discuss this in the next section.  
3.3.2 Contradictions 
There is some debate about whether a person is always correct about what 
her beliefs are.  Problems arise when a person does not behave in 
accordance with her stated beliefs.  In this case, a common sense folk 
psychological understanding might lead us to think that the person has made 
a mistake about her beliefs.  This seems to counter my assertion that a 
person has privileged direct access to her mental life.  For example, if I say 
that I believe in animal rights and wear leather shoes an observer might say 
that I am mistaken about my stated belief.  
Another example of a case where we might dispute a person’s stated beliefs 
relates to what is known as implicit bias.  Implicit bias is a phenomenon where 
a person’s stated belief might contradict her behaviour, perhaps only at the 
micro-behavioural level.   For example a person who says she is not racist, 
sexist, or homophobic might respond to cues in the lab that demonstrate that 
she might feel negatively towards certain groups thus contradicting her stated 
beliefs.  This is not an unusual or pathological phenomenon and evidence 
suggests that this kind of implicit bias is common in many populations (Nosek 
et al., 2007).   
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Where mental illness is concerned a paradigmatic example of this kind of 
observable contradiction relates to the phenomenon known as double 
bookkeeping (Sass, 2014).  In some cases, people who appear to have 
avowed delusional beliefs do not act on them.  For example, a person who 
seems (in some sense) to believe that staff on a psychiatric ward are trying to 
poison her still eats the food they give her.  What is interesting here is not 
whether she is right or wrong about her beliefs but that they give observers 
cause to think that there is something unusual about her experience.  She 
appears to sincerely state that she believes people are trying to poison her yet 
behaves as if she does not believe it (Gallagher, 2009).   
The three cases described - the animal lover who wears leather, the implicitly 
racist, sexist or homophobic person who believes she is none of these things, 
and the person with delusions who does not act on her delusions lead us to 
question the nature of some mental activity and perhaps the nature of belief.  
This suggests that we need both third-party observations and first-person 
descriptions of mental life to understand what is happening in some cases.   
In these kinds of cases there is more to say about the phenomenon and an in-
depth phenomenological enquiry is required to better understand what is 
happening.  If we undertake a detailed phenomenological enquiry, where we 
take what a person says seriously, we can discover or uncover what a 
person’s mental life is like.  Even if we ultimately conclude, for example, that 
their avowed beliefs are unstable we cannot reach this conclusion without first 
accepting their description of their experience and then observing how this 
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might contradict behaviour.  For example, if a person says they are not angry 
but shouts and complains to her partner about the washing up then both parts 
of this scenario are interesting and important.  She says she is not angry and 
behaves as if she is.  The understanding of what is going on here can only be 
fully grasped if we take seriously the fact that she says she is not angry.  
Something about not being angry is important to her in ways that need 
exploration in order to be understood.  If we take the stance that we simply 
dismiss her assertion (that she is not angry) as mistaken then we fail to 
understand the complexity of her mental experience.   
3.3.3 Interim summary 
If we are trying to understand what a person’s experience is like it is safe to 
assume that she has some information that an observer does not have.  What 
a person experiences, particularly if it is peculiar or bizarre is what highlights 
that there is a problem.  There is no sense in which a person could be 
described as mentally ill if her mental activity was completely ordinary 
(although there might be marginal cases where it might be desirable to treat 
relatively ordinary mental activity resulting in mild depression or anxiety with 
some kind of therapeutic intervention).  Provided a person is behaving 
normally and reports no unusual mental activity, even if we identified 
anomalies at the neuronal level, that is, if we looked at a person’s brain 
structure and saw that it was highly unusual in some way, this would simply 
show us that degrees of neuronal ‘difference’ correlate with ordinary human 
functioning.  What people tell us about what they believe or experience as 
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well as how they behave tells us when something is wrong.  Unusual mental 
activity (usually) underpins unusual behaviour and a detailed understanding of 
what this is like can help us with research and therapeutic intervention. 
A person’s psychological life consists of perceptions, thoughts and emotions, 
the meaning the person gives to those experiences (more thoughts) and the 
way the person understands what these things represent at a conceptual level 
(more thoughts).  Some of these experiences are readily translatable into 
mutually understandable language.  Other experiences, such as some of 
those occurring in mental illness and relating to anomalous perception in 
particular, are perhaps less readily translatable23.   
In the next section I look at the developing science of the mind and how it 
relates to research in mental illness. 
3.4 The Developing Science of the Mind 
It is true that folk psychology has hardly begun to give us explanations or an 
understanding of many aspects of the human experience.  We know little 
about the nature of sleep, mental illness, creative imagination, differences in 
intelligence among individuals, memory or our abilities with regard to how we 
negotiate our environment in all sorts of complex ways.  We also make 
mistakes with regard to our folk psychological explanations.  For example, we 
regularly make mistake about our own drives and desires – I might say I want 
a cup of coffee because I like the taste but a better explanation might be that I 
                                            
23 I will say more about this in this chapter, section 3.7. 
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am addicted to caffeine.  We also make mistakes about our beliefs – I might 
say that I do not believe in God because I have examined the evidence and 
come to this conclusion but a better explanation might be that I was told from 
an early age that people who believe in God are a bit foolish or deluded.  Our 
folk psychological explanations are also culturally dependent.  For example an 
Indian woman might believe that she should (and therefore would) feel shame 
if she has been raped whereas a white British woman might believe that the 
person who raped her should feel shame and she should feel anger24. 
Paul Churchland would say that these problems (lack of progress, mistakes, 
and cultural dependency) as well as the seeming incommensurability with 
physical science show us that folk psychology is false and, although useful at 
times, it tells us nothing substantial about the human condition.  If this is true 
then ultimately, through a paradigm shift, we will replace folk psychology with 
scientific explanations (Churchland, 1981).  It is clear that if we assume that 
folk psychology is a valid theory about the human condition, there would be a 
huge amount of work to do.  As the science of the mind develops some might 
claim that neuroscience is the scientific explanation for our psychological life.  
This leaves us with (at least) four questions: how might we expand or enrich 
our understanding of folk psychology; how might we correlate this 
understanding with neuroscience; is this kind of correlation even possible; and 
how this might relate to culture, context and environment.  In the next section I 
                                            
24 This is recent change in British culture and it could be argued that women 
still (inappropriately) feel shame in relation to this experience. 
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briefly highlight how culture, context and environment might impact a person’s 
experience. 
3.4.1 Context, Culture and Environment 
Culture can be understood in terms of an historically transmitted system of 
inherited concepts, meaning and expression used to develop, perpetuate and 
communicate knowledge in relation to attitudes toward life (Geertz, 1973, 
p.89).  We are born into specific environments and respond to these 
environments in a context specific culturally patterned way.  Because we just 
do have context, culture, and environment (and these are ineliminable from 
the human experience) folk psychology25 understood in terms of context, 
culture and environment is the best way to account for the complexities of the 
human experience.   
A person is born into an environment to which she must adapt in order to 
survive 26 .  For example, such basic capacities as language are learnt 
depending on the environment.  A person born in the UK with Polish parents 
is likely to learn Polish and English from a young age and to be fluent in both 
– the basic capacity to communicate with those around her would be vital to 
her survival.  A person born into a hunter-gatherer environment will develop 
know-how in relation to survival in this environment.  Such capacities as 
identifying which plants in the environment are safe to eat and chasing, killing, 
gutting, skinning, cooking and eating animals would be part of this person’s 
                                            
25 As research continues and our knowledge expands this may, of course, be 
an enriched or expanded version of what we currently understand by folk 
psychology. 
26 I will return to this in Chapter 7. 
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know-how.  A person born into a developed Western environment will develop 
know-how in relation to the environment in which she finds herself.  This might 
include capacities such as how to cross a busy road safely and an 
understanding of what the local currency is worth.  There are many capacities 
a person must develop in order to survive and flourish in her environment.  
Environments can be small and diverse and include sub-cultures and families 
– two people in different families but in the same country might need similar 
capacities to negotiate some scenarios which relate to the country that they 
find themselves in.  These same people might develop different capacities in 
order to negotiate other scenarios relating to their family or sub-culture.  Thus 
the environment shapes us from the moment we are born and continues to 
shape us as we grow and move through our environment and as the 
environment changes around us.  Human beings are incredibly flexible and 
can adapt and survive in diverse environments as well as actively shape the 
environment in complex and diverse ways in order to meet their needs 
(Wexler, 2006).  However, as we will see in the next chapter and in chapter 8, 
radical changes to environment can sometimes present enormous challenges 
which are incredibly difficult to adapt to.   
At the level of individual difference our environment and history have a huge 
impact on our capacities, mental life and ability to survive and flourish in new 
and diverse situations.  The fact that we do not have folk psychological 
explanations for some of the complex mental activities that human beings 
experience and the fact that we sometimes make mistakes about our own 
motivations and potential behaviour as well as that of others does not mean 
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we should abandon the whole system.  It simply means that we need to do 
more work to fill the gaps.  So we might, over time, and as we find out more, 
revise some of our notions of what constitutes correct folk psychology.   
One’s experience of, say, being angry has a phenomenal character (Burwood 
et al., 1998) or ‘raw feel’ that can only be experienced subjectively.  Some raw 
feel retains no matter how one labels it.  If the taxonomy changes one might 
have something different to say about the ‘raw feel’ but one would still have a 
first-person subjective experience.  This experience may have some kind of 
neuronal correlate.  However, the neuronal correlate is not the raw feel in the 
same way that the atoms that make up the glass that I am drinking out of is 
not the glass.  In this case I do not deny that my drinking vessel is made of 
glass and glass is predominately made from silicon dioxide.  I am simply 
saying that, for the purposes of practical utility (i.e. using the glass to drink out 
of) the level of explanation required is not the chemical substance from which 
it is made.  When one talks about, for example, anger all the other mental 
activity connected to this raw feel is also retained i.e. what one is angry about, 
how angry one is, how it affects one’s mood, how this relates to one’s other 
thoughts, feelings, actions etc.  One might feel inclined to raise one’s voice or 
punch someone or one might feel inclined to take action in some other way 
about a perceived injustice.  One’s mental and behavioural reaction to a 
situation is, to some extent, culturally and environmentally determined.  It 
relates to a person’s history and upbringing as well as to the environment she 
finds herself in at the time of expression.  For example, a person might 
express her anger differently if she is surrounded by others who agree with 
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her stance (ie: that she is justified in feeling angry about a given situation) 
than she would if she was surrounded by people who did not agree.  Knowing 
that one is in, say, ‘brain process a’ gives one no advantage.  Bare 
decontextualized information about brain processes, neurons firing or 
adrenalin production increasing would not give us the right kind of information 
for therapeutic intervention either.  In fact, it is impossible for me to write 
about neurons firing or hormones increasing without saying that they are firing 
in virtue of something.  It would be nonsensical to talk about the physical 
attributes and responses of the brain without saying what they are responding 
to. The experiential descriptive component must exist in some form or 
another.  I do not experience my brain processes, I have no direct access to 
what my brain is doing but I just do have subjective access to my experience.  
The angry person is angry about something.  This is usually something 
tangible that is in the environment.  Even if she is angry about, say, a 
perceived injustice (and is mistaken) we can still think of this in terms of anger 
about something outside herself.  Her concept of what is just and unjust (in 
the world) is engaged and her expression of her feelings relates to the 
environment she finds herself in at the time of expression.  Her response 
engages her capacities for know-how within her environment based on 
patterned responses developed (at least to some extent) in order to survive 
and flourish.  Whilst it is true that we might develop a different taxonomy for 
our experience (a non-folk-psychological one) we would still need to say 
something about the experience in readily understandable language in order 
to continue our research into how these processes work and to develop 
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therapeutic intervention for those experiencing psychological distress.  As 
Thomas Nagel puts it: 
 “…it’s a mystery how the true character of experiences could be 
revealed in the physical operation of that organism.” (Nagel, 1979, 
p.172). 
Understanding, for example, function and behaviour tells us something about 
human beings and a third party can often say something about the mental 
activity of another person by observing her behaviour.  However, third party 
observation excludes what is experiential and private or privileged.  I suggest 
we need to consider all the factors that relate to an experience, including 
context, culture and environment, if we are to fully understand what that 
experience is like. 
In the next section I look at recent history and how we have, theoretically, 
moved away from the biomedical model for illness towards the bio-psycho-
social model. 
3.5 The Bio-Psycho-Social Model 
In 1977 George Engel proposed how we might use the bio-psycho-social 
model for medicine, arguing that the biomedical model was insufficient when 
dealing with people presenting with symptoms, distress or illness.  People 
have illnesses and as such we should consider a person’s lived experience as 
well as any biological problems when managing patient care (Engel, 1977).  
He elaborates further on appropriate training and education for clinicians in 
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terms of components that can be considered separately in their own right and 
which are also components of the larger system and are connected 
hierarchically. So molecules, cells, tissue, nervous systems, organs, people, 
families and community can each be understood in their own right.  In addition 
each feeds into the other in the hierarchical order specified and can be 
studied or understood at different levels (Engel, 1981).  We have yet to see a 
full integration of this kind of model into healthcare (Kontos, 2011).  And I 
further suggest that this model does not go far enough27. 
Engels’ critics argue that the model is too vague and, until we are able to 
explain how illness emerges from the complex connectivity between the 
biological, the psychological and the social, we should stick with what we 
know (Guze, 1989).  Others say that, as medicine is heterogeneous, no one 
model can account for all of medicine and that includes the biopsychosocial 
model (Kontos, 2011).  Reductionist approaches, such as biological disease 
models, are compelling because they simplify understanding and enable 
targeted treatment.  So, if we believe that schizophrenia is a disease with a 
biological cause (notwithstanding that we have yet to find a biological 
aetiology) then, in theory, we can treat this disease using biomedical means.  
Yet if the reductionist approach is false – perhaps there is no circumscribed 
biological aetiology - then we thwart our ability to research, understand and 
treat people who have this diagnosis.  If we fail to acknowledge the possibility 
                                            
27 Engels suggests a hierarchy that ignores the intermeshed nature or these 
factors and the possibility of feedback and feedforward loops and I will say 
more about this in chapter 7.   
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of other (psycho-social) causal contributions we will only be looking for 
biomedical causes and identifying biomedical interventions.   
If we truly grasp and understand that a person’s experience is created through 
her lived experience, history, meaning and environment we might be better 
able to grasp both preventative methods as well as truly bio-psycho-social 
interventions with regard to mental illness. This is not a new idea.  People 
know that they are in process responding to their environment (although I feel 
sure that they would not use a philosopher’s terminology in this regard).  This 
kind of multi-factor approach is illustrated in Peter Chadwick’s first person 
description of recovery from psychosis.  He makes meaning from his history 
and experiences and realises that a number of factors have brought about 
and are maintaining the cognitive process that we call psychosis (again this is 
not his terminology, this is mine).  For Chadwick personal recovery includes 
medication, cognitive and psychodynamic insights and a change of 
environment (Chadwick, 2006).  If people experiencing psychosis, and indeed 
ordinary lay people with no experience of mental illness and no medical 
expertise understand experience in this way (as relating to their history, 
experience and personal psychology as well as their physiology) why do we 
not fully incorporate this kind of investigation into our research and 
understanding of mental illness? 
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I suggest that we can begin to understand how these things are inter-related 
using the enactive approach and by recognising that a person is embodied 
and embedded in a changing environment to which she must respond28.  
I now look at the decline of phenomenological enquiry and the impact that this 
has had in psychiatry. 
3.6 The Decline of Phenomenological Enquiry 
Here I define phenomenological enquiry as relating to all aspects of a 
person’s lived experience.  The version of phenomenology that I am 
interested in relates to the entirety of the experience.  This includes embodied 
perception, thoughts (including meaning) and affect (and the structure of 
these) as well as context, culture, history, and environment.  These aspects of 
experience cannot be examined in isolation and we are in danger of missing 
vital information about the experience as well as the onset and maintenance 
of mental illness if we ignore any of these aspects.  I accept that this makes 
the enquiry messy and complex – but this is the reality of the person’s lived 
experience.  If one isolates aspects of an experience for the purposes of 
simplicity or clarity one loses important contextual information about the 
experience.  Nevertheless this is what has happened over the last century.  
This has long been a recognised problem in psychiatry.  It is not easy 
(perhaps not even possible) to reconcile the objective and subjective.  It might 
be useful to have a detailed understanding of the kinds of experiences or 
symptoms that are problematic and that lead to psychiatric illness, however 
                                            
28 I expand on this in chapter 7 
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we should not do this at the expense of recognising the person as a person.     
A person cannot be treated as an object for science or biology, and 
psychiatric enquiry must relate to the “being of a man as a whole” 
(Binswanger, 1975, p.211). 
I suggest that Jaspers’ phenomenology is the kind of method we require to 
examine the experience of mental illness as it encompasses all the features 
that relate to a person’s lived experience.  This kind of detailed descriptive 
account of a person’s experience is no longer sought in the psychiatric 
interview.  Further, research is often focused on diagnostic groups which are 
heterogeneous in nature and are determined by ever narrower symptom 
ranges.   
In his article on the use of phenomenology in psychopathology Paul Mullen 
notes that Blueler’s phenomenology of the schizophrenias had 95 possible 
symptoms, Kraepelin used 75 and DSM IV has 30 (Ungvari and Tang in 
Mullen, 2007). The current DSM (DSM 5) lists just five key features, namely: 
delusion, hallucination, disorganized thinking (speech), grossly disorganized 
or abnormal motor behaviour (including catatonia) and negative symptoms 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.87).  If we use restrictive 
questionnaires to elicit answers to questions about symptoms which meet 
DSM 5 criteria we have created a limiting tool with no possibility for 
understanding the full experience of the individual.  Further, we cannot 
capture, describe, or research subtle similarities or differences. 
So we have a problem:   
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“The descriptive psychopathology of Jaspers has gradually been 
transformed into a caricature which has substituted authority for 
enquiry and simplification for subtlety.” (Mullen, 2007, p.113). 
In 1912 Jaspers commented on the decline of phenomenological enquiry in 
favour of general symptom categories (Jaspers, 1968).  Unfortunately his 
warning went unheeded.  We are (still) in danger of losing our understanding 
of the lived experience of a person who has sought psychiatric help and thus 
we are also in danger of losing our ability to help him or her in any meaningful 
way. 
As Nancy Andreasen, a member of the DSM III and IV task force, puts it in 
her paper on the decline of phenomenology: DSM criteria were intended as 
the minimum requirement for a diagnosis, they were never intended to be 
comprehensive.  The requirement to use DSM symptom checklists is an 
integral part of psychiatric training in the US and this takes precedence over 
other methods of enquiry.  Taking a detailed history of an individual patient 
experience has all but disappeared and psychiatrists are not encouraged to 
get to know their patients.  Validity has been sacrificed for reliability.  So, 
clinicians might all arrive at the same diagnosis based on a limited checklist of 
symptoms but the meaningfulness of the diagnosis might be lost as we are 
working with extremely narrow constructs.  This might also mean that we can 
only undertake research based on these constructs thus excluding or denying 
features of psychological distress that are outside these diagnostic limits 
(Andreasen, 2007).   
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Nassir Ghaemi calls for a return to phenomenology highlighting the ‘mixed’ 
nature of various disorders and citing the use of the DSM checklist as 
contributing to oversimplification (Ghaemi, 2007).  Giovanni Stanghellini has 
written about how the standard approach of diagnosis by diagnostic schema 
may be impeding the evolution of psychiatric knowledge. Observation and 
documentation of signs and symptoms that meet diagnostic criteria might 
mean that other peculiar or abnormal phenomena may go unnoticed.  A 
structured diagnostic interview might fragment personal experience, assume 
shared meanings between interviewer and interviewee, suppress the 
interviewee’s narrative and, falsely, give the impression of a ‘neutral’ 
interaction (Stanghellini, 2013).  There are other consequences to the decline 
in full phenomenological enquiry with regard to treatment.  People often feel 
that psychiatrists are not listening to them (Chadwick, 1997).  This is an 
epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) – it is an ethical harm that does an injustice 
to the person by undervaluing the knowledge that he or she has about their 
own experience29. 
Where the narrative of a person’s experience is replaced by diagnostic 
categories, medication and what Femi Oyebode calls the ‘rituals’ of 
psychiatry: 
“…wards are still permeated and characterised by a lack of respect for 
patients; a subtle coercive atmosphere still presides…. unreflective and 
                                            
29 I will say more about this in 4, section 4.4.1 
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inhumane indifference to anguish can still be observed.” (Oyebode, 
2003, p.268).   
Concerns about how a person is treated and the way in which science can 
objectify are not new, as Ludwig Binswanger puts it: 
“For as soon as I objectify my fellow man, as soon as I objectify his 
subjectivity, he is no longer my fellow man…” (Binswanger, 1975, 
p.210).  
In their paper on the psychiatric interview Julie Nordgaard and colleagues 
express the worry that: 
“…there is an implicit assumption that symptoms exist as ready made, 
pre-defined mental objects… the structured interview pre-defines what 
counts as information.” (Nordgaard et al., 2012, p.4). 
They conclude: 
“We need a methodological approach that is faithful to (mental or 
experiential) reality rather than an approach that implicitly distorts this 
reality in order to make it fit to its own prejudice.  Faithfully to assess 
another person’s anomalies of experience, belief, expression, and 
behavior (the second-person perspective), adds certain specific 
demands to our clinical skills and analytic-conceptual knowledge, 
constituting psychiatry also as an academic and scholarly endeavor, 
while at the same time providing solid foundations for achieving 
empirical objectivity.” (Nordgaard et al., 2012, p.362).  
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In summary, as we have seen (above) the reduction of psychiatric 
assessment to ‘signs and symptoms’ prevents us from understanding the full 
experience of the person in distress.  It makes it more likely that we will 
objectify a person and assume that those with the same diagnosis have 
similar experience.  This in turn leads to a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
therapeutic intervention.  It also means that we may undertake research on 
diverse heterogeneous groups (based on diagnosis) that will be less likely to 
give us meaningful outcomes.  If, for example, we give the same drug to a 
group of people that have the same diagnosis it is possible that different 
people within that group might have different symptoms (and certain that they 
have different overall experiences).  Even if we were to narrow 
pharmacological intervention to patient groups with the same symptom we 
might find that at symptom level our understanding is still not fine grained 
enough.   
If we assume that the experience of those that have delusions is ‘the same’ in 
some important way we might try to identify neuronal correlates or anomalies 
for the delusional experience.  This might mean we make mistakes and 
correlate perceived ‘patterns’ in neuronal activity that do not really relate to 
the phenomenon we are trying to understand.  If there are delusional 
experiences that are actually different in significant ways that have not been 
fully understood then the clinician’s attempt at mapping the neural correlates 
for an experience will be too broad brush and they will fail in identifying 
anything significant.  If we understand the differences between people’s 
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experiences we might find out something more accurate and useful at the 
neuronal level. 
This problem also applies to pharmacological and other therapeutic 
interventions.  If, for example, one’s delusion includes a strong sense of 
alienation from one’s body then a bodily/physical therapy might be indicated 
(e.g. yoga).  If one’s delusion carries no such sense of bodily alienation then 
therapeutic yoga would not be indicated.  I am, of course, speculating about 
the kinds of interventions that might be helpful as this is an empirical question.  
Ultimately, the point that I am making is that unless we attempt a more fine-
grained approach to understanding the experience of those with mental 
illnesses we cannot say what, if any, the important differences and similarities 
might be.  And if we do not have the right kind of information about people’s 
experiences we limit our opportunities of developing novel and appropriate 
therapeutic interventions.  Of course we might find out that broad symptoms 
and/or diagnoses can provide useful neural correlates or identifiable genetic 
or other biological markers but as we have so far failed to find these 
correlates I suggest a new approach is required.  There is some evidence that 
we can differentiate between sub-types of depression which respond to 
different therapeutic intervention (Drysdale et al., 2017).    However, this 
whole area has been neglected because of the ways in which diagnosis and 
treatment has been oversimplified (as described above) in the last several 
decades. 
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I now turn to some exploration of phenomenological approaches to the 
understanding of another person.  I do this by returning to Jaspers who was 
writing at the beginning of the last century before the decline in 
phenomenological enquiry. 
Whilst Jaspers doesn’t specifically write about the ineffability of the 
experience of the other he does recognise the translation problem that we 
might have when trying to understand the experience of another who has a 
diagnosable mental illness.  This is particularly noticeable when a person’s 
experiences are radically different from the usual (more typical) human 
experience.  People sometimes find these experiences impossible to explain 
to others particularly where the normal unity of conscious (human) experience 
is compromised. 
3.7 Jaspers’ Phenomenology 
In some mental illnesses, such as psychosis, there is an assumption that a 
person’s experience cannot be communicated or that any attempt at 
communication is unreliable.  I suspect that this assumption thwarts research.  
Whilst it is true that some people’s experience is very different from the 
experience of others, this does not mean that it is beyond the realms of 
understanding.   
A full phenomenological enquiry is the best way to capture all the relevant 
factors that make up experience.  It can help us appreciate the form or 
structure of the delusional experience, that is, the way in which it is manifest 
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in terms of how it is experienced.  This might include anomalous self-
experiences which are difficult to articulate.  It also gives us an understanding 
of any meaningful content the delusion might have in relation to a person’s 
history, personality, culture and values.  Phenomenological enquiry tells us 
about the genesis of the delusion, that is, the context in which it arises and 
how this is experienced.  It might also tell us what factors contribute to the 
maintenance of the delusion.  In Jaspers terminology we can gain information 
about the Form and Content of the delusion and the Meaningful and Causal 
connections relating to that delusion.  We also might gain an Understanding 
and/or Explanation of the delusion, identify Objective and Subjective 
characteristics and identify Genetic and Static features of the delusion 
(Jaspers, 1968).  In the next three sections I briefly explain these terms.  
3.7.1 Features of Experience 
In his attempt to document the different kinds of mental disorders Jaspers 
distinguishes between Form and Content, Meaningful and Causal 
connections, Understanding and Explanation and between Objective and 
Subjective phenomena (Jaspers, 1968).  For the purposes of context, I will 
briefly describe what he means by these terms using examples. 
If I insist that I am the Queen of England then (assuming I am not the Queen 
of England) the form of this thought is delusional (because it meets Jaspers’ 
criteria; loosely – it is a false belief, held with conviction, and immune to 
counter-evidence) and the content is that I am the Queen.  If I am refusing to 
get out of bed and crying all the time because my husband has died this is 
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both meaningful and understandable. In this case there is a reason for my 
reaction that can be understood by other people. This reason is understood in 
narrative terms – I have a meaningful history with my husband and his death 
constitutes a loss that engenders sadness.30  If I am refusing to get out of bed 
and crying all the time for no reason that I or others can intuit based on recent 
events, however, subsequent investigations show a tumour on my thyroid 
which, when treated brings about symptom reduction, then this is both a 
cause and an explanation.  If I am crying and refuse to get out of bed where 
no meaningful or understandable reason can be found then Jaspers assumes 
a causal explanation (Jaspers, 1997, p.606).  This does not mean, however, 
that a causal explanation will be found.  In the above example recent 
psychiatry might suggest the ‘cause’ is low serotonin and would probably treat 
with Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs)31.  Jaspers’ investigation 
of subjective phenomena is of particular interest as his empathic method is 
intended to enable the translation of the subjective into mutually 
understandable language.  This method is used to illuminate the bizarre and 
unusual aspects of a person’s experience and, as such, might help us to see 
what constitutes what is clinically significant about these illnesses. 
3.7.2 Objective and Subjective Features 
For Jaspers, objective symptoms include observable phenomena such as 
conduct, appearance, reflexes, capacities such as memory and cognitive 
                                            
30 I will day more about this in chapter 4 
31This causal explanation is by no means agreed upon although clinicians and 
the general public behave as if this is a known cause (for a critique see 
Kirsch, 2009) 
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ability as well as the rational content of communication including, for example, 
the content of a patient’s delusional thought (e.g. I am the Queen of England).  
Subjective symptoms relate to the form of a disorder and include inner 
processes such as emotions, which the patient does not articulate 
straightforwardly as well as other mental processes which are outside the 
scope of ordinary (more typical) experiencing and relate to the way in which 
something is experienced.  Some of these experiences are not therefore 
easily describable in ordinary language.  Furthermore they are (usually) 
outside the scope of a researcher’s experience and perhaps outside the 
scope of the researcher’s imagination.  This might mean that this kind of 
experience is easily dismissed and it is assumed that the patient is an 
unreliable witness to her own experience.  For Jaspers, subjective 
phenomena can only truly be perceived ‘subjectively’ through empathy. This 
might include, for example, the clinician’s detailed ‘grasping’ or ‘immersive’ 
experience of a feeling of dread experienced by a patient.  It might also 
include a ‘grasping’ of the difference between reality, mental imagery and, 
say, hallucinations experienced by the patient (Jaspers, 1968).   
3.7.3 Genetic and Static Features 
Jaspers differentiates between the genesis of the patient’s experience (the 
events, thoughts, ideas and feelings leading to what he calls the pathological 
experience) and the experience itself.  He uses the term ‘genetic 
understanding’ to describe the clinician’s knowledge of the former and ‘static 
understanding’ to describe her knowledge of the latter.  In this latter category 
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there are three groups of phenomena: those known to us from our own 
experience; those that are extremes of everyday experiences (and thus can 
be grasped relatively straightforwardly through the imagination) and; those 
that are inaccessible through empathic understanding (because they are not 
ordinary (more typical) human experiences) and can only be better 
understood (although never fully grasped) through metaphor and analogy 
(Jaspers, 1968). 
Jaspers is not clear about the distinction between some of the objective 
phenomena and some of the subjective phenomena.  Both involve elements 
described by the patient.  However the difference between the objective 
symptoms described by the patient (including those to do with emotions and 
other mental process) are those that are readily understood by both the 
patient and other people and the subjective symptoms (which might also be 
partly understood through information articulated by the patient) are not 
readily understood.  They are not ‘rational’ in the sense that they are not 
directly understandable by others.  They are outside the everyday experience 
of the investigator and as such require careful, phenomenological exploration.  
Whilst we can never fully grasp these bizarre experiences, Jaspers suggests 
that by careful empathic phenomenological enquiry and perhaps by the use of 
metaphor we can increase our knowledge of the mental phenomena involved 
in illness (Jaspers, 1968).  
For Jaspers, objective investigation leads  
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“…quite systematically to the elimination of everything that can be said 
to be called mental or psychic.” (Jaspers, 1968, p.1314).   
Whereas his phenomenological method, which employs subjective 
psychology leads to a different kind of knowledge which: 
 “…aims at the final realization of the concepts and ideas which form the 
inner representation of psychic process…”(Jaspers, 1968, p.1314). 
I notice that he says that this method aims at the realisation of inner mental 
process.  There is a recognition here by Jaspers that whilst this method gives 
us more information about the patient’s particular experience it is not 
definitive, it does not (and cannot) give us full knowledge of the experience of 
the other.  Any explanation of a person’s experience necessarily abandons 
the subjective.  A person’s explanation of her own experience is just that – an 
explanation – it is not the experience itself.  A third party can explain the 
experience of another in mutually understandable language but something is 
always lost.  Descriptions are not experiences.  Still, we can attempt to get as 
close an understanding as possible using Jaspers’ phenomenology. 
I now turn to the notion of empathy and how it might be used to gain new 
knowledge about experience. 
3.7.4 Empathy 
For Jaspers the mental experiences (the psychic life) of the patient cannot be 
understood purely through objective observation and measurement.  He 
believes that his empathic phenomenological method can be used to identify 
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the vast array of possible mental experience, expand the taxonomy and make 
a richer, more diverse, and more accurate source for diagnosis.  He 
recognises the difficulty in this undertaking as it is not usual for a person to 
consider a mental phenomenon in isolation yet it is this that he is suggesting 
we can do using his phenomenology.  He also acknowledges that any 
empathic experience an investigator might have is useless from a scientific 
point of view and must be translated into communicable knowledge (Jaspers, 
1968).  Phenomenological enquiry involves the bracketing of assumptions or 
a formal suspension or epoché (Husserl in Moran, 2000). This means that the 
researcher must not allow her own experience and assumptions to influence 
the collection of data.  Jaspers (like Husserl) believes that this whole process 
must be undertaken without contamination from the investigator’s psyche and 
must accurately represent the conscious experience of the patient.  The 
investigator improves her skill at the phenomenological approach through 
repetitious effort and attention to elimination of prejudices.  She immerses 
herself in the world of the patient, through direct apprehension (‘grasping’ or 
‘actualizing’) of the patient’s world and through fine-grained questioning and 
reading first person descriptions by patients of their mental experiences 
(Jaspers, 1968). 
Of course we have an immediate contradiction here.  Jaspers and Husserl are 
suggesting that one can ‘bracket’ one’s own experience and assumptions to 
provide an uncontaminated view of the experience of the other.  Yet if there is 
no shared ‘humanness’ and language any understanding would be 
impossible.   It is impossible for me to abstract myself from my embodied, 
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embedded, inculturated ‘humanness’ – in fact one needs one’s humanness in 
order to attempt any kind of phenomenological enquiry into another’s 
experience.  At the same time it is incumbent on the researcher to be mindful 
of personal assumptions that might hinder the enquiry.  This bracketing 
process is an aspiration and is not truly possible (Merleau-Ponty in Moran, 
2000), yet an attempt must be made to see the experience of the other as it 
presents itself and as it is experienced by the other.  One can always gain 
some understanding of another’s experience through gathering the right kind 
of information in the right way. 
Empathy and the ability to see another’s point of view or to put one’s self in 
‘someone else’s shoes’ can be used to better understand the experience of 
another.  There is something in the notion of empathy which most of us 
experience to some extent in the context of every day situations that does 
seem to tell us something about the other.  For example, if my partner comes 
home from work, throws his papers down on the kitchen work surface, fills the 
kettle and slams it down I might surmise that he is angry or annoyed about 
something.  If I ask him about it he might say he has been asked to do more 
admin.  I already know that he hates admin.  It’s easy for me to understand 
that a person who hates admin might be angry about being asked to do more 
of it.  I might bring some assumptions to this interaction – for example, I would 
assume that he is rational and that his experience of the world has something 
in common with mine.  I would probably be very surprised if he was angry with 
the kettle – this would not make sense to me.  However in order to attempt a 
truly uncontaminated empathy (uncontaminated by my assumptions) I would 
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need to bracket any such assumptions about whether he may or may not be 
angry with the kettle (maybe he has a delusion that all kettles are ‘out to get 
him’ and this kettle caused him to be late for work).  I would also need to 
recognise that the fact that I love admin is not relevant here.  There would be 
no point me saying ‘…yes but admin is fun, you are making a mistake, get 
over it….’.  This would lack empathy.  I am seeing the ‘problem’ from my point 
of view, not his.  In short, I have not ‘bracketed’ off my worldview.  Being 
empathic becomes increasingly more difficult the farther a person’s 
experience is from other similar mental phenomena ordinarily experienced by 
the empathiser.   
To empathise with someone is to ‘feel’ what it is to be in her shoes. This in 
turn provides additional information about the experience of the other 
(information outside the overt observable signs and symptoms and outside 
what the other has communicated verbally) which increases the researcher’s 
understanding of a person’s experience.  
If I am successfully able to communicate my empathy in language in a way 
that is understandable and recognisable as empathic to the other then this 
might constitute a new ‘objective’ feature of her experience.  I am avoiding the 
word ‘interpretation’ here which is problematic to me.  I do not want to 
interpret the experience of the other – I want to attempt to capture it – I can 
only do this if it is recognised as true or real by the other.  If I am ‘interpreting’ 
perhaps I am translating her experience to something that she no longer 
recognises.  Whilst it will always be the case that something is lost in this 
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process, the endeavour must be collaborative and the outcome must be 
understandable to both parties.  This kind of researcher engagement with 
another is difficult and time consuming and is rarely undertaken.  
There are a wide variety of ways of being human.  We all have different 
experiences and, as Havi Carel puts it: 
“Overall, there is no consensus on what the experience of illness is like, 
if it is like anything at all.” (Carel, 2012, p.99). 
A ‘phenomenological toolkit’ might be required in order to change our 
approach to understanding mental illness.  This would aim at making the 
phenomenological reduction possible for those experiencing all kinds of 
illnesses.  Instead of looking at behaviour, symptoms, diagnostic categories or 
notional causes we ask the person what her experience is like. 
“Phenomenology offers a step back from conventional understandings of 
illness and offers an opportunity for a genuinely unconstrained 
examination of illness.” (Carel, 2012, p.100). 
Empathy is a kind of fellow feeling in which the empathiser has an affective or 
emotional response similar to the person she is empathising with, which 
stems from taking the perspective of that other person32.  I endorse a version 
of empathy much like that favoured by psychologists Tracy Spinrad and 
                                            
32  Other sub-personal mechanisms that make this possible might include 
mirror neurons (Gallese, 2005), facial mimicry (Ekman, 2003) and non-verbal 
vocalisations (Sauter et al., 2010) along with other (familiar, culturally learned) 
cues like the tone of a person’s voice and her body language (Harré and 
Parrott, 1996). 
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Nancy Eisenberg because if it is true and we can ‘feel in to’ the experience of 
another then this can give us new knowledge about the experience of the 
other.  This adds to what a person can tell us directly and what we can 
observe objectively.   
“Empathy is defined as an affective response which stems from the 
apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or 
condition and is very similar or the same as what another person feels or 
would be expected to feel.” (Spinrad and Eisenberg, 2014, p.61). 
I do not agree, however, that empathy lets one experience ‘the same’ emotion 
that another would feel because the empathiser’s experience is always ‘at one 
remove’ from the other’s experience.  As Carl Rogers puts it the empathiser is 
alongside the other ‘feeling in to’ her experience as if she were in her shoes 
yet always retaining the ‘as if’ quality (Rogers, 1961, p.284).  Martha 
Nussbaum describes this as requiring 
 “…a participatory enactment of the situation of the sufferer, but is 
always combined with the awareness that one is not in oneself the 
sufferer.” (Nussbaum, 2001, p.327).   
In summary, as we have seen (above) empathy is affective in nature (the 
empathiser feels something) and has enough of the appropriate features of 
the emotion (or affective response) that the other is experiencing (or would be 
experiencing) for it to be recognisable to the empathiser. Of course this is not 
an error free endeavour - we can make mistakes.  One might feel sad in the 
presence of another’s sadness without recognising this as their sadness or 
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one might feel sad coincidentally about something else.  In research empathy 
must be experienced, understood and articulated in a way that is 
understandable to the person with whom the researcher is empathising.  This 
is one way in which new knowledge can be gained.   
3.7.4.1 Everyday Experience 
Consider the person living in England who comes from a different culture.  
Whilst one cannot have immediate uneducated access to this person’s world-
view it is likely that with enough of the right kind of information this could be 
easily remedied.  Recently a client of mine from South Africa told me about 
her daily experience of fear of violence before moving to England.  Whilst this 
danger of violence existed for her throughout her formative years and some of 
her adult years she is no longer in the same kind of danger in this country.  
Her highly attuned attitude to personal safety and concern about loss of 
property seems strange to her (English) peers and they sense that she is 
over-reacting or perhaps ‘paranoid’ (in the folk psychological sense as 
opposed to the psychopathological sense).  It is straightforward (obvious 
even) that most people, with this history, background and upbringing, would 
have developed a degree of hyper-vigilance in relation to personal safety.  
One need only use one’s imagination to understand her position.  This applies 
to human experience in general and it is why we are able to use 
phenomenology to study the experience of others.  The way in which this 
person experiences her fear or hyper-vigilance can be understood 
subjectively to some extent by ‘feeling into’ her experience using empathy.  If 
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the empathiser then articulates this feeling this might count as new 
knowledge. 
This might fall into Jaspers ‘second’ kind of phenomenon (as mentioned 
above in section 3.7.3), i.e. an extreme version of an ordinarily 
‘understandable’ human trait.  It is true to say that one can never experience 
exactly what another experiences due to the complexity and diversity of the 
individual lived experience.  However, this does not mean that the subjective 
experience is closed to others.  In fact, given enough of the right kind of 
information about the other, it becomes obvious what her experience is like 
and what it might mean to her.  This is a very straightforward example of how 
one can use empathy to understand another. 
3.7.4.2 Bizarre or Anomalous Experience 
Although more challenging than this everyday example, one can extend the 
use of this method to understand much more complex and bizarre 
experiences.  I, like Jaspers, believe that this method can increase our 
understanding of anomalous mental experiences and the researcher can use 
this understanding to inform further research and therapeutic intervention.  
Jaspers denies that we can fully empathise with people who have anomalous 
experiences and describes them as un-understandable, yet he does think we 
can gain some knowledge of these experiences by paying careful attention to 
what people say and by using metaphor and analogy.  People often struggle 
to explain their peculiar experiences and find that they sometimes do not have 
the language to describe them.  They might persist in the struggle or they 
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might employ metaphor or analogy to try and get the experience across.33  I 
disagree with Jaspers and believe that we can, to some extend, ‘feel into’ 
bizarre and anomalous experiences.  What I mean here is that, whilst we 
might not be able to fully ‘feel into’ the anomalous experience of, for example, 
ideas of reference (where things in the environment stand out and seem 
personally important or salient), we might be able to imagine what it is like to 
experience things in the environment taking on an unusual significance or 
importance that can be overwhelming and that demands explanation.  A 
significance that draws a person in and that cannot be accounted for by 
recourse to ordinary language or everyday experience.  We might be able to 
use our imagination to get some sense of what it might be like to feel other 
intense, peculiar or anomalous experiences given the right kind of descriptive 
or metaphorical information.  Further, I suggest that, whether it is truly 
possible or not the attempt should still be made.  We cannot hope to gain 
knowledge about a person’s experience unless we attempt to do so 
employing the tools available to us.  This should include an attempt to 
empathise. 
In uncovering the meaning and nature of a person’s experience we transcend 
the ‘subjective’ and embrace the phenomenal.  The meaning, explanation, 
and nature of the experience of the other is a public process which involves 
language.  This is not the same as the subjective experience (which is not 
possible using this method).  Instead we have the best communicable 
approximation about what it is like to experience what another has 
                                            
33 We see examples of this in chapter 4. 
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experienced.  The potential to understand all human experience can be 
conceptualised in this way.  This would even be true in the case of, say, the 
psychopath.  If we take the metaphors seriously that the psychopath uses to 
describe herself in the world, for example that she is a predator and others 
are prey or that she is a cat in a world of mice (Hare, 1999) we can 
understand that she does not empathise with others (that is, does not have 
fellow-feeling for other human beings and cannot feel into the experience of 
other human beings, they do not even seem to her to be the same species as 
she is) then her goal seeking behaviour, devoid of consideration of other 
human beings becomes understandable.  Again, whilst it is difficult to 
understand, we can use our imagination about what it might be like to simply 
not see other people as being like us, and the difference that this might make 
to our lived experience.  The attempt to gain an objective understanding of the 
other can only be achieved by taking her description of her experience 
seriously.  I suggest that this is essential when trying to understand the 
human condition in general as well as those in psychological distress and 
those who have diagnoses of various mental illnesses. 
3.7.5 Philosophical and Psychological Phenomenology 
Philosophical phenomenology is usually associated with such aspects as 
agency, ownership, embodiment, temporality, spatiality, intentionality and self-
awareness.  Psychological phenomenological enquiry usually concerns itself 
with thoughts, emotions and meaning.  I suggest that a full understanding of a 
person’s experience must include both philosophical and psychological 
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phenomenology.  Jaspers would agree with this (although he uses different 
terminology).  Further, in the pursuit of understanding the more anomalous 
experiences one might employ Jaspers’ empathic method (as described 
above) in an attempt at ‘gasping’ a person’s metaphorical or analogous 
explanations in ways that give us a greater understanding of the altered 
structure of her experience 
Phenomenological enquiry relating to the structure of experience (or, in 
Jaspers’ terms the form of the experience) can give us information that 
informs neuroscience.  If one wants to understand the ways in which brain 
processes are altered in relation to anomalous experiences associated with 
mental illnesses one needs to understand what the anomalous experiences 
are.  The structures of experience exposed by this kind of enquiry might tell us 
something important about the experience of the components of background 
reality that we take for granted.  As Matthew Ratcliffe notes in his article on 
the indispensability of phenomenology first person description often tells us 
something important about the structure of experience.  For example features 
such as a sense of loss of practical possibilities or potential in people with 
depression might be closely associated with alterations in the experience of 
time.  A pervading feeling of dread or anxiety might be described as an 
alteration in a background sense of belonging to the world, so too might a 
sense of fading, ghostliness or even the sense that one might be dead.  The 
sense of alienation from one’s body or of intense physical pain throughout 
one’s body might best be described as an alteration in the (ordinarily) ‘given’ 
nature of embodiment (Ratcliffe, 2009).  In the experience of delusions in 
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general a transformation of the total awareness of reality is implied (Jaspers, 
1997).  For example, in the delusion of thought insertion34 the experience 
might be described as an alteration in the experience of agency and 
ownership of thought (Bortolotti and Broome, 2009; Gunn, 2016b).  In the 
experience of schizophrenia a pervading sense of disconnection from the 
world might be described as an alteration in one’s sense of self (Parnas and 
Sass, 2001).  In the Cotard delusion a person who says he is dead might be 
described as having an altered sense of relationship to his body (Gerrans, 
2002).  I do not mean to endorse any of these notions - I am agnostic in this 
regard.  I merely mean to point out that a phenomenological enquiry into the 
structure of an experience (or what Jaspers’ would call the form of an 
experience) might yield important information that can inform neuroscience 
and therapeutic intervention.  I suggest that these kinds of experiences are 
those that Jaspers would describe as inaccessible through empathic 
understanding (because they are not ordinary (more typical) human 
experiences) and can only be better understood (although never fully 
grasped) through metaphor and analogy (Jaspers, 1968).  Whilst I agree with 
Jaspers that metaphor and analogy are required when exploring these 
experiences I am not sure that I agree that we cannot empathise as part of a 
shared understanding of the experience.  Identifying changes in the structure 
of experience is just part of what is required to understand what it is like for a 
person who has a mental illness and we can use our imaginations to ‘grasp’ 
                                            
34 I say more about this in chapter 5, section 5.4.4 
	 98	
what this might be like.  Other psychological, social and environmental factors 
are also needed to obtain a fully filled out picture of the person’s experience. 
I suggest a change is needed.  A broader phenomenological approach is 
required if we are to truly understand what the experience of another is like.  
This in turn can lead us to better neuroscience and differentiated therapeutic 
intervention.  To this end I suggest that we employ multiple methods 
embracing philosophical and psychological phenomenology when we analyse 
first-person description.   
3.8. Summary 
Phenomenological enquiry has declined in the last century and this may be 
thwarting research and the possibilities for therapeutic intervention as well as 
doing an injustice35 to the patient who has knowledge of her experience that 
does not readily fit into current signs and symptoms checklist. 
I suggest that we can and should attempt to account for all the elements of 
the delusional experience using Jaspers’ phenomenology: its form (or 
structure), content and meaningfulness, the causal connections which include 
understanding and explanation and the objective and subjective features of 
the experience.   We should, like Jaspers, distinguish between the genetic 
understanding (how the delusion formed) and static understanding (what the 
experience is like once formed) and we should use all the tools available to us 
including empathy. 
                                            
35 I say more about this in chapter 4, section 4.4.1 
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Whilst some experiences are outside ordinary (more typical or given) human 
experience we should not assume meaninglessness (although it is possible 
that it might turn out to be the case that some aspects of delusion are, in 
some sense, meaningless).  Human experience is never meaningless and a 
person’s interpretation of anomalous or bizarre events must form part of our 
understanding of the overall experience. 
In the next chapter I explore, among other things, meaningful aspects of the 
delusion experience using original research where I interview people who 
have clinically significant delusions. 
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CHAPTER 4 - INTERVIEWS 
______________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Introduction 
I am interested in the phenomenology of lived experience because, as I have 
argued in chapter 3, a full phenomenology is the best way to capture all the 
relevant factors that make up experience.  My epistemological stance is that I 
assume that people are meaning-making or sense-making beings and this fits 
with those assumptions as explicated in Chapter 7 in relation to the Enactive 
Approach.  Further, I assume that one of the ways that people make sense of 
the world is through stories or narratives.  To this end, I have chosen research 
methodologies that enable a focus on story and on meaning.  I am particularly 
interested in ‘what it is like’ for people who acquire psychiatric diagnoses to 
live through this experience and for the purposes of this thesis I am focussing 
on the experiences of those who have active delusions.  Philosophical texts 
rely on oft repeated de-contextualised quotes from psychiatric texts and 
articles (e.g.: Jaspers, 1997; Mellor, 1970) and on highly detailed first-person 
descriptions from philosophically minded writers (e.g.: Schreber, 2000).  
There are autobiographies written by people who have experienced mental 
illness (e.g.: Cockburn and Cockburn, 2012; Jamison, 2011) but there is little 
symptom-specific qualitative data available in the literature.  My purpose in 
embarking on these interviews was to attempt to understand people’s 
experiences in context and add to the literature on what it might be like to live 
through these experiences.   
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In section 4.2 I describe my research methodology for this study as well as 
problems that I encountered and the limitations of this research.  In section 
4.3 I report, summarise, and interpret my empirical findings and in section 4.4 
I comment on some of the implications. 
4.2 Empirical Research 
People negotiate the world based on their experience of how their world 
works.  A person is born into a family with particular relationships within that 
family and that family lives within a relatively circumscribed culture.  A person 
might move through different cultures or sub-cultures as she develops and 
finds her place in the world.  Her family environment might change too 
especially as we have more ‘blended’ families (i.e.: step-parents, step-siblings 
and others) as a result of increased divorces.  We are relatively good at 
adapting to our environment and it is evolutionarily desirable that we are able 
to do this in order to survive and to procreate36.   Neuroplasticity enables us to 
learn new skills and thus survive in a changing environment (Costandi, 2016).  
The difference between the lived experience of a hunter-gatherer in the 
Amazon Rainforest and an investment banker in the City of London highlights 
how flexible human beings are. 
However, there might be circumstances under which an alteration in a 
person’s lived experience is so radical or distressing that rapid adjustment is 
                                            
36 For a survey of ideas relating to human diversity in terms of psychological, 
behavioural, ecological and evolutionary adaptability see Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences (Brown et al., 2011 and its companion 
articles). 
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not possible.  At this point a person might be unable to cope with her lived 
experience.  This might lead to despair, depression or even suicide.  A person 
might require a new explanation of how the world works in order to make 
sense of her experience. 
Karl Jaspers distinguishes delusion proper from delusion-like ideas, the 
former being psychologically un-understandable and the latter being 
psychologically understandable.  According to Jaspers (and other 
psychiatrists of his day) the un-understandable delusions (as well as other 
problems that are grouped within the psychoses) are likely, to have a 
biological aetiology which has yet to be discovered (Jaspers, 1997, p.607).  
This is a dualism of sorts.  People are biological organisms and mental activity 
is experienced at person level thus mental activity is both biological and 
psychological.  If we confine our attention to biological aetiology we might fail 
to capture other important factors that help us understand delusion and other 
psychiatric symptoms.  When things go wrong and someone becomes 
mentally ill there are many factors that might contribute to this as we will see 
in what follows. 
Using original research where people who have clinically significant delusions 
are interviewed we can see how a radical alteration in lived experience shows 
a trajectory that leads to the forming of new explanations about the world via 
intense affective, perceptual and emotional experiences, 
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4.2.1 Methodology 
4.2.1.1 Approach 
Whilst, in an ideal world, open-ended interviews engaging in in-depth detailed 
phenomenological enquiry (as described in Chapter 3 above) would have 
provided the ‘filled out’ and detailed kind of information that I am seeking, this 
was not possible given time constraints and NHS ethical and practical 
considerations.  Ultimately, to facilitate my enquiry, I planned to interview, 
record and transcribe the experiences of up to ten people with active 
delusions and analyse the transcriptions using Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  IPA has its origins in phenomenology and 
as such, at least to some extent, fits with an attempt to capture experience as 
I have described in Chapter 3.  Smith and colleagues use Heidegger’s notion 
of appearing and liken interpretation to a kind of detective work where the 
researcher is mining the material for possible meanings thus allowing the 
phenomenon of interest to shine forth (Smith et al., 2009, p.35).  The double 
hermeneutic means that the researcher is always trying to make sense of the 
participant trying to make sense of what is happening to her within the context 
of her lifeworld as an embodied, situated person.  In this way interpretation 
and understanding involves a synthesis of both the research participants’ 
sense-making and the researcher’s sense-making.  This involves deep 
engagement and navigation through different layers of interpretation.  The 
double hermeneutic is invoked here - interpretative layers arise out of the dual 
interpretative engagement of empathy and suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970).  When 
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engaging with IPA, these two hermeneutics are employed to encourage a 
both/and approach on the part of the researcher.  On the one hand to assume 
an empathic stance and imagine what it is like to be the participant and, at the 
same time, to be critical and probing in ways in which participants might be 
unwilling or unable to engage with themselves.  IPA thus aims to produce rich 
experiential understandings of the phenomenon under investigation whilst 
remaining close to the participant’s sense-making.  At the same time the 
researcher can put aside what has been accepted at face value in order to 
develop a narrative of other possible meanings and still retain the primacy or 
privileging of each participant’s material (Eatough and Smith, 2008).  This is in 
contrast to other qualitative methods such as ethnography, thematic analysis 
and grounded theory which do not specifically employ the double hermeneutic 
in this way (Howitt, 2016). 
IPA aims at understanding the experience of a particular person in a particular 
context in terms of the meaning that her experience holds for her.  It is a 
qualitative method, where in-depth interviews are undertaken, and is designed 
to be used for small numbers of participants – typically between 4 and 10 
people.  Each interview is analysed to identify themes and common themes 
shared across the group are identified (Smith et al., 2009).  IPA has also been 
shown to be a fruitful way of illuminating a person’s situated, embodied 
meaning-making experience and is thus compatible with the enactive 
approach to cognition37 (Larkin et al., 2011).  IPA is also compatible with a 
narrative analysis.  Narrative is a way in which we can understand life 
                                            
37 I will say more about this in chapter 7. 
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experience over time, the meaning it holds for the storyteller and how she 
sees herself within the narrative (Smith et al., 2009).  In addition, people tend 
to describe experience in terms of narrative, whether we ask them to or not, 
and this was the case with all my research participants.  I had not grasped this 
when I wrote my research protocol.  However, on gathering the data, a need 
for a degree of narrative analysis became obvious38.  
4.2.1.2 Context 
I hoped to find appropriate research participants through local National Health 
Services (NHS) trusts.  In order to achieve this I relied on introductions to 
potential participants from NHS collaborators.  A detailed research protocol 
and protocol summary flow chart (see appendix 1) was written and submitted 
for National Health Service (NHS) Ethical approval and for NHS Research 
and Development (R&D) approval via the Integrated Research Application 
System (IRAS).  On completion of the approval process I was issued with a 
letter of authority enabling me to work on NHS premises. 
4.2.1.3 Recruitment Strategy 
I was introduced to various healthcare workers (via my named NHS 
collaborators), I explained the research to them and provided them with the 
document ‘Information for Keyworkers’ (see appendix 2).  NHS staff were 
advised of the inclusion and exclusion criteria for potential participants. 
The inclusion criteria were as follows, a participant must: 
                                            
38 I will say more about this in my analysis section (this chapter, section 4.2.4) 
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• be a service user within local mental health services 
• have active delusion(s) 
• be able to give informed consent to participate in the study 
• be able to talk about their experiences 
• be at minimal risk (of distress) when talking about their experiences 
• be able to speak English (no translator is provided) 
• be willing to travel to a suitable location to participate in the interview 
The exclusion criteria were as follows, a participant will be excluded if: 
• the lead healthcare professional believes he/she would be at risk (of 
severe distress or suicide) by participating 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant 
represents a risk to the interviewer 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant is unable 
to give informed consent to participate in the study 
NHS staff were given the ‘Invitation to Participate’ document (see appendix 3) 
which they were asked to give to potential participants.  Once introduced to a 
potential participant I explained the research to him or her, provided a 
‘Participant Information Sheet’ (see appendix 4) and checked that they 
understood what I had told them and that they had the capacity to make an 
informed decision using the ‘Mental Capacity Act Tool Kit’ (Medical Ethics 
Department, British Medical Association, 2008).  Capacity was subsequently 
checked on each occasion that I met with each potential participant.  If he or 
she expressed an interest in participating we either went through the 
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Participant Information Sheet there and then or made an appointment to go 
through the sheet at a later date. 
Once we had discussed the Participant Information Sheet, if the potential 
participant was still interested in doing the research I checked that they had 
understood everything and they completed and signed a consent form (see 
appendix 5) which specified what the research included and how the data 
would be used.  Forty-eight hours later I contacted the potential participant to 
see if he or she still wanted to participate.  If they agreed then an appointment 
was made to conduct the first interview and a letter was sent (appendix 6) to 
their consultant psychiatrist confirming that they had agreed to participate in 
the research.   
4.2.2 Participants 
Two people discussed the research with me and declined to participate at the 
initial discussion.  Four people discussed the research with me, agreed to 
participate in principle and then declined to participate for various reasons 
when I next made contact with them. 
Four people (one man and three women) agreed to participate and were 
interviewed for this research.  Two were recruited via a psychiatric outpatient 
clinic and two were recruited from a psychiatric day hospital.  All four identified 
as white British.  Three out of four lived alone and one lived with her husband.  
Three were unemployed and one was retired.  All of them had unstable or 
changing diagnoses or no diagnosis at all.  Their ages ranged between 25 
and 65 and all but one had been using NHS mental health services for a few 
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years.  One had been using NHS mental health services for just 3 months.  All 
of them described experiencing psychological distress before the onset of 
their delusional experiences.  None of them sought help at the initial ‘distress’ 
phase.  All of them said that they had told me things they had not told their 
psychiatrist or support worker (if they had one).  As I have said (in chapter 3, 
section 3.6) I suspect this relates to the way psychiatric assessment is 
structured which focuses on symptom identification and on risk assessment, 
as well as time constraints when interviews take place.  I also speculate that 
patients fear the consequences (in terms of increased medication and 
detention) of ‘admitting’ to the strangeness or worrying nature of their 
experience.  
4.2.3 Data Collection 
This is qualitative research and the emphasis is on what a person’s lived 
experience was like during the lead-up to and onset of the problems 
experienced in relation to her contact with mental health services. Each 
participant was interviewed twice for approximately one hour on each 
occasion using semi-structured interviews (see appendix 8)39.  In the first 
interview the participants were asked about their history and the onset of their 
problems.  In the second interview participants were asked what their 
experience was like at the time of being interviewed.  In practice the 
interviews were free-flowing with the participant describing their experiences 
                                            
39  A short demographic questionnaire was also completed from data 
spontaneously supplied during the interviews.  At the end of the final interview 
gaps were filled by asking the questions that were not covered (see appendix 
7).   
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in whatever way came to them.  The focus was on what was important to the 
participant.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed.  Transcripts are 
not included in this thesis in order to retain participant confidentiality.  This 
approach (using open questions, encouraging the participant to talk about 
what was important or relevant to her and recording and transcribing the 
whole of a research participant’s interview) is designed to enable bracketing 
of assumptions about what I (the researcher) might understand about the 
experience of delusion, thus emphasising what is important to the research 
participant (Smith et al., 2009).   
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
My data analysis was influenced by IPA as this aims at understanding what 
experience means to an individual and aims at identifying themes across 
different people’s experience.  In the first instance I analysed the findings with 
a view to establishing chronology and along narrative lines in order to try to 
grasp context and trajectory (some of the transcripts were difficult to follow as 
I discuss in section 4.2.5).  What I mean here is that, in order to undertake 
any kind of analysis, I must first take the whole or a person’s story seriously, 
and I do not ignore or dismiss anything as irrelevant.  Telling stories is a 
significant way in which individuals construct and express meaning which 
develops naturally in children without explicit instruction or training.  
Narratives enable internally consistent interpretation of how we understand 
the past, how we experience the present and how we anticipate the future.  
They are of special importance as a mode through which individuals express 
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their understanding of events and experiences.  If storytelling and story 
comprehension are natural and pervasive modes of communicating meaning 
we must take the whole story (or narrative) seriously and must not suppress 
parts of a person’s response to a research question as irrelevant.  If 
everything that a respondent says is relevant to and has a place in the story 
then it is incumbent on the researcher to determine how the story fits together 
(Mishler, 1986).  As Christine Stephens and Mary Breheny put it: 
“…narrative is a pervasive structure with which we convey and 
comprehend the experiences and meanings of events, account for our 
own and others’ behaviour, or reveal ourselves to others in the way in 
which we would like to be seen.  In doing so, we also reveal something 
of the structure of our social world.” (Stephens and Breheny, 2013, 
p.14). 
Narrative stories shape identity, guide action, and constitute our mode of 
being. Narrative psychology, takes seriously the view that a person is a 
storytelling animal and engages with the move toward selves and identities as 
active and interpretatively constituted through embodied narratives.  Narrative 
enables the researcher to engage with the question of how the story and 
social reality is constructed and with the substantive elements and 
organisation of the narrative: its plot, characters, and content - thus 
emphasising the what questions (Smith and Sparkes, 2006). 
Narratives can be described as the organizing principle for all human action 
and are generally understood as stories that order events across time, enable 
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us to come to make sense of the storyteller’s social world and account for 
events in ways that give meaning to the experiences of that story teller.  
Stories might also define or constitute a person’s social identity and explain 
and enable moral decision-making.  Thus narrative provides an important 
basis for the analysis of qualitative data and, whether we ask them to or not, 
participants in qualitative research interviews often shape their accounts as 
stories.  If we are to interpret these accounts, it is helpful to attend to these 
narratives: stories are not distractions from important information about 
experiences.  Stories themselves are important information (Stephens and 
Breheny, 2013). 
My research relates to lived experience and a person’s narrative is vital in this 
endeavour.  I am also interested in what makes a delusion problematic (as 
compared with everyday mistakes/false beliefs held with conviction) and what 
differentiates it from other psychiatric symptoms.  In order to try and 
understand what might be problematic about the experience I then analysed 
the data to identify themes using IPA whilst still taking the whole story 
(narrative) seriously.  In this way I made sure that I did not exclude elements 
of the narrative (such as those that did not directly answer specific questions 
about delusion).  In short, I aim to understand both the experience of the 
delusion and the meaning it holds as well as the context (in narrative terms) in 
which the delusion arises.  I also analysed the data to try and understand 
something about the form or structure of anomalous self-experience.  I did not 
ask formal questions about the structure of experience in these interviews 
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nevertheless I was able to glean some information about what these 
experiences were like as the interviews unfolded.40 
Data was analysed recursively for each participant and across the different 
participants (see figure 1).  The process of analysis involved listening to the 
data a number of times to familiarise myself with the material, transcribing the 
data and anonymising it where appropriate (eg: changing street names and 
family names).  I then read each transcript a number of times and highlighted 
themes within the individual transcript.  I produced a table of descriptive, 
linguistic and conceptual themes with references to quotes on the transcript 
that illustrated the themes and then performed the same task for each of the 
transcripts.  Once I had completed this first level of analysis I identified 
themes that were common across the different research participants.  These 
themes were highlighted on the tables already produced.  I then checked the 
credibility of these themes by referring back to supporting quotes within the 
transcripts.  credibility was sought from my PhD supervisors through providing 
them with the full transcript data and my initial (and ongoing) analysis of 
themes.  This process (repeated listening, transcribing, repeated reading of 
transcripts, annotation and tabling of themes, checking, re-checking and 
seeking credibility with a third party) is designed to enable bracketing of my 
(the researcher’s) biases and assumptions (Smith et al., 2009). 
 
                                            
40 Specific anomalies relating to self-experience have been identified by Josef 
Parnas and colleagues and a detailed questionnaire (Examination of 
Anomalous Self-Experience - EASE) has been developed to research how 
these experiences relate to different diagnoses (Parnas et al., 2005) 
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Figure 1 – Interview Data Analysis 
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There were only four research participants and they have all had different 
experiences.  As discussed (above) narrative trajectory is vital as it gives 
context and shows how things develop over time so I have analysed the data 
in narrative terms as well as using IPA to identify themes.  
I was struck by the fact that all the people interviewed were coping with 
radical changes to their lived experience.  These included radical 
environmental changes and unusual or anomalous intense and persistent 
perceptual, affective and emotional, experiences. I have identified some 
themes and come up with two.   In section 4.3 I will focus on the broad 
themes of coping with radical change and guilt, justice and doing the right 
thing as these are, to some extent, common across all four narratives. 
4.2.5 Reflections, Problems and Limitations 
4.2.5.1 Protocol and Collaborators 
Writing the research protocol, identifying research collaborators and getting 
ethical approval and R&D approval took much longer than expected.  Two 
colleagues of one of the collaborators each identified a potential participant.  
Towards the end of the formal research period one research collaborator left 
the area and I then identified a new collaborator.  The new collaborator 
enabled access to a psychiatric day hospital and two more research 
participants were identified.  This was only possible because I was able to 
extend the formal research period (and my honorary NHS letter of access) by 
3 months. 
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Identifying possible methods for analysis was problematic because, at the 
time of submitting my research proposal (which documents the methodology 
to be used) I was hoping to get up to ten research participants.  I chose a 
method of analysis (IPA) based on very little knowledge about the various 
methods available and on an assumption that, with ten research participants, 
themes would be revealed.  In the end I only recruited and interviewed four 
participants.  Despite this difficulty I did manage to identify two broad themes 
that applied, to some extent, to all participants. 
4.2.5.2 Eliciting Responses 
Eliciting responses to specific questions was problematic.  On the one hand it 
seemed important to let the interviews unfold and at the same time I wanted 
to know about the delusional experience. 
One research participant (Andrew) did not tell me anything about his 
delusional experience until the second interview and had to be heavily 
prompted to do so at all.  Andrew also spoke continually and was focussed on 
describing what he thought was going on in his work place and how he 
thought the world should be (which was obviously very important to him) and 
found it difficult to talk directly about his own experience.  Another participant 
(Caroline) found it difficult to describe her experiences at all and there were 
some long silences where I tried to rephrase things to try to be better 
understood and to prompt her to continue. 
At times I found it very difficult to ask questions and felt that what I was asking 
for was not relevant to the participant or was something that they were only 
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thinking about because I was asking about it.  This might mean that some of 
the things that the participants said had little to do with their experience and 
simply served to fill a gap when prompted to answer. 
Some of the interviews were difficult to follow (Alison in particular) and context 
and narrative trajectory were hard to understand.  As context is vital to an 
understanding of the onset of symptoms this proved quite difficult to untangle 
and there are gaps in the narrative which only came to light after the full 
interviews had been listened to a number of times and the full transcripts had 
been written up and analysed with a view to chronology.  As I was unable to 
go back to research participants to ask questions to fill the gaps (due to the 
limitations of my research protocol) these gaps remain unfilled. 
4.2.5.3 Lost Data 
Due to problems with the recording device one interview (Barbara) was cut 
short and another interview (Andrew) was lost.  I explained the situation to 
Barbara at our next meeting and she agreed to cover some of the missing 
material again.  This meant that, overall, there was less time (approximately 1 
hour and 40 minutes) recorded with Barbara than with others.  I explained the 
situation to Andrew and he volunteered to re-do the first interview.  As a 
result, due to shortage of time, I undertook Andrew’s second interview a day 
later and had little time to reflect on the first interview and identify gaps or 
unanswered question.   
	 117	
4.2.5.4 Credibility 
As stated above (section 4.2.4) credibility checking was sought from my PhD 
supervisors through providing them with the full transcript data and my initial 
(and ongoing) analysis of themes.  I was somewhat limited with regard to 
additional verification as my research protocol did not include sharing the full 
data with a wider audience.  I did not specify or recruit other researchers to 
help me in checking the credibility of my analysis and, in practice, I do not 
think I would have had time to include these additional steps given the time 
taken to achieve NHS agreement and the difficulty I had in recruiting 
participants in the first place.  IPA as an approach is supportive of 
triangulation approaches to credibility checking, but cautious about erasing 
the analyst’s insights through over commitment to multiple forms of such 
checking, and critical of ascribing value to these checks (Smith et al., 2009).  
From an IPA perspective, such checks do not validate the analytic findings, 
but they do provide useful feedback on its development.  
4.2.5.5 Other Limitations 
Different people have different degrees of ‘psychological mindedness.’  The 
degree to which each person was able to introspect was variable and it was 
clear that some of my questions did not really make sense to some 
participants.  This, in itself, is interesting as it shows that some people simply 
do not have the kind of self-narrative that philosophers, psychologists and 
others rely on to explain or understand symptoms and psychological distress. 
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Some of the experiences were highly unusual and therefore very difficult to 
describe.  This was recognised by the research participants who did not 
expect me to understand what had happened to them because I had not been 
through what they had been through and they would not have believed it had 
it not happened to them. 
4.2.5.6 Interviewer Stance 
I am interested in the history of psychiatry and, as I have argued in Chapter 3, 
detailed phenomenological analysis of a person’s experience (which might 
include such features as those highlighted by Jaspers phenomenological 
method) can enrich our understanding of experience.  I am trained as a 
person-centred therapist and, as such, am used to paying close attention to 
what people are saying.  My usual way of engaging with people in therapy 
relates to trying to ‘put myself in the shoes’ of the other and includes empathic 
engagement.  I found the research interviews difficult and often felt cold, 
detached and disingenuous.  I was aware that I had to censor myself and 
move on with the interview.  I did not always achieve this and occasionally 
found myself responding as I might have done in a therapeutic situation. 
I am aware that I have a preference for taking things at face value.  I tend to 
assume that what someone tells me is true and I suspect that I would grant 
that there is much more truth in the narrative relating to a delusional schema 
than others might.  For example, in the case of Alison, who had a number of 
problems with various neighbours I assumed that what she said to me was 
true with the exception of those things that seemed implausible (eg: that the 
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local council had a machine that could read people’s fingerprints on the 
leaves of garden plants and her neighbour was using this machine to prove 
that Alison had been in her garden).  I am aware that her husband disbelieved 
most things that she said had happened in relation to the neighbours but I am 
inclined to believe them unless there is a very good reason not to.  This, of 
course, affects my interpretation of the situation.  If I am right then she was 
persecuted by her neighbours and this eventually contributed to her becoming 
ill.  If her husband is right, then she had persecutory delusions for a long time 
with no basis in reality. 
There is evidence that mental health professionals are biased in the opposite 
way assuming that, once a person acquires a psychiatric diagnosis, her 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour all relate to that illness.  In the classic 1970s 
experiment researchers who told healthcare professionals that they 
experienced one symptom of a mental illness and were admitted to hospital, 
were kept in hospital and their behaviours were documented as being part of 
the illness even though they behaved normally (Rosenhan, 1974).  I have 
witnessed this kind of bias directly when a client of mine was ignored when 
she tried to alert the local authority to a fraud in relation to building works on 
her council property.  She sued the authority and gained access to records 
that had been kept about the numerous phonecalls she had made and letters 
she had sent in which she found that they had assumed she was ‘making 
things up’ or ‘delusional’ because she had a mental health problem.  (She 
exposed the fraudulent building company, their contract with her local 
authority was terminated and they were prosecuted for fraud).  As I have 
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argued in chapter 3, there is good reason to take a person’s experience 
seriously thereby doing justice to the knowledge that they have about 
themselves and their experience. 
Once I had analysed the data and whilst undertaking further research on the 
enactive approach I came across the idea (as espoused by Michelle Maiese) 
that some features of mental illness (and perhaps mental illness as a whole) 
might be described as resultant from attenuated affective framing.  This 
seemed to be a plausible fit with my research findings and I explore this 
further in Chapter 8. 
In the next section I summarise my empirical finding in terms of meaning and 
sense making in relation to the themes identified 1) guilt, justice and doing the 
right thing and 2) coping with change – a radical alteration in lived experience. 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
What follows represents just one way in which the data can be summarised 
and interpreted.  In section 4.3.1 I describe the lived experience of Barbara, 
Alison, Andrew and Caroline prior to the onset of their delusion.  Quotes are 
used to illustrate the themes of guilt, justice and doing the right thing (section 
4.3.2) and coping with radical changes in lived experience (section 4.3.3) and 
to illustrate how they each re-interpret their new world (section 4.3.4).   
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4.3.1 Participants’ Lived Experience  
This qualitative research relies on the participant to tell his or her story in 
whatever way they choose.  An assumption that a person has said what they 
deem to be significant is made here.  Details about their lives before the onset 
of their delusions are, in some cases, particularly sparse yet it is possible to 
glean some information about what was important and meaningful to them 
and what they expected from life. 
One of the research participants, who I have called Barbara, was married to a 
man who was a serial adulterer.  He had already left or threatened to leave 
her on a number of occasions for other women.   She had been desperate for 
him to stay with her and he had done so each time.  Her marriage was 
extremely important to her and she had made decisions against her better 
judgement at her husband’s behest in order to prevent him from leaving.  
Barbara’s husband had afforded her some form of stability as, despite his 
liaisons with other women, she had believed that he would always ultimately 
return to her. 
Another research participant, Alison, had two young children when her 
husband committed suicide.  She worked as a legal secretary and had a keen 
interest in the law.  She subsequently re-married and had two more children 
with her new husband.  She continued to work because she enjoyed her job 
and she wanted to help support the family financially.  She retired after 
working for over thirty years.  She came across as a caring person and, 
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despite having some problems with her neighbours, she had looked after 
some of them and was involved with her community.  
Another participant, Andrew, joined a ‘job for life’ workplace at a young age.  
He was the office junior and was required to respond to the demands of a 
number of different people.  He was perhaps very naïve and had little 
experience of relationships outside the family.  He says a number of times 
while recounting his experiences ‘I didn’t know how the world worked.’  He 
bought a flat in his early 20s and moved out from the parental home to live on 
his own.  His father became ill and his mother became his Father’s carer.  
Andrew, who was very close to his parents, says he was ‘left alone to my own 
devices.’  He was fixated with work and had a strong desire to do well. 
Caroline grew up in a family where she was required to do what her older 
sister said or she would be threatened, hit or punished.  If she cried or 
showed she was upset her father would threaten her or hit her.  When she 
complained to her mother about her sister’s behaviour she said she would not 
help her and would say ‘I didn’t see it, what do you want me to do about it?’ 
(her sister was very careful not to get caught).  She says she learnt to ‘smile 
and just get on with it’ regardless of her situation.  Her Nan, who lived on the 
same street as she grew up on, was kind and they had a good relationship.  
Her Nan died when Caroline was in her late teens.  Caroline started a 
relationship with a woman when she was in her teens and some time later 
they moved in to a house together.  Caroline says that the relationship was 
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good to start with.  She had a good job that she liked and was also training to 
qualify for a better job in her chosen field.   
In the next section I illustrate experiences relating to the theme of guilt, justice 
and doing the right thing. 
4.3.2 Guilt, Justice and Doing the Right Thing 
Each person encountered injustice or guilt and felt that they must do 
something to redress the balance.  They must ‘do the right thing’ so that 
justice could be done. 
4.3.2.1 Barbara 
When Barbara’s husband finally left her she became extremely depressed, 
she says: 
“I was really depressed, really down, really miserable.  So I prayed as 
you do and I asked him to bring my husband back and I said no 
actually… I’ve asked that time and time again and it’s happened and I 
said I don’t want it.  I said if it’s not good for me I don’t want it.  I just 
want this pain to go away.  So… um… I’d already been through a bad 
time, took an overdose, everything and then all of a sudden… I felt better 
after I’d prayed.” (Barbara 1, 1:9-15)   
Barbara was desperate for the pain of this separation to go away.  She had 
been through this kind of emotional pain on a number of occasions and while 
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she was feeling this misery she took an overdose.  She did not elaborate on 
this in the interview and it is unclear whether she had taken overdoses before.   
Guilt about a personal decision she had made which she justified in order to 
keep her husband now comes to the surface.  Barbara experienced the 
injustice of this situation.  She had compromised her principles to keep her 
husband and he had ultimately left her anyway.  Later Barbara was 
overwhelmed by guilt and felt the need to atone.  The guilt seemed to be free 
floating or objectless at times and she connected it to other activities:  
“…and guiltiness, when I smoked and ate chocolate as soon as I’d done 
it I’d feel really really guilty, the guilt would like…  eat you up like you’ve 
done murder or something.  It was…  it felt really really guilty.” (Barbara 
1, 3:35-38) 
4.3.2.2 Alison 
Alison had problems on her street about four years prior to her interview.  A 
teenage neighbour regularly set fire to the bins near her house and she was 
obliged to call the fire service on a regular basis.  Alison subsequently moved 
away and went to live near another family member.  This relative was falsely 
accused of sexual assault.  Alison attended court every day.  She became 
stressed and started to have difficulty sleeping.  He was found guilty of the 
crime and subsequently jailed.  She describes it as follows, and is clearly 
disdainful of the decision: 
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“It was split, and the judge, it was a late Friday afternoon and the judge 
said well I’m locking you up for the weekend, you can go in there, I’m 
going to turn the key, I’m going home, he said, unless you can come 
back quickly with a ten two.  So they did.  And he was found guilty.  He 
did from the May til Christmas and obviously he’s got ten years now 
because you have ten years put on don’t you, at home.  He’s done three 
years.  But he didn’t do it.” (Alison 1, 3:10-16)   
She is horrified that, on this occasion, when her family member is relying on 
the law to prove that he is innocent the system has failed.  She finds this 
injustice difficult to understand. 
The injustices accrued for Alison.  She was falsely accused of crimes and 
reported to the police by a neighbour when she moved back to her home-
town.  The harassment from her neighbour was so distressing that she 
decided to move house.  Around this time she also found out she had a life-
threatening heart condition.  It is unclear exactly when this happened but at 
some point Alison started to think that the neighbour, the local council and the 
police were working together to prove that she was guilty of something.  
4.3.2.3 Andrew 
Andrew described his workplace as a ‘hellhole’.  He found it very difficult to 
talk about, resorting to analogy and generalisation.  He says: 
“It’s that awful I don’t even like talking about it but I will.  It’s that awful.  
You’ve seen the original ‘Planet of the Apes’… film, 1964 I think it is with 
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Charlton Heston… and you know how he’s treated during it? 41  
Management treat you the… similar to that.  That’s how it felt.” (Andrew 
1, 6:37-44) 
His whole idea of what the workplace should be like and how people should 
be treated is brought into question.  He sounds contemptuous when he says: 
“So when… managers have more power than the worker they misuse it.  
It’s human nature.  Absolute power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.  If you give people too much power they’ll misuse it.” (Andrew 
1, 7:7-10) 
“The overall manager of that department was hated, was despised.  Now 
the example she sets, what she does filter down.  The other managers 
copy what she does.  And they mis… they mistreat people.” (Andrew 1, 
7:16-19) 
“Because all you get is disrespect, indecency and it’s not the way that 
man… it’s not the way to treat people.” (Andrew 1, 8:22-24) 
I can only assume he has not experienced this kind of injustice before and he 
finds what he witnesses and experiences at work intolerable.  It is likely that 
he and (others) were being bullied at work.  Whilst he does not explicitly say 
so, it looks like he did not (and perhaps could not) contemplate finding 
another job.  He says, on a number of occasions ‘I’m not a quitter.’   
                                            
41 In the film ‘Planet of the Apes’ human beings are treated like animals, used 
for slave labour, kept in cages and experiments are done on them. 
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After his anomalous (delusional) experience Andrew felt he had become 
God’s messenger and could meter out God’s justice.  As God’s messenger he 
wrote an email condemning people and saying how he could right certain 
wrongs and sent this email to a wide variety of people.  He became very 
powerful in this experience and believed that what he had written in the email 
about certain people actually condemned those people to Hell: 
“…that condemns them… at the end of the day. What that shows to 
me… is that… heaven and hell… they’re off to hell.” (Andrew 2, 18:40-
45) 
If there was no justice or fairness in the workplace there was justice through 
God.  Andrew, as God’s messenger, could communicate about the injustice 
that was being done, could condemn those who perpetrated this injustice to 
Hell and could commit to participating in making sure that justice was done by 
‘doing all that is necessary.’42   
4.3.2.4 Caroline 
Caroline had, perhaps, experienced injustice all her life but because this was 
normalised she had developed coping strategies.  She is re-assaulted by this 
injustice in her new relationship, which was initially good, when her partner 
becomes psychologically and physically abusive and finds that her coping 
strategies no longer work.  Caroline lost a lot of weight, had trouble sleeping 
                                            
42 This is a quote from the film ‘Batman Returns’ (Andrew uses this quote a 
number of times and uses other ‘hero’ film analogies throughout the 
interviews). 
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and stopped eating properly.  She only recognises this with hindsight and was 
unaware of this as a ‘problem’ at the time.  She just ‘got on with it.’ 
Caroline felt that she was doing the right thing by staying with her abusive 
partner and ‘just getting on with it.’  When she started to experience ‘voices’ 
commanding her to behave in certain ways and threatening harm to her family 
if she did not comply she, again, thought she was doing the right thing by 
responding to the voices thus protecting her family. 
“… yeah, cos they threatened to hurt family and things like that, it was 
like I had to do these things to protect other people and… things like that 
so…” (Caroline 2, 6:4-6)  
4.3.2.5 Interim Summary 
Barbara felt the injustice of the breakdown of her marriage through no fault of 
her own as well as intense guilt over past decisions and a need to atone.  
Alison observed the injustice done to her family member when he was found 
guilty of a sexual offence that he had not committed.  She also experienced 
the injustice of being persecuted by various neighbours with no redress.  
Andrew experienced the injustice of being bullied in the workplace and felt 
that justice could be done if he became God’s messenger. Caroline 
experienced the injustice of being bullied and abused by her partner and also 
felt that she was protecting others by doing what her ‘voices’ commanded. 
Each had tried to do the right thing.  Barbara compromised her principles to 
try and keep her marriage and then tried to atone through talking to God and 
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denying herself food and cigarettes.  Alison supported her family member 
through his court case and tried to remain a good neighbour even when she 
was being treated badly.  Andrew decided to train in HR to try to improve the 
working environment for others and then sent an email to various people 
detailing how he would right various global and local wrongs.  Caroline stayed 
with her partner to prove that she could ‘just get on with it’ and did what her 
voices commanded to protect her family. 
In the next section I describe how these people re-interpret the world in terms 
of an attempt at meaning making as a response to the radical alteration of 
their lived experiences. 
4.3.3 Coping with Change - A Radical Alteration in Lived Experience 
Each person went through radical changes in experience which they found 
stressful and difficult to cope with. 
4.3.3.1 Barbara  
Barbara’s separation from her husband represents a significant alteration in 
Barbara’s lived experience.  Her marriage gave her meaning and, although 
her husband was unreliable he had always returned to her in the past thus 
affording a form of stability.   
Barbara suffered anguish and despair over the breakdown of her marriage.  
However, two weeks later she suddenly felt better.  Her depression and 
mental anguish disappeared and she was enjoying life.  At the time she was 
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relieved, pleased and happy but with hindsight she thought this was odd, she 
says: 
 “…but I didn’t realise that… the only reason I was feeling… so happy 
about being single after the… after that massive crash… nobody gets 
over a breakup in two weeks do they?... not if they really didn’t want it to 
break up.  But… uh… but because God was holding on to me… but I 
didn’t know that at the time.  I just thought… I’m an independent person, 
I can do this.” (Barbara 2, 19:45-48) 
Around this time Barbara started to get the sense that she was being watched 
and that songs on the radio were presenting important messages to her.  
These kinds of ‘uncanny’ experiences (Jaspers, 1997, p.97) or anomalous 
perceptual experiences (Kapur, 2003) are a common feature prior to delusion 
formation.  She did not seem distressed or worried, perhaps because she was 
feeling really good and really happy.  She did not even seem particularly 
puzzled although she did think it was ‘weird’ and found it difficult to explain.  
She assumed there was an explanation and that it might have had something 
to do with a new work colleague. 
“… I’d come home and I’d get the feeling I was being watched… and 
then the music started talking to me… I don’t know… I can’t explain that 
very well but I would… I would ask a question and it’d talk to me. And I 
thought this guy had something to do with it.  I thought he’d put set 
cameras up in my house and was watching me and… and using the 
radio station to talk to me.  It was really weird.” (Barbara 1, 1:28-33) 
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Then Barbara started getting messages in other ways in the environment, for 
example, through road signs.   Her attention was drawn to particular words 
and the amalgamation of these words gave her these new messages.  She 
says: 
 “…it’s how they change your mind… its how you see the messages… 
you look directly at the right one at the right time.” (Barbara 1, 3:2-4) 
Again, she found this very difficult to explain.  Certain words appeared salient, 
they stood out in the environment and her attention was drawn to them.  
4.3.3.2 Alison 
Alison’s experience with the police and the law constitutes a radical alteration 
in her lived experience.  She previously had positive experiences with the law, 
the police and authority (due to her job as a legal secretary and from personal 
experience) and she had faith in the police and the judicial system.   
After further problems with her neighbours (who falsely accused her of crimes 
and reported her to the police) Alison went to bed and stayed there for four 
months only getting up to go to doctor’s appointments and to see family when 
they called at the house.  She was probably depressed but this was 
undiagnosed.  Eventually she decided to go out (there was a family event she 
wanted to attend and a cardiology appointment she wanted to attend). 
Alison said she could hear other people having conversations (when those 
people were not present).  She also said she could hear people who were 
present but who did not look like they were ‘talking’ (they were not opening 
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their mouths) and she could communicate with others without ‘saying’ 
anything.  She has difficulty explaining this and, at times, is adamant that this 
was happening and at other times she questions the experience and wonders 
if it was ‘all in her head’.  She says: 
“I got the voices in my head… um… I felt that I could talk to people 
without moving my mouth, I could hear long distance conversations, but 
yeah sometimes I still do.  And sometimes I walk past people and I feel 
as though I know what they’re thinking.” (Alison 1, 3:46-49) 
“Well, no, that is true.  I could hear people’s thoughts.  And I used to go 
like this as I passed them [puts fingers in ears].  And D said to me one 
day what on earth are you doing and I said, nothing.  They’re having a 
conversation and I don’t want to hear it.” (Alison 2, 5:4-7)   
Alison incorporated this into her experience of the world.  She did not believe 
that people could have these kinds of ‘long distance conversations’ until it 
happened to her. 
4.3.3.3 Andrew 
After prolonged distress through bullying at work Andrew developed 
obsessional thoughts, checking behaviours and mild paranoia.  He was 
diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).  He says: 
“…I’ve got brain lock over urine, I can’t move or function without… 
thinking that I need to go to the toilet literally 24 hours so I needed to 
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take sleeping tablets to get to sleep… it was ridiculous.  It was very very 
frightening.” (Andrew 1, 1:14-21) 
“…and then it just got worse into total chaos, um… chaos and torture.” 
(Andrew 1, 1:38-39) 
This represents a radical alteration in Andrew’s lived experience.  Prior to this 
he lived with his parents and enjoyed a relatively stress free life.  Although he 
did not say so specifically it is unlikely that he had any serious problems 
negotiating relationships with, for example, school friends and others (he 
certainly does not mention any problems) and he had a good relationship with 
his parents.  He found that he was unable to negotiate the relationships at 
work and felt huge anxiety in this regard.  He became stressed and fearful 
about his job and had trouble sleeping.  He stopped looking after himself and 
lost a lot of weight.  He also became isolated prioritising work and study over 
friends and family.  He did not recognise this as a problem to start with.   
4.3.3.4 Caroline 
It is not clear how long it lasted but it appears that Caroline had a short period 
of respite.  She moved away from her sister and her father into a new 
relationship which was good to start with.  Some time later her ability to 
negotiate the world becomes radically altered.  Caroline’s relationship, which 
started off well, starts to break down.  Her partner begins to bully her and 
becomes verbally and physically aggressive.  With hindsight Caroline could 
see that she was unable to acknowledge her own emotions or express 
herself.  She was unaware of this at the time and she just put up with it as it 
	 134	
got worse.  She assumed that this abuse was ‘normal’ as she had 
experienced it from her sister and her father.  She says: 
“um… not that I would’ve realised at the time.  Now it’s a bit later and 
I’ve seen different things and talked to different people um… I never 
realised at the time I was in an abusive relationship… both mentally and 
physically.  So of course that’s not going to help your state of mental 
health sort of thing.  Um… but I guess I just didn’t realise it at the time, I 
didn’t… I just thought this is how it was, you just… did what she did to 
me sort of thing and... Some people do it and some people don’t and it 
was just normal to have people out there that did do them things…” 
(Caroline 1, 6:34-42) 
She was used to being able to shut off her emotions and put up with anything.  
She now finds she can no longer do this.  Caroline had a couple of incidents 
where she felt she couldn’t breathe.  She then had a number of panic attacks 
that she did not understand and sought help from her GP.  She was given 
beta-blockers.  At this stage she had no explanation for her behaviour.  She 
started to take overdoses of prescription medication and ended up in hospital 
a number of times.  She said that it sometimes felt like someone else was 
taking the tablets.  She could not say, at the time, why she was doing this.  
Her experience of herself as a robust person who could just get on with life is 
completely shattered. 
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4.3.3.5 Interim Summary 
Each person’s environment had altered in a number of ways.  Barbara’s 
marriage had broken down and she was experiencing the ‘uncanny’ sense 
that she was being watched and that objects in the environment afforded 
important messages for her.  Alison’s trust in the police, the law and authority 
had disappeared and she was experiencing her thoughts and imaginings as 
un-owned by her.  Andrew’s safe just world was altered by his experience of 
being bullied at work, he became fixated with work, experienced intrusive 
thoughts, developed checking rituals and felt compelled to send an email to 
redress the balance in this unjust world.  Caroline could no longer ‘just get on 
with it,’ she became panicky, took overdoses and started behaving oddly at 
the command of her ‘voices.’ 
Each person needed a new explanation of how the world worked to account 
for their experiences. 
4.3.4 Re-interpreting the world 
4.3.4.1 Barbara 
For Barbara, over time, what started out as ideas of reference evolved into 
delusions of reference holding specific meanings relating to her delusional 
schema43.  Later she noticed words on signs and song lyrics that seemed to 
                                            
43 An idea of reference is “The feeling that causal incidents and external 
events have a particular and unusual meaning that is specific to the person. 
An idea of reference is to be distinguished from a DELUSION OF 
REFERENCE, in which there is a belief that is held with delusional 
conviction.” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.823) 
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afford important messages from God.  It is unclear exactly when it started to 
happen but at some point she experienced God replying to her questions and 
prayers.  She says that God was talking to her directly ‘by telepathy.’  Barbara 
received a message from God about a decision she had made to keep her 
marriage.  When she received this message Barbara was overwhelmed by 
fear and guilt and the need to atone.  She began to deny herself food and 
tried to give up smoking.  Eventually she developed an elaborate schema in 
which she was God’s daughter, all other people were devils and were doomed 
to mortal lives, she could talk to God any time she wanted to and he would 
talk back to her, God loved her unconditionally and regularly told her positive 
things about herself44 and she would live forever in Heaven.   
Barbara was sectioned under the Mental Health Act and detained in hospital 
against her will.  When she arrived at the psychiatric hospital she was asked if 
she saw devils.  She replied that she could see them in the doctor’s eyes. 
Barbara’s new world included anomalous affective and perceptual 
experiences.  Things stood out in the environment in ways that were novel 
and hard for her to understand.  As time went on the environmental anomalies 
seemed to provide specific self-referential messages.  She tried to find an 
explanation and, at first thought it was something to do with a work colleague.  
When she realised this was not the case she continued to puzzle over these 
strange experiences.  Barbara also felt intense emotions (fear, love, anger 
and guilt) that seemed to be free floating and objectless at times.  She 
                                            
44 I return to this in chapter 6, section 6.2.1.3 
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sometimes attached these feelings to things in the environment but at the 
same time felt that the emotions did not relate to these things appropriately.  
Eventually she realised that her experiences could only be supernatural in 
origin.  When she first realised God was talking to her it was ‘really lovely.’  
This enabled her to make sense of her experiences and make new meaning 
in this new world.  The new world-view also enabled her to feel that she was 
loved and lovable, that she was intelligent, beautiful and important and was 
forgiven for past actions.  
4.3.4.2 Alison 
After months of persecution from her neighbour Alison moved house to get 
away from this abuse and found out that the old neighbour was friends with 
the new one. 
“The current neighbour that I’ve got, yeah my old neighbour, yeah they 
were best pals.  I though what have I done?  It sounds silly, it sounds far 
fetched but it’s totally, totally true.” (Alison 1, 4: 51-53) 
After this she takes to her bed and stays there for four months.  Alison’s worry 
about the neighbours was dismissed by her husband and he said it was ‘all in 
her head.’  When Alison first developed voice hearing (and related) 
experiences she thought she was going mad: 
“That’s when I first thought perhaps D’s right, perhaps I am ill.  And 
then… I just let things go on and things got worse.” (Alison 2, 6:51-52) 
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When asked about what happened when she could hear other people’s 
thoughts and communicate telepathically she says: 
“I think… all around two… three months ago say…  it all really started to 
kick off.  And… I don’t know why… because um… there is a drug you 
can have that can make you do that and whether I thought I’d had that 
drug, I don’t know.” (Alison 2, 29:34-37) 
“Well… well not now, but I mean at one stage I could do it at any time as 
I thought, yeah.”  (Alison 2, 29:41-42) 
“I’d just have a conversation with er… like… um… a police officer, you 
know, cos I thought oh he’s got the same drug [laughs].  So it’s just 
nonsense in my head.” (Alison 2, 29:47-49) 
This was a persistent experience and went on for a number of months.  If she 
was mis-identifying her own thoughts, fears, wishes and imaginings as 
external in some sense (either ‘voiced’ out loud or ‘picked up’ through 
telepathy) she required an explanation.  If she thought that these thoughts 
and voices were not her then she looked to the environment for an 
explanation.  Those who were around her, such as neighbours and visiting 
police, seemed likely candidates.  If she could pick up the thoughts of others 
then it seemed likely to her that they could pick up her thoughts.  This seemed 
to her to be true as what she experienced seemed like a conversation (using 
telepathy).  Alison’s new world incorporated these experiences.  She did not 
need to worry about ‘going mad’ because she was telepathic. 
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4.3.4.3 Andrew 
Andrew was taken over by God, wrote an email where he committed to 
righting some global wrongs and sent it to a large mailing list, called the police 
and called an ambulance.  He says that God spoke to him saying: 
“… ‘you need to take a massive leap of faith.  Trust in me. Trust in God 
and send this e-mail.  You are the only person who can do it. You are… 
a modern day Noah’. And what I did is…  I sent it to all the most powerful 
people I know, my mentors who are older, some of these people are HR 
directors, they’re doctors, world-renowned doctors one of them.  And I 
literally wrote… everything… that it felt I was commanded to by God.” 
(Andrew 2, 6:30-36) 
Andrew tried to describe the experience of becoming God’s messenger and 
found it incredibly difficult: 
“….all I know is what happened was is that I was… went on the floor, 
went on my… this was on my lounge floor, went on the floor and it just 
felt like evil was trying to turn me into its thing.” (Andrew 2, 5:9-12) 
“So it was like a power… it felt like a test from God… that’s what it felt 
like. Or the devil or whatever you want to call it, but I would say a test 
from God.” (Andrew 2, 5:38-44) 
It was a force that was so powerful I can’t even explain it to you.  
(Andrew 2, 11:49-50) 
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“I wouldn’t even be able to, it’s futile.” (Andrew 2, 12:1)  
 “The… the power cannot be described.  The only person who could be 
able to… is someone who’s been through it as well.” (Andrew 2, 12: 26-
27) 
Andrew felt that he now knew how the world worked. God was in charge.  
This might help to restore his previously held ideas about the world being just. 
This new world, in which he was God’s messenger, enabled him to make 
sense of being overwhelmed by an inexplicable power and make sense of the 
past ‘torture’ that he has endured. 
This allowed him to believe that God always had a plan for him and enabled 
resolution of the tension he felt about not being able to fully explain, 
understand or negotiate the world.  It restored a sense of power or agency 
that has been missing whilst he was suffering in the workplace and suffering 
due to his OCD and enabled him to make sense of his new world.  He says: 
 “…even whilst all the suffering I’d been through, like during it, I’d always 
thought that this was potentially God’s plan.  For me. (Andrew 2, 11:19-
21) 
“I’ve got a huge amount of courage.  I’ve always had that even as a 
child.  So if I am… a chosen God’s messenger it’s because of… 
because of courage predominantly.  Cos I do have the courage to do all 
that is necessary.” (Andrew 2, 13:45-48) 
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“…at the minute… I do… I think I’m one of God’s messengers, yeah I 
do” (Andrew 2, 21:6-7)  
4.3.4.4 Caroline 
Caroline’s world was radically altered.  She found she was behaving oddly, 
doing things she could not explain, having panic attacks and taking 
overdoses.  She says: 
“…it was just like it weren’t me… and… I’m there taking these pills and… 
it was like… I’m sat there and I’m looking at them… but is not me 
controlling my arm to take them.” (Caroline 1, 12:2-5) 
Caroline was asked by a clinician, after an occasion when she was 
hospitalised as result of taking an overdose, if she heard voices.   Although 
she didn’t really understand the question at the time, she came to the 
conclusion that she was hearing voices.  She had thought this was ‘normal’ 
and that others could hear what she could hear.  She didn’t suddenly notice 
voices, she just ‘grew into them.’  She described looking around for where the 
voices were coming from on some occasions, thinking there were speakers 
behind her somewhere, thinking there was a chip in her arm (put in by the 
government) and puzzling over how she was hearing what she was hearing.  
At the same time she also seemed to think it was normal in some sense.  She 
could not remember when it started and perhaps assumed that others also 
had these kinds of experiences.   
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“when… I realised other people couldn’t hear them, then went into ‘is it 
an implant?’ have the government already took me and put something 
inside me, um… and… yeah… I went through ‘have they got speakers 
all around me?’ ‘are they broadcasting from different places so when I 
move I just can’t see where the speaker is and that?’” (Caroline 2, 7:32-
36) 
“I… I went through speakers…  um… sort of… more… I think because 
I’m an electrician… just more electrical stuff [laughs]… so it’s someone 
put a speaker behind my head or… were… Broadcasting from 
somewhere where I couldn’t… get hold of…  I don’t know… I never…  I 
knew I had like… these thoughts there must be something there 
because I can hear it… but I never… I thought a little but not too hard 
about what it could be.” (Caroline 2, 5:18-24) 
Caroline took these experiences in her stride and incorporated them into her 
world-view.  She was not particularly worried about where the voices were 
coming from to start with and, although she does not explicitly say so, 
perhaps she did not even contemplate this until she was asked (by a clinician) 
if she heard voices: 
“…though I had the voices I was more focused on what they were saying 
and having to do these things than I was where they were coming from.” 
(Caroline 2, 5:40-42) 
With hindsight she said that taking overdoses must have been a way to get 
out of the relationship she was in because she did not think she could just 
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leave as she was too scared.   So she could not leave and she could not stay.  
She did not understand this at the time and was unable to express her 
emotions (she could not acknowledge that she was upset or afraid).  When 
asked about the impact her upbringing had on her she said: 
“I think in a way it stopped me from showing any emotion… if you 
weren’t happy and leading what they would class a normal life then 
that’s it you just… you’re strange or weird or something, I don’t know… 
but… yeah… you’ve got to smile and just get on with it.” (Caroline 1, 
8:17-25) 
Her ‘voices’ seemed to have a commanding nature which she did not 
question.  She simply incorporated them into her world as real and felt 
compelled to do what they commanded.  Sometimes she would resist but the 
voice would persist and the threat would increase until she did what she was 
told.  There are obvious parallels between this and her sister’s behaviour (‘do 
this or I’ll hit you’), her father’s behaviour (‘don’t get upset or I’ll give you 
something to really be upset about’) and her partner’s threatening and 
abusive behaviour.   
Caroline started behaving oddly.  She was doing things that she felt her 
voices compelled her to do out of fear of reprisal.  She lost some friends as a 
result and attracted the attention of the police and mental health services.    
Eventually she was able to leave her abusive partner.  However, her fears of 
being hurt were not resolved.  She had shared finances with her ex-partner 
and negotiating resolution about this took over two years.  For most of this 
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time she lived in fear of reprisals.  Although she did not say so specifically I 
suspect that her living arrangements at this time were not ideal as she had 
moved back in with her father.  She did say that there were some basic 
improvements – for example her father would regularly make meals for them 
to share (she had not been eating properly for some time prior to this). 
Caroline’s new world needed to incorporate a new experience of herself.  She 
was no longer a person who ‘just got on with it.’  She had had a number of 
panic attacks and taken a number of overdoses and she found this puzzling at 
the time.  On top of this voices were threatening her and commanding her to 
behave in odd ways.  These voices were incorporated into her lived 
experience and enabled her to make sense of what has been happening to 
her without the need to acknowledge difficult emotions which she may not 
have had the language for. 
4.3.5 Interim Summary 
Periods of stress, difficulties, trauma and injustice were followed by periods of 
poor self-care and despair or depression in each case.  A need to do the right 
thing, see justice done or atone for past behaviour was evident to some extent 
in the experience of each research participant.  They all experienced a radical 
alteration in lived experience which demanded a re-interpretation of the world. 
As the new worlds were interpreted meaning was sought and found in what 
might be described as delusional explanations.  The alteration in lived 
experience included intense and persistent affective, emotional and 
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perceptual changes and this might be a significant feature of the formation of 
clinically significant delusion.   
4.4 Implications and Discussion 
I suggest that the research analysed here has implications with regard to 
doing justice to the knowledge that people have about their own experiences 
(section 4.4.1), our understanding of people’s experience of delusion 
formation in general (section 4.4.2), stigma reduction (section 4.4.3) and 
therapeutic intervention and prevention of illness (section 4.4.4). 
4.4.1 Avoiding Epistemic Injustice 
There is evidence that minority groups and those perceived to be less 
powerful than others can be treated as if their evidence has less value than 
the evidence of others.  Miranda Fricker coined the phrase epistemic injustice 
to capture this phenomenon (Fricker, 2007).  Because those with mental 
health problems are often stereotyped as having cognitive deficits, being 
emotionally unstable, lacking capacity to make decisions and generally ‘not of 
sound mind’ there might be a tendency to deflate the epistemic value of their 
testimonies and defer to the psychiatric ‘expert.’  Paul Crichton and 
colleagues suggest that prejudices against people with mental disorders are 
entrenched in our society in what Fricker calls the ‘collective social 
imagination’ (Fricker, 2007).  Psychiatrists, the general public, organisations, 
politicians and friends and family of a person with mental health problems 
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might be capable of committing this kind of injustice due to prejudice and 
stereotyping (Crichton et al., 2017).  
In order to ensure that epistemic justice is done with regard to the knowledge 
that people who seek psychiatric help have about their own experience 
Crichton and colleagues suggest a number of changes.  These include: 
introduction of ‘Schwartz rounds’ which are intended to focus on existential, 
ethical and personal aspects in relation to a particular person seeking 
psychiatric help; multi-disciplinary team meetings to look at multiple aspects of 
care; the training of psychiatrists to listen carefully to what their patients say 
and to engage collaboratively with regard to treatment and decision-making; 
and changes in the social and political arena - suggesting that the news 
media should cease to engage in negative stereotypes in relation to people 
who are mentally ill and that politicians should ensure a fair distribution of 
healthcare resources (Crichton et al., 2017).   
Lack of detailed phenomenological enquiry made available in the public 
domain combined with media portrayals of the ‘dangerous’ mentally ill person 
help to reinforce the stereotype and this in turn feeds the potential for 
epistemic injustice.  At the individual level, this kind of injustice - testimonial 
injustice is an ethical harm to that individual person and might impact 
treatment and add to self-stigma.  At the level of practice – if people’s 
experiences are routinely given less weight than is appropriate – we lose vital 
information for research and treatment, thwart our understanding of what 
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these experiences are really like and reinforce the stereotypes and thus the 
stigma that is already widely held. 
4.4.1 Understandability  
Instead of thinking of delusion formation in terms of an un-understandable 
problem with an underlying biological cause which has yet to be found 
(Jaspers, 1997, p.607), or thinking of psychiatry as the study of disorders of 
the brain (Bargmann and Lieberman, 2014) or as being synonymous with 
neuroscience (Tandon et al., 2015), we might think of mental illness in general 
and delusion formation in particular as a far more complex phenomenon.  The 
phenomenon might be said to be understandable given the context in which it 
arises.  Whilst we might not straightforwardly understand ‘uncanny’ prodromal 
states (e.g.: Barbara), voice hearing phenomena (e.g.: Alison and Caroline) or 
being overtaken by an inexplicable power (e.g.: Andrew) that people can 
experience, we can understand that their attempt to describe them tells us 
that they have undergone a real subjective experience that is primary.   If this 
kind of experience is intense or persistent enough it is integrated into 
experience and the normal human desire for sense making means that an 
explanation is needed.  The explanation that a person adopts to explain the 
experience is then understood as delusional.  In the cases presented here, 
the context enables us to see that the delusion – at least in these cases - is 
formed following a period of distress, despair, or depression and poor self-
care and has not come ‘out of the blue’.  The context in which experience 
breaks down is vital for our understanding of delusional formation. Any 
	 148	
successful account of delusion will thus have to extend beyond the brain, and 
engage with the complexity of experiential context.  If psychiatry is the study 
of the different factors contributing to delusion formation and other mental 
phenomenon associated with mental illness it must, therefore, incorporate an 
understanding of lived bodily environmental experience.   
When people are faced with despair, negative emotions, and suicidal 
thoughts, the adoption of new beliefs that make sense of their experiences is 
understandable and might protect them from intolerable feelings.  This 
process can be conceived of as an unconscious defence mechanism or as a 
basic biological response to life-threatening or unbearable distress.  This 
might even be considered pragmatic or beneficial. 45  
4.4.2 Stigma Reduction 
Nicholas Rüsch and David Thornicroft highlight a number of factors that might 
have an impact on stigma and thus on treatment and prevention.  Poor mental 
health literacy or lack of knowledge about risk factors and protective factors 
might prevent people from seeking help before they become ill thus 
preventing mental illness in the first place.  Poor knowledge about early signs 
and symptoms might prevent people from getting help at the onset of a mental 
illness and poor knowledge about treatment and relapse prevention might 
prevent people from seeking help at relapse.  Public stigma might engender 
an unwillingness to participate in preventative practices, avoidance of seeking 
help at onset, and avoidance of seeking help at relapse.  People might also 
                                            
45 I say more about this in chapter 6. 
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feel pessimistic about the success of potential intervention and might 
experience discrimination in relation to areas such as work, housing and 
social life as a barrier to recovery.  Self-stigma might lead to self-labelling, 
shame, social isolation and pessimism about recovery.  Structural 
discrimination, say at government level, might lead to fewer resources being 
made available at all levels (prevention, early intervention, treatment and 
relapse prevention) and structural discrimination, by the media, leads to 
negative portrayals of people with mental illness (Rüsch and Thornicroft, 
2014).  
Whilst the authors acknowledge we do not fully understand how these 
domains might interact (for example, we do not know what the general public 
actually does, if anything, with regard to prevention of mental health 
problems) it seems likely that these four domains: poor mental health literacy, 
public stigma, self-stigma and structural discrimination all influence each other 
and have a negative impact on prevention, early intervention, treatment and 
relapse prevention (ibid). 
If we take a contextual holistic view of the person experiencing mental health 
difficulties and make this information available in the wider public domain we 
might improve mental health literacy and perhaps reduce stigma and increase 
access to treatment. 
Although there is some evidence that there is a genetic link for some 
conditions such as schizophrenia (e.g., Wicks et al. 2010), no clear genetic 
markers have been identified thus far (Farrell et al. 2015).  The medical model 
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(that mental illnesses are biological brain disorders) is alleged to reduce 
stigma in relation to blame as no responsibility is placed on the person for 
developing psychotic symptoms.  The downside, however, is that stigmatising 
associations can be made between psychosis and (a) dangerousness, (b) 
lack of autonomy, and (c) chronicity (Corrigan and Watson 2004; Mehta and 
Farina 1997).  If those who have psychotic symptoms are at the mercy of a 
biological disease, then (a) they might be unable to control their own 
behaviour and therefore be unpredictable and dangerous; (b) they might be 
lacking in capacity and autonomy, and therefore lose some of their rights and 
require a third party’s benevolent intervention; and (c) the ‘disease’ might be 
seen as chronic and irreversible, making recovery impossible. 
A model of psychosis which takes into account not only biological factors, but 
also social, psychological and environmental ones may offer a more balanced 
account of the person’s capacities and limitations, and may enable us to view 
and at least partially understand the individual symptom within the context of 
the person’s overall life experience.  The more we know about the 
experiences of other people, the closer we get to understanding their beliefs 
and behaviour.  Even a very implausible belief can make sense in context. 
This does not mean that we need to rule out the possibility of distinct 
identifiable endogenous biological aetiology.  This might contribute to the 
cause of some kinds of mental illness.  Further, it might be distressing for 
some people to have their illness associated with childhood trauma or other 
trauma or distress where there is none.  There is no doubt that the model that 
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people are given as an explanation for mental illness has an impact on how 
they respond to treatment and how they feel about themselves and there is 
some evidence that a combined psychological and biological explanation can 
be most helpful in terms of compliance with treatment (Lüllmann et al., 2011).  
The evidence is mixed and there are few studies relating to the impact of 
patient belief about the cause of their illness on outcomes.  There is some 
evidence that a person who cites a biological cause for her illness is more 
likely to comply with medication, is more likely to engage with keyworkers but 
might be more likely to experience self-stigma.  More research is required in 
this area to understand what the impact a patient’s beliefs about the causes of 
her illness might have on outcome (Carter et al., 2017).  I suggest a plurality 
of understanding for this heterogeneous group of illnesses and symptoms 
where research, grounded in phenomenology, might distinguish between 
different kinds of psychosis or different kinds of delusions perhaps with 
different aetiologies. 
In each of the cases described above, the new (delusional) meaning that a 
person makes from a radical alteration in lived experience relates powerfully 
to significant events in that person’s life.   At the time when it is first adopted, it 
enables the person to make sense of her lived experience.  If we take this 
perspective it may be a more effective way to break down the stigma 
associated with psychosis than to describe people with psychosis as simply 
having some kind of biological illness.  The descriptions of people’s lived 
experience help us to appreciate the context in which delusions are adopted, 
as it shows us that dire circumstances in the person’s social and physical 
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environment contribute to the onset of mental health problems.  This might 
happen to anybody.  Although some individuals may be more vulnerable than 
others to developing delusional symptoms, I suggest that a continuum 
approach better describes the person/environment combination that enables 
delusion formation.  Even a person who is considered to be mentally or 
psychologically robust or resilient might still develop delusions given the ‘right’ 
environmental stressors. 
If delusion formation is an understandable outcome (which might even be 
beneficial or pragmatic in the short term) resulting from extreme life stresses 
leading to intense or anomalous perceptual, affective and emotional 
experiences, then we cannot ‘blame’ the person.  Life stresses occur in 
everyone’s life and some people are luckier than others and have fewer life 
stresses.  Child development problems and childhood trauma might be 
considered a highly significant life stressor making a person more vulnerable 
to developing delusions in later life (Hardy, 2017).  Again, we cannot blame 
the person, she has just been unlucky.  Context is vital.  If we understand the 
context in which delusions develop then a person’s reaction to the life 
stresses becomes, at least to some extent, understandable.  And if we 
understand a person, then we are less likely to think in terms of ‘them and us.’  
As survival is evolutionarily desirable, then delusions formed as a pragmatic 
response to protect a person from life threatening despair is also desirable.  
How can we blame a person for protecting herself from this and how can we 
think there is something ‘wrong’ with her when, even under duress, her 
survival instincts are still intact? 
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A person trying to make sense of her lived experience is just doing what we 
all do, sense-making is an inherently human capacity.  We need to make 
sense of our world in order to negotiate it.  How can we think that a person 
who has become delusional as a result of trying to make sense of her new 
experience is somehow ‘other’ or significantly different?  Further, a person 
responding in an understandable way to extreme life stress can recover so we 
need not think of her as chronically ill.  She is not inherently dangerous - she 
is no more likely to be dangerous than any vulnerable person trying to protect 
herself.  Nor is she in need of an overly paternalistic intervention.  She might 
just be in need of understanding and the right kind of therapeutic (and 
perhaps social/environmental) intervention.  What I am saying here is not 
new:  
 “Anti-stigma initiatives should emphasize the well-researched 
psychological and social contributors to mental illness in addition to 
biological factors. This framing provides an accurate and less 
stigmatizing explanation of the causes of mental illness. Recognizing 
that people can and do recover is perhaps the most important way to 
end the stigmatizing ‘us vs. them’ attitudes and behaviours too often 
experienced by people living with mental illnesses.” (Canadian Health 
Services Research Foundation, 2013) 
Yet somehow this attitude has not been taken on within the public 
understanding of mental illness. 
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If we want people to seek help earlier, we need to reduce the stigma 
associated with mental health issues and more data like those analysed in 
this paper should be gathered and made available in the public domain.  If 
people better understood the nature and the trajectory of mental health issues 
such as delusions in terms of their context then they might be more able to 
recognise signs of distress in themselves and others, and less concerned 
about the perceived negative or stigmatising consequences of seeking help.   
4.4.3 Treatment, Prevention and Early Intervention 
There is evidence that early intervention in psychosis predicts better 
outcomes in children and young adults (McGorry, 2015).  But what about 
intervention in other groups, how early can we intervene, what form should 
the intervention take and what are the ethical issues to be addressed?  In the 
At-Risk Mental State (ARMS) literature in relation to psychosis, Andrew 
Thompson and colleagues’ review a number of research articles with a view 
to understanding the efficacy of various ARMS assessments, the ethical 
issues that preventative treatment raises and the treatment options that are 
available.  They conclude that, whilst those assessed as ‘at risk’ are much 
more likely to develop a psychotic illness than the general population, the 
majority do not actually become ill.  The potential risks associated with 
unnecessary treatment are therefore a serious consideration (Thompson et 
al., 2016). 
In the kind of examples above, if these people were to present to psychiatric 
services prior to the onset of their delusions, early intervention might take the 
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form of talking therapy helping them to come to terms with change and the 
circumstances they find themselves in that might otherwise lead to 
unbearable despair or distress.  Whatever form the therapeutic intervention 
takes it should be tailored to the needs of the individual.  This has wider 
political or socio-economic implications, because the distress might be related 
to a person’s environment and this might have to change in order for the 
despair or distress to be ameliorated.  For example, a client of mine after a 
long-term hospitalisation, was housed in a block of flats where his neighbours 
were people who had recently come out of prison (who were engaging in low-
level criminal activity), drug addicts and recovering drug addicts.  He felt his 
environment was unsafe and (quite understandably) his persecutory delusions 
resurfaced very quickly resulting in him being re-hospitalised.  This form of 
housing was clearly inappropriate for this person. 
If environment causally contributes to mental illness46 this has still wider 
political and socio-economic impact in terms of prevention.  If predictors 
include poor housing, poor social support, poor sleep, nutrition and self care 
then there might be more to be done in terms of prevention.  We might reduce 
the risk of development of some mental illnesses by improving education 
around these environmental risks, providing more support for those at risk and 
by building appropriate housing within environments that ameliorate these 
risks. 
                                            
46  I give some examples of how increased incidence of mental illness 
correlate with environmental factors in chapter 7, section 7.4.5. 
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The discourse around seeking help and treatment at early intervention might 
be altered if context is understood and we think of coping with significant life 
change as a flag for potential problems.  Understanding the development of 
delusion in terms of perceptual, affective and emotional anomalies might 
change the way we intervene.  Specific therapies might be developed that 
target percept, affect and emotion.  This might include psycho-education and 
perhaps talking therapies designed to improve a person’s ability to manage 
her emotions as well as perhaps poetry, literature and film used as 
therapeutic tools.  If perceptual anomalies are impacted by a sense of self / 
body ownership then perhaps bodily or bodily/visual therapies might be 
developed.  Body awareness therapy, yoga, music therapy, dance, other 
forms of movement therapy, occupational therapy and art therapy might be 
indicated (for a survey of these kinds of therapies see Maiese, 2015a, 
chap.6).  Of course I cannot say exactly which therapies would work for which 
people in what circumstances this is an empirical question.  Little research in 
this area has been done but there is some evidence that these therapies can 
be useful for certain groups (ibid).  
The kind of help offered is likely to have an impact on stigma – if we offer anti-
psychotic medication then we imply a ‘downward’ trajectory and label 
‘ordinary’ problems as highly problematic.  The people interviewed in this 
study were not looking after themselves - none of them were eating or 
sleeping properly.  If we offer therapies that relate to nutrition, healthy sleep 
patterns and coping with change, perceptual, affective and emotional 
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problems not only do we reduce the potential for harmful side-effects47 and 
iatrogenic dependence on anti-psychotic medication (Moncrieff, 2006) we 
‘normalise’ these prodromal (or even pre-prodromal) ‘symptoms’ and perhaps 
prevent psychosis from developing in the first place.   
As we have seen from the empirical data in this chapter each research 
participant experienced strong emotional, affective and/or perceptual 
anomalies prior to and/or during the onset of their delusions.  In the next 
chapter I survey some of the literature on emotion, affect and percept in 
relation to delusion formation and show how this relates to my interview data. 
  
                                            
47  Side effects of anti-psychotic medication are numerous and some are 
potentially life threatening (for a compreshensive guide see Gardner and 
Teehan, 2011) 
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CHAPTER 5 - AFFECT, PERCEPTION AND 
EMOTION 
______________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction 
As I have shown in chapter 2 delusion is notoriously difficult to define.  Clinical 
definitions usually relate to false beliefs in the absence of supporting evidence 
that are held with conviction despite the availability of counter evidence.  At 
first pass this makes it look like the ‘problem’ lies with processes used to 
make inferences.  But is this really what is going on?  In this chapter I look at 
some literature relating to delusion formation in terms of a phenomenon that 
arises out of extreme or unusual affective, perceptual or emotional states.  I 
argue that delusions arise as an understandable response to 1) heightened 
emotional experiences such as trauma, 2) bizarre or anomalous perceptual or 
affective ‘felt’ experiences and 3) other ‘free-floating’ or objectless intense 
emotions.  I suggest that any of these (or a combination of these) if intense 
and/or persistent enough partly constitute a radical alteration in lived 
experience and thus demand a re-evaluation of a person’s understanding of 
the world resulting in delusion formation. 
In section 5.2 I look at some literature about what it might be about clinically 
significant delusions that differentiates them from other ‘ordinary’ mistaken 
beliefs, in section 5.3 I link the literature to my empirical findings, in section 
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5.4 I discuss the implications and finally I summarise and make my concluding 
remarks (section 5.5). 
5.2 What Sets Clinically Significant Delusion Apart? 
As we have seen in chapter 2 most clinical definitions of delusion relate to 
false beliefs held with conviction.  It is worth re-stating the most commonly 
cited definition from DSM 5 and its similarity to Jaspers’ definition (which 
predates DSM 5 by 100 years) in order to reiterate what some of the problems 
are and how we can move from this ‘vague’ definition to a way of better 
capturing what is problematic about clinically significant delusions.  According 
to DSM 5 and to Jaspers a delusion is: 
“A false belief [Jaspers’ – “false judgement(s)”] based on incorrect 
inference about external reality that is firmly sustained [Jaspers’ – “held 
with extraordinary conviction”] despite what almost everyone else 
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof 
or evidence to the contrary [Jaspers’ – “imperviousness to other 
experiences and compelling counter arguments”]. The belief is not 
ordinarily one accepted by other members of the person’s culture or 
subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith) [Jaspers’ – “…nor 
can the prolific views of entire nations be given the title delusion…”].  
When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a 
delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.819; Jaspers, 1997, pp.95–
96 & 195) 
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Brendan Maher concludes that the clinical definition of delusion requires that 
we hold certain assumptions about belief formation and about delusion 
formation: that beliefs can be verified from available evidence; that people 
routinely look at appropriate evidence when forming beliefs; culturally held 
superstitions and religious beliefs do not arise as a result of the kind of faulty 
inference process associated with clinically significant delusions; and extreme 
cases of implausibility should be included as delusions.  He posits that these 
assumptions might cause us to hypothesise that the ‘pathology’ (or clinical 
significance) with regard to delusions formation lies in a defect in inferential 
processes (Maher, 2001, p.309) 
Jaspers describes ‘external characteristics’ that are similar to modern 
definitions and can only be recognised as possible delusions, in the first 
instance, from these external characteristics.  He says that the term delusion 
can only ‘vaguely’ be applied to his definition (above) and that the content of a 
delusion is more like a rudimentary feeling which has an obscure certainty 
(Jaspers, 1997, p.95) 
Despite his definition (above) and the fact that he says we can only identify a 
delusion using this definition which ‘vaguely’ applies he is quick to point out 
that he does not intend that we understand clinically significant delusion in 
terms of problems with inferential processes: 
“…in any case the mentally ill person has as much right to be illogical as 
the healthy one.  It is wrong to consider the failure in reasoning a morbid 
symptom in one case but normal in the other.” (Jaspers, 1997, p.97) 
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On this point Maher agrees and cites evidence demonstrating that if we 
assume that there are ‘ideal’ ways in which we use deductive and inferential 
reasoning (such as the ways in which a scientist would use these processes) 
we might find that many of us fall short of this ideal.  But most of us are not 
delusional (Maher, 2001).  
For Jaspers, understanding delusion cannot rest on reasoning deficits 
(although some would disagree with my interpretation of Jaspers, see for 
example Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007).  For Jaspers our understanding of this 
phenomenon requires a different approach: 
“We should rather address ourselves to the problem of what it is that 
occasions the incorrigibility and causes us to recognise certain modes of 
wrong judgement as delusional.” (Jaspers, 1997, p.195)  
For Jaspers there is something that ‘occasions incorrigibility’ and this is what 
is clinically significant.   
As I have mentioned in chapter 2 Jaspers differentiates between delusion 
proper (or primary delusion) and delusion-like ideas.   For Jaspers, if delusion 
can be psychologically understood in context then it is not delusion-proper but 
simply a delusion-like idea.  When the whole meaning of a person’s lived 
experience alters at the onset or genesis of delusion and the subjective feel of 
this psychic phenomenon cannot be understood in any kind of psychological 
context then this is delusion-proper (or primary delusion). 
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Jaspers’ detailed phenomenology shows that people with delusion-like beliefs 
form them in ways which are understandable and emerge from other psychic 
events such as affects, drives, desires and fears.  Primary delusions, on the 
other hand, are psychologically irreducible and derive from an ‘uncanny’ 
feeling that precedes delusion formation and represents a change in lived 
experience and the meaning that the world holds for the person: 
“We find that there arise in the patient certain primary sensations, vital 
feelings, moods, awarenesses…  Patients feel uncanny and that there is 
something suspicious afoot.  Everything gets a new meaning… there is 
some change which envelopes everything with a subtle, pervasive and 
strangely uncertain light.” (Jaspers, 1997, p.98) 
Perhaps because of the clinical definition of delusion that relates to belief 
formation and suggests a problem with inferential processing there is 
considerable research around problems with reasoning in relation to people 
with delusions.   
There is evidence that people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who have 
delusions are more likely to jump to conclusions than controls under 
experimental condition (Dudley et al., 2016).  Belief flexibility includes the 
capacity to accept the possibility of being mistaken, the ability to develop 
alternative explanations and the capacity to take on board evidence that is 
counter to an established belief.  There is some evidence that populations 
with clinically significant delusions perform less well in these areas than those 
who do not have clinically significant delusions (Ward and Garety, 2017).  
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These biases might be thought of in terms of Daniel Kahneman’s notion of 
thinking fast (intuitive thinking) and thinking slow (reflective thinking) 
(Kahneman, 2012) and this might have implications for treatment (Ward and 
Garety, 2017)  However, we cannot say whether people become unwell 
because they have a tendency towards reasoning biases or they now have 
this tendency because they are unwell.  The ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) 
literature only demonstrates that people with a certain psychiatric diagnosis 
make decisions more quickly and with less evidence than people who do not 
have this diagnosis not that their actual decision making is impaired (in Huq et 
al., 1988 correct decision making was no worse for people with delusions than 
for people without) .  Whilst it is possible that people with delusions may have 
problems with reasoning there is no clear evidence that demonstrates that this 
is clinically significant.  I suspect it is unlikely that people with delusions have 
reasoning problems that are any worse than the rest of the population and, in 
any case as Jaspers says (above), a failure in reasoning is not considered a 
morbid symptom in the normal population so why would we consider it to be 
so in a person who has delusions. 
I further suggest that by focussing on this characteristic we miss the nature of 
delusion formation.  If we listen to what people say we find that anomalies in 
experience are the precursor to delusion formation.  These anomalies need to 
be investigated.  As we have seen (in chapter 4) people sometimes find their 
experiences extremely difficult to describe and the researcher (who is unlikely 
to have experienced what is described) finds the description difficult to 
understand.  Nevertheless we should attempt to understand.  When a degree 
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of understanding is reached then the delusion formation becomes 
understandable.  We might not understand elements of the anomalous 
experience when taken out of context but nevertheless, if we take what a 
person says seriously in the context of her lived experience we can move 
towards a better understanding. 
A person experiencing extreme or unusual perceptual, affective or emotional 
anomalies must make sense of the world by incorporating these experiences 
into her world.  This is an ordinary process that we all go through.  We pick up 
cues from our environment and from the people around us and incorporate 
what we experience into our world-view in a meaningful way.  A person 
always has subjective experiences which are not directly available to others.  
There is always ‘something that it is like’ to be that person undergoing her 
unique lived experience.  All the elements that contribute to her experience 
form part of the environment from which the person must derive meaning and 
make sense.    
I am agnostic about whether there is a strict difference between (Jaspers’) 
primary delusions (or delusion-proper) and delusion like ideas.  In addition to 
distress and/or problems with functioning, at least with regard to the 
experience of my research participants, I suggest that the alterations in the 
affective, perceptual and emotional nature of lived experience prior to 
delusion formation (which may come about by a number of different means – 
psychologically understandable or not) is the characteristic that enables us to 
differentiate between clinically significant delusions and ordinary unexamined 
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or mistaken beliefs held with conviction by people who never acquire a 
psychiatric diagnosis.  On this point Jaspers’ would agree.  Delusion-proper 
arises from an ‘uncanny’ change to ‘primary sensations, vital feelings, moods, 
awarenesses’ and delusion-like ideas arise from (psychologically 
understandable) affects, drives, desires and fears. 
The degree to which a person’s experience is altered might give rise to 
different delusional outcomes.  For example, it might be the case that in some 
circumscribed or monothematic delusions there is a specific or relatively 
narrow alteration in experience.  It might be the case that in florid psychotic 
delusions with elaborate schemas the alterations in lived experience might be 
much more broad and all-encompassing. 
Subjective states such as the ‘uncanny’ feeling described by Jaspers and the 
prodromal states described in more recent literature (see for example Kapur, 
2003) as well as the subjective affective and emotional states that might be 
involved in some (perhaps more readily psychologically understandable) 
delusion formation are primary.  A third party cannot dispute them.  If a person 
feels, for example, fear then this is her experience of herself at the time she 
felt that fear.  Of course she might decide, on reflection, that she had nothing 
to be afraid of and in this case perhaps the fear would dissipate.  This does 
not, however, alter the fact of her experience at the time that it happened.   
Anomalous subjective states are the territory that I am interested in.  I suggest 
that they can take a number of forms relating to altered perception, affect and 
emotion and it is these alterations that lead to delusion formation.   
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In the next section I briefly describe what I understand affect, emotion and 
perception to be in order to explore these notions in relation to psychiatric 
illnesses in general and delusion in particular. 
5.3 Emotions, Affectivity and Perception 
5.3.1 Emotions 
I take human emotions to be experience that is ‘felt’ and is at once bodily and 
cognitive.48  Bodily or ‘felt’ arousal alone is not emotion and we need other 
factors to explain experience.49  If my heart rate increases and I start to feel 
bodily agitation I will look to my environment for an explanation.  If there is 
nothing in the environment that ‘explains’ this to me I might think I’m having a 
panic attack or even a heart attack.  If I look to the environment and see an 
attractive man I might think this is the cause of what I now label ‘excitement.’  
If I look to the environment and see a tiger I might think this is the cause of 
what I now label ‘fear.’  The environment is thus partly constitutive of the 
emotion.  Without the stimulus or explanation (as well as the ‘feel’) I would not 
be experiencing what human beings usually understand as emotion.  If I see 
an attractive man and think to myself ‘he’s attractive’ but I have no ‘felt’ or 
bodily response I am not excited.  If I see a tiger and think to myself ‘there is a 
dangerous tiger’ but have no ‘felt’ or bodily response then I am not feeling 
                                            
48 There is a huge literature on emotions and what an emotion is is by no 
means settled.  Some see emotions as judgments (e.g.: Solomon, 2007) and 
others see emotions as fundamentally bodily or perhaps perceptual (e.g.: 
Prinz, 2004) and there are a number of hybrid theories (e.g.: Goldie, 2002). 
49  There is evidence that primitive brain responses which are probably 
consistent across mammalian species and perhaps other animals too 
underpin the human emotions (see Panksepp, 2012). 
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fear.  I can, of course, feel fear by imagining a dangerous situation so the 
‘environment’ might be in my imagination.  These principles apply to other 
emotions too.  An emotion can be (but may not be) recognised and labelled 
by the person experiencing it.  A person’s capacity to name an emotion is 
linguistically and culturally determined.  The (bodily) feeling relating to certain 
kinds of experience is similar enough to other experiences for this to be 
recognisable.  For example my fear of tigers feels a bit like my fear of snakes. 
5.3.2 Affectivity 
I take affectivity50 to be a term that captures all the subtle responses that a 
person might have relating to pleasure, pain and desire as well as more 
obvious (recognisable and easy to articulate) emotions and moods.  It is not 
synonymous with emotions but includes emotions.  It also includes the bodily 
and the non-self-consciously cognitive and might include unmediated (direct) 
responses to perception.  Affectivity includes sub-personal drives that bring 
about goal directed action.  Affect might draw a person towards a pleasurable 
object or situation or toward an activity that meets a person’s wants or 
desires.  Affect might also repel a person from objects or situations that cause 
pain or suffering or that prevent a person from meeting her wants or desires.  
As such, affect can alter (increase or decrease) a person’s capacity to act.   
                                            
50 The literature in this area is vast and affectivity is cognitive for some (e.g.: 
Lazarus, 1982), bodily and sometimes directly ‘perceptual’ for some (e.g.: 
Prinz, 2004) and automatic and not synonymous with emotion for others (e.g.: 
Massumi, 1995).  Antonio Damasio has written extensively on the different 
‘states’ of this kind of experience: bodily (or somatic) emotion, feeling and 
feeling made conscious (Damasio, 2000, 1996).  Whether affect is cognitive 
or bodily also rests on definitions of cognition that are enormously varied (for 
a brief critique see Zajonc, 1984; or Loewenstein, 2007). 
	 168	
5.3.3 Perception 
I take perception to be the ability to see, hear, smell, taste, touch or become 
aware of something through the senses.  Perception and affect are 
overlapping capacities that can be intermeshed51.  For example, perception is 
influenced by attention so I might perceive (see, hear, smell, taste or feel) 
something because my attention is drawn to it.  I might, for example, have my 
attention drawn to (or ‘notice’) the smell of coffee in the environment because 
it is lunchtime and I did not have my usual cup of coffee this morning.  I might 
also hear my name called against a noisy background in which I cannot 
distinguish other words and phrases (Driver, 2001).  The environment is partly 
constitutive of perception (no coffee, no smell52).  This ‘noticing’ of something 
salient in the environment is affective and relates to goal seeking behaviour.  
‘Noticing’ (or perceiving through smell) that coffee is available in the 
environment enables me to seek out the coffee and to satisfy my craving.  
Noticing my name against a background of other noise enables me to turn my 
attention to listening to speech that is aimed at me.  Conversely, if I am paying 
close deliberately focussed attention to something then other things in the 
environment can become invisible.  This is known as inattentional blindness 
(Simons and Chabris, 1999).  So a person’s capacity to perceive things in the 
environment is, to some extent, intermeshed with her affective goal seeking 
behaviour. 
                                            
51 The extent to which affect and perception are intermeshed or overlap is 
hotly debated in the literature (for a review of some of the arguments see 
Firestone and Scholl, 2016 and the companion articles in this edition of 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences). 
52 Unless I am having an olfactory hallucination. 
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In the next section I give some examples of perceptual, affective and 
emotional anomalies from the philosophical literature on psychiatric illness 
5.4 Perceptual, Affective and Emotional Anomalies 
5.4.1 Perceptual Anomalies in Schizophrenia and Delusion 
In their article on perceptual anomalies in schizophrenia Peter Uhlhaas and 
Aaron Mishara review the territory with a view to integrating phenomenology 
and cognitive neuroscience.  As we have already seen in chapters 3 and 4 
whilst the practice of phenomenology is atheoretical the findings from 
phenomenological analysis might provide important insights about how 
subjective experience relates to psychiatric disorders which might lead to 
testable hypotheses about underlying mechanisms.  They cite a number of 
examples from the literature suggesting that people who go on to acquire the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia experience perceptual anomalies prior to 
diagnosis.  These anomalies relate to 1) an inability to see a scene as a whole 
(the scene is fragmented and only individual details are available), 2) 
movements of people and objects in the environment cause the scene to 
‘disappear’ requiring effort to reconstitute it 3) an inability to make sense of 
other people’s conversations (their words do not ‘fit together’) 4) certain 
objects standing out in the environment (experienced as personally salient) 
and 5) an inability to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant 
(Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007).  Perception provides the background through 
which we experience the world and enables the world to show up as an 
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organized meaningful whole.  In human beings meaningful sense-making 
occurs as a direct result of perceptual input.   
“Perception is, by definition, a meaningful awareness of one’s 
environment and one’s perspective on it.  Lacking access to cognition, 
pure perception would be devoid of meaning and consist instead of an 
absolute associative agnosia in which the conceptual recognition of 
environmental objects and events is entirely absent.” (Clore and Proffitt, 
2016) 
If perception is impaired, lived experience becomes odd or peculiar.  The 
environment is not readily recognisable and objects and sounds in the 
environment do not ‘cohere’ into a meaningful whole.  People experiencing 
these kinds of alterations find it increasingly difficult to make sense of the 
world in which they find themselves.  If a person’s perceptual experience is 
altered she must somehow make sense of this new world.   
Klaus Conrad describes three phases in the development of delusional 
perception.  In the first phase the environment takes on a new significance but 
this is not understood (similar to Jaspers’ ‘uncanny’ experience), in the 
second phase certain objects have immediate personal significance and in the 
third phase certain objects have specific personal meaning (Conrad in 
Mishara, 2009).   
Uhlhaas and Mishara review the experimental data and phenomenological 
data and conclude that perceptual anomalies might be present in some 
people who acquire a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the degree of perceptual 
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impairment might be linked to the severity of the illness and perceptual 
impairment might be primary leading to reduced processing capacity in 
relation to other mental activity (Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007). 
5.4.2 Affective Anomalies in the Capgras Delusion 
In the case of some monothematic delusions there is some evidence that 
there is a breakdown in certain affective capacities.  People with the Capgras 
delusion (or Capgras syndrome) think that loved ones or close family 
members are imposters of some kind.  They might think that they are aliens or 
robots or that they are another person in a very good disguise.  They do not 
deny that the ‘imposter’ looks like the loved one or family member but they 
routinely describe a sense of ‘unfamiliarity.’  Capgras is a heterogenous 
syndrome and there are a number of different explanations for the formation 
of the delusion (for a review of research in this area see Sautter et al., 1991).  
There is, however, some evidence that a person’s capacity for facial 
recognition has a number of components relating to the look of the person as 
well as to an affective or emotional feeling of ‘warmth’ or ‘familiarity’ toward a 
known person.  When impairments in the capacities that contribute to the 
affective ‘feel’ of familiarity occur then the Capgras delusion develops.  Face 
processing impairments relating to identification of familiar faces, recognition 
of emotional facial expressions and matching of unfamiliar faces have been 
shown to be present in people who have developed this delusion (Young et 
al., 1993).  The galvanic skin responses (used to measure heightened 
emotions or affect) of people with the Capgras delusion were the same when 
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looking at familiar people as when they were looking at unfamiliar people.  
This is in contrast to populations who do not have the Capgras delusion 
where the galvanic skin response is higher for familiar faces (Ellis and Young, 
1990).   This lack of affective response to the ‘imposter’ is not readily 
understood by the person experiencing it.  ‘What it is like’ to interact with the 
loved one is altered in a way that is hard to articulate.  This suggests that the 
normal affective response is absent when the Capgras patient looks at the 
family member.  An explanation for this difference in subjective experience is 
required and the delusion arises as the result of a person’s accounting for this 
change (Stone and Young, 1997).  On this account ‘imposter’ status is ‘given’ 
in the experience (at a sub-personal level) and the delusion that develops 
might have differing (personally salient) content (eg: my wife has been 
replaced by the government).  
5.4.3 The Perceptual Affective Anomaly of Alien Control 
People with the delusion of alien control think that their body parts and/or their 
thoughts are controlled by a third party.  Thought insertion is often described 
as a delusion of control and seems to share some phenomenology with the 
delusion of (bodily) alien control as well as with voice hearing experiences.   
The phenomenology variously includes the sense that one’s body parts are 
not one’s own, an inability to distinguish between one’s body or mind and 
those of other people, the sense that someone or something else is 
controlling one’s body or one’s mind and an inability to prevent involuntary 
movements or to make deliberative movements.  This might be described as 
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1) a perceptual anomaly or 2) an affective problem relating to salience or 3) 
an affective/perceptual problem where sense data and affect (valenced 
subjective feel) are both attenuated.  In ‘alien control’ experiences a person’s 
ordinary perception of ownership of her own body and agential movement of 
her body parts is altered or her own body movements lose their ‘given’ sense 
of personal ownership and agency in some way and seem to gain the 
salience of the external action of others.  Chris Frith’s influential model posits 
that a breakdown in our (sub-personal) ability to predict our own thoughts and 
movements leads to the experience that those very same thoughts and 
movements are not our own (Frith, 1987).  The ability to ‘predict’ exists just so 
that we can tell the difference between our own movements and that of 
others.  Others’ actions are highly salient and our attention is drawn to them 
because they are not predicted.  If our (internal) ability to predict our own 
movements or thoughts is compromised we cannot tell that they ‘belong’ to us 
and we lose the ordinary ‘given’ sense of agency and mine-ness (Blakemore 
et al., 2003; Hohwy and Rosenberg, 2005). 
We know that perception of ownership and agency over our own body parts is 
complex.  For example, we can trick people into incorporating rubber hands 
and mirror reflections of a hand and arm into their own body schema53.  So we 
know that our perception of our own bodies is partly constituted by visual 
feedback.  As it is not settled or fully understood how these delusions are 
formed and they are heterogeneous there might be different aetiologies.  It is 
                                            
53 I say more about this in chapter 7, section 7.4.1. 
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possible, then, the delusion of alien control arises in part due to some kind of 
perceptual and/or affective anomaly.   
5.4.4 The Perceptual Anomaly of Voice Hearing and Thought Insertion  
Voice hearing or Auditory Vocal Hallucination (AVH) is a phenomenon where 
a person might experience her own thoughts (imaginings, hopes, fears or 
desires) as if they are externally voiced from somewhere outside herself.  
Thought Insertion is a phenomenon where it is thought that a person 
experiences her own thoughts as if they belong to other people.  In psychiatry 
these are thought of as distinct symptoms but many agree that there might be 
some overlap.  For Irwin Feinberg: 
“…auditory hallucinations are perhaps the most common symptom in 
schizophrenia.  They often seem more cognitive than sensory and 
frequently have strong affective tone.” (my emphasis Feinberg in 
Feinberg, 1978, p.638).  
It is likely, then, that people describing ‘voices’ and people describing ‘thought 
insertion’ may, in fact be experiencing a similar phenomenon (see also Frith, 
1992; Langland-Hassan, 2008; Stephens, 2000; Gunn, 2016b).  
These phenomena might be described as altered perceptions.  A person 
ordinarily experiences her thoughts as self-generated with a sense of 
ownership or ‘mine-ness’.  Thoughts show up in a person’s stream of 
consciousness and ownership and agency is ‘given.’  It would not occur to 
most of us to wonder who owns or who generated the thoughts to which we 
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have first-personal access.  There is also evidence that people who have 
voice hearing experiences have what is termed as an ‘externalising bias’.  In 
experimental conditions it has been shown that when played ‘white noise’ 
those who experience voice hearing are more likely to say that what they 
heard contained a person talking than others who do not experience voice 
hearing.  In recall tasks this group are also more likely to think that they said a 
word out loud (when they were only asked to think about that word - not say it) 
and more likely to incorrectly recall the experimenter saying a word (when it 
was actually the research participant who had said it).  There is also some 
evidence that when asked to respond to positively or negatively valenced 
words those who heard voices felt that they were less in control of their 
responses than they were with regard to responses to neutral words.  This 
was in contrast to controls where there was no significant difference in their 
perception of control over neutral words and valenced words (Morrison and 
Haddock, 1997).  The results of these kinds of experiements are mixed and 
might be thwarted by the fact that research groups have different diagnoses 
and other symptoms (as well as voice hearing).  Further, there is a consensus 
that voice hearers are a heterogeneous group with different experiences and 
that ‘voice hearing’ experiences might have differing aetiologies (for a review 
of research in this area see Brookwell et al., 2013). 
In summary, further research is needed in this area but there is some 
evidence to suggests that the environment is more readily misinterpreted by 
some people who hear voices and that emotionally positive and negative 
words might increase the propensity to misattribute thoughts and words to a 
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third party and this anomalous experience might be described as both 
perceptual and affective. 
5.4.5 Emotional Anomalies in Delusion Formation 
Delusion is a common symptom of psychotic illnesses and it is well 
established that emotional stress is linked to psychosis (for a review of 
research in this area see Myin-Germeys and van Os, 2007).  The British 
Psychological Society also posits a distress model for the development of 
psychosis citing such factors as childhood trauma and bullying as well as 
everyday life stresses such as bereavement, divorce and redundancy as 
contributing to the development of psychosis (Cooke, 2017).  They cite 
evidence to support this and go as far as to say that: 
“Some psychologists are reaching the conclusion that psychosis is often 
no more and no less than a natural reaction to traumatic events.” (ibid, 
p.43) 
Others have written extensively on the impact of emotional distress on the 
development of psychosis as well as the influence emotions might have on 
the experience of psychosis itself and the effect emotions might have on 
recovery citing literature from psychoanalysis, cognitive science, 
developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology and neurobiology (see, 
for example Gumley et al., 2013).   
There is increasing evidence in the literature that emotions have an impact on 
delusion formation specifically.  In a recent study by Daniel Freeman and 
	 177	
colleagues people with persecutory delusions were randomised to three 
groups.  In one group short term worry was induced by asking each person to 
think about a particular area that he or she was prone to worry about.  In 
another group worry was reduced using meditative techniques.  In the third 
group participants were given magazines to read.  Each group was assessed 
prior to the interventions and after the trial using established measures.  The 
investigators hypothesised that working memory would be reduced, 
propensity for jumping to conclusions (JTC) would increase and that aberrant 
or anomalous perceptual experiences associated with delusion formation 
would increase in the worry induction group.  Whilst there were no reductions 
in working memory or increases in propensity for JTC there were significant 
increases in aberrant or anomalous perceptual experiences in the worry 
induction group.  The researchers conclude that excessive or increased worry 
increases aberrant or anomalous perceptual experiences associated with 
delusion formation and that therapies that target worry reduction might reduce 
propensity to delusion formation (Freeman et al., 2013).  Their finding is 
supported by a pilot study that evidenced that a specific focus on diffusion of 
the emotional components of persecutory delusion reduces distressing 
symptoms (Hepworth et al., 2013). 
Other research, reviewing a number of studies on grandiose delusions, 
proposes a model for delusion formation by at least two different routes.  One 
route involves a highly positive affective (or euphoric) internal mental state, 
perhaps after a positive triggering event or after substance abuse, which 
leads to judgements about the internal state and thoughts about specialness 
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or special abilities.  Another route might be as a defensive reaction to 
negative life events threatening self-esteem or social rank thus protecting the 
person from an intolerable reality.  These two routes are not mutually 
exclusive and might interact with each other (Knowles et al., 2011).  In either 
case a radical affective alteration in lived experience is involved.  In the former 
case a person experiences a kind of ‘high’ or euphoria that, if sufficiently 
persistent, demands a re-evaluation of the world and leads to delusion 
formation.  In the latter case a person experiences psychologically intolerable 
negative life events which might demand a response that protects her from 
fully acknowledging this experience54.  
I suggest that when affective, perceptual or emotional anomalies occur which 
are intense and persistent enough then a person will form what others might 
call a delusional explanation.  In the next section I illustrate this using data 
from my empirical research. 
5.5 Affect, Perception and Emotions in the Empirical Analysis 
It is difficult to separate affect, perception and emotion.  They are overlapping 
phenomena.  Things might be said to stand out in the environment or be 
salient if a person is drawn towards them or repelled by them.  This might be 
described as both perceptual and affective.  Objects have a different 
perceptual impact because they have a different affective impact.  Ordinarily a 
person notices an object in the environment because it helps her to make 
                                            
54  I discuss the protective nature of delusion formation in more detail in 
chapter 6. 
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sense of her environment.  For example, a dangerous object in the 
environment might stand out and be repellent affording the possibility of 
avoidant behaviour.  An edible object in the environment might stand out and 
be attractive affording the possibility of feeding oneself.  Mood might also 
have an impact on what a person notices in her environment and a euphoric 
person might ‘see’ her environment differently from a depressed person (for a 
brief review of some evidence showing the interaction between mood, affect, 
emotion and perception see Zadra and Clore, 2011). 
In this section, I show how the experiences described by the research 
participants prior to delusion formation all contain these kinds of anomalies.  
These anomalies, which are persistent and/or intense, come to form part of a 
person’s lived experience and are incorporated into the meaning or sense-
making of that person’s experience.  The new (delusional) meaning is an 
ordinary response to extraordinary experience. 
5.5.1 Affective Anomalies 
5.5.1.1 Barbara 
Barbara’s ordinary affective engagement with the world was radically altered.  
She experienced being drawn towards things in the environment such as 
music on the radio, road signs and things that people were saying.  Prior to 
this experience Barbara had no special response to road signs, songs on the 
radio or to what people were saying.  She experienced them in the way that 
most of us do.  Road signs simply gave information about the roads, music on 
the radio was just background noise and other people’s conversations were 
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not especially important to her.  As we have seen in chapter 4 Barbara finds 
this very difficult to explain.   
As the experience intensified Barbara finds she is drawn to the conversations 
of others and that these conversations become personally salient: 
“Then… it started happening everywhere, everywhere I went people 
were talking about me, talking about things in my house.  Even in… 
their own conversations.  I was like [whispers] what’s going on here?” 
(Barbara 1, 1:37-40) 
Certain things and people in the environment were no longer ‘neutral’.  
Certain people and places, repelled her.  They were experienced as ‘evil’ and 
this meant they had something to do with the Devil: 
“I really wanted to smoke and I got signs saying no smoking, stuff like 
that.  It weren’t nice signs it was… like evil signs.” (Barbara 1, 2:23-25) 
“…this doctor said to me do you see Devils?  I said yes I see them right 
in your eyes right now.  Cos it was really frightening, you could see 
them, you could see the Demons around you.” (Barbara 1, 5:43-46) 
“…when the devil wants me to, he can just make me see something 
really ugly and really scare me.” (Barbara 2, 20:51-52) 
“I went into this club, and everyone… was just staring at me. And I was 
like L [her friend] I have to get out of here, I said I’m sorry I just have to 
get out of here.  I was only drinking water.  I said I have to get out of 
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here everyone’s staring at me.  It was like okay, she took me home. 
But…  it was all redeye and… stuff like that. It was all a Devil’s den.” 
(Barbara 2, 20: 39-45)  
Certain experiences became polarised.  Some related to the Devil and some 
related to God: 
“…cos back then I used to take messages from the tears as well. One 
would be the left side which was the Devil and one was the right side 
which was God.  It was all weird…” (Barbara 1, 6:24-26) 
“A police car signalled the Devil and an ambulance signalled God. And I 
still see the ambulances now. God still talks to me through them.” 
(Barbara 1, 6:34-36) 
All of these experiences were unusual for Barbara, she had not experienced 
them before and she found it hard to articulate what was happening to her.  
Nevertheless, this was a real subjective primary sensory experience which is 
not directly accessible to others.  The experience is intense and persistent 
and affectively charged.   
5.5.1.2 Andrew 
As we have seen in chapter 4 after years of distress, OCD, intrusive thoughts 
and lack of sleep Andrew experienced an overwhelming ‘power’ come over 
him.  The way he describes it makes it sound like it was both bodily and 
perhaps (self-consciously) cognitive as well as affective.  He ‘feels’ the power 
and seems to immediately know it is something to do with a battle between 
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good and evil.  He has the sense that God is controlling him and he finds it 
very difficulty to explain.  He ‘feels’ this and it is thus affective in nature but 
does not have the signature of a recognisable emotion.  As we saw in chapter 
4 he realises that it is unusual and intense and that others would not be likely 
to understand it. 
It was a force that was so powerful I can’t even explain it to you.  
(Andrew 2, 11:49-50) 
“I wouldn’t even be able to, it’s futile.” (Andrew 2, 12:1)  
“The… the power cannot be described.  The only person who could be 
able to… is someone who’s been through it as well.” (Andrew 2, 12: 26-
27) 
Again, for Andrew, this was a real and intense subjective primary sensory 
intensely affective experience.  He felt a power come over him and he had a 
sense that good and evil (or perhaps God and the Devil) were doing battle 
over him. 
5.5.2 Perceptual Anomalies 
5.5.2.1 Voice Hearing and Related Phenomena 
Alison, Barbara and Caroline all had ‘voice hearing’ or related experiences.  
As I have mentioned above (in section 5.4.4) voice hearing (or Auditory Vocal 
Hallucinations – AVHs) and similar related phenomena are common 
symptoms in some diagnosable mental illnesses (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2013, p.87).  The experience itself is usually described as 
hallucinatory and the explanation that a person might give for having this 
experience is described as delusional.  ‘Voices’ and related phenomena and 
are also experienced by people who do not seek or require psychiatric help 
(Romme and Escher, 1993). 
Alison’s delusional explanation for her ‘voices’ related to hearing other 
people’s thoughts and conversation, Barbara felt that God was talking to her 
and Caroline thought her ‘voices’ had something to do with the government.  
Their ordinary experiences of their own thoughts, imaginings, hopes, desires 
and fears seemed to somehow be outside themselves.  They did not seem to 
be self-produced and they had no sense that these thoughts were owned by 
them.  Alison, Barbara and Caroline experienced their own mental activity 
(perhaps combined with other sounds or prompts in the environment) as 
coming from outside themselves in some sense.  This is a direct subjective 
primary sensory experience to which others have no access.  All three of 
them experienced this over months or years.   
Alison found that she was experiencing ‘voices’ in the environment when 
there was no one else there or when she could see that those who were 
present were not actually speaking. She at first found this peculiar and 
thought she might be ill.  
“I’d got an appointment with him and I woke up and I said to D today I’m 
going to take control of my life, I’m going to see Dr T [laughs] I said and 
this time I’m going firstly I’m going to apologise for the time before 
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because I did scream the surgery down literally.  And I said I’m going to 
tell him that I need help and can he please help me.  And D said why 
and I said because I’ve got voices in my head…” (Alison 1, 5:45-52) 
As this experience persisted she came to accept that something was 
happening to her that required explanation.  As we saw in chapter 4 she 
incorporated this anomalous perceptual experience into her world view in a 
way that made sense of what was happening and came to accept that she 
could talk to people without moving her mouth, hear other people’s thoughts 
and hear long distance conversations.  
At the time of being interviewed Alison had sought help and recognised that 
the ‘voices’ were a stress response relating to her ‘breakdown.’  However, as 
we saw in chapter 4, she was still adamant that she had been able to hear 
other people’s thoughts: 
“Well, no, that is true.  I could hear people’s thoughts.” (Alison 2, 5:4)   
This demonstrates the vividness and intensity of this subjective primary 
sensory experience.  While it was happening she concluded that she could 
‘hear’ long distance conversations (when no one else was there), read the 
minds of others (when people were there but did not appear to be speaking) 
and converse with people ‘telepathically’ (with people who were present and 
people who were not).  This subjective experience is not readily dismissed.  
On the one hand Alison knows she was ill and on the other hand she is 
convinced she could ‘hear people’s thoughts.’ 
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Barbara felt she could talk to God through telepathy and God would talk to 
her.  This realisation came about after she had experienced intense emotions 
and after anomalous perceptual experiences where objects and sounds in the 
environment stood out to her and became personally salient.  It is not clear 
exactly when or how the intense emotional experiences and perceptual 
anomalies gave way to direct communication with God.  She does, however, 
say that when she realised that she was talking to God and God was talking 
back she was really happy.   
“And I was like… Oh my god… and it was really lovely at first I was just 
talking to… I was just talking to god.  And I was like really really happy.” 
(Barbara 1, 2:7-9) 
She had been searching for an explanation for the anomalous experiences 
and this appeared to give her some relief from her confusion.  This feeling of 
relief or resolution is a common feature at this stage of delusion formation.55   
Once she realised that God was talking to her and that his love was 
unconditional she needed an explanation for the mental pain and negative 
thoughts she was also experiencing.  At some point the negative thoughts 
become ‘detached’ and she experiences them as coming from outside herself 
in some sense.  Again, she struggles to make sense of this. 
“Well… god was picking me up and talking to me all the time and so the 
messages were coming into my mind as well… but…. Then I realised 
there was a devil.  I did realise there was a devil.  And…  he was 
                                            
55 I discuss this more in Chapter 6.   
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threatening me but I was begging God to clear my mind and tell me 
which one was God and which one was the devil, because I didn’t 
know.” (Barbara 1, 3:28-32) 
Barbara’s experiences were intense, persistent primary and subjective and 
others did not have access to them.  She incorporated these experiences into 
her world view and concluded that she and God were conversing using 
‘telepathy.’ 
Caroline said she ‘grew into’ her voices and does not remember when they 
started.  She realised with hindsight that her odd behaviours, that she did not 
understand, where she felt compelled to act were driven by voiced commands 
that she was unable to resist.  She recounts an incident where a voice is 
commanding her to behave in a way that she would not normally: 
“…it started off like a command.  So I felt impelled to do the actions, 
so… yeah, I lost one friend because I tipped a drink over their head sort 
of thing.  Um… some of them afterwards understood… I didn’t want to 
do it, I kind of… had to be compelled to do it” (Caroline 1, 5:19-22) 
Caroline was often afraid that the government or some third party was going 
to do her or her family harm.  The ‘voices’ threatened her and told her she had 
to behave in certain ways to prevent this harm.  The experience was primary, 
intense and persistent.  She did not question whether these voices were real 
and she was less worried about where they were coming from than what they 
were actually saying.  She assumed that the harm that they threatened would 
come to pass if she did not act in the way that they commanded.  No one else 
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has access to Caroline’s experience.  The way she described it and her 
behaviour as a result of it points to the compelling nature of this anomalous 
subjective experience. 
Alison, Barbara and Caroline all had ‘voice hearing’ type experiences.  They 
experienced their own thoughts as being somehow ‘outside’ themselves.   
These experiences might be though of as perceptual anomalies. 
5.5.2.2 Delusions of Control 
Caroline also had some experiences where she felt it was not her that was 
acting.  When I asked her if she could tell me more about what it was like 
when she was taking overdoses she replies: 
“I can’t really, cos… it did just… it was just like it weren’t me… and… I’m 
there taking these pills and… it was like… I’m sat there and I’m looking 
at them… but it’s not me controlling my arm to take them”. (Caroline 1, 
12:2-5) 
As I have mentioned above (in this chapter, section 5.4.2) this is known as a 
delusion of control and is a common symptom in some psychiatric diagnoses. 
Andrew also experienced delusions of control.  He fell to the ground when he 
was overtaken by an inexplicable power.  When he started writing he had the 
sense that he was not in control of this process and that someone else (God) 
was ‘making’ him write. Andrew’s ordinary sense of ownership and agency 
with regard to his body and with regard to action was altered in a way that he 
found extremely difficult to explain: 
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“but I was compelled… not compelled… commanded to write.  There’s 
only one way that I can explain it.  Imagine someone put your hands on 
a piano, and… they play it for you.  That’s exactly what it felt like.  And it 
felt like God was… on my shoulder or over my shoulder, however you 
want to coin it, or… inside me. (Andrew 2, 6:49-53) 
Despite what he has been told about his mental illness Andrew’s direct 
subjective experience of this overwhelming perceptual anomaly was so 
compelling he could not dismiss it: 
“…was that my brain that’s… did that?  Or… or was it a religious 
experience?  At the moment I do not know.” (Andrew 2, 13:4-5) 
“…you know…  because I don’t know enough about the medical c… I 
don’t know enough about either.  I don’t know enough about the medical 
and I don’t know enough about the religious experiences that people 
have.  I can only go by what I felt, and it did not feel medical.” (Andrew 2, 
13:9-13). 
Andrew was struggling to make sense of what had happened to him.  He 
knew he had been ill and he understood that his OCD, intrusive thoughts and 
addiction to sleeping tablets were all problematic.  With regard to his 
delusional experience he found the subjective experience so compelling that 
he could not see how it could be ‘medical.’   
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5.5.3 Emotional Anomalies 
Barbara felt despair about her husband leaving and became suicidal.  She 
was overwhelmed by feelings of guilt about past decisions.  She also 
experienced intense joy, fear and anger.  At times these emotions were free-
floating and objectless.  Her guilt too felt objectless at times and became 
attached to other experiences like eating and smoking.  To start with she did 
not understand this and felt that the degree or intensity of her feelings did not 
make sense.  These free floating intense emotions were unusual and 
demanded an explanation: 
“…I’d already been through a bad time, took an overdose, everything 
and then all of a sudden… I felt better after I’d prayed.” (Barbara 1, 1:14-
15)   
“…and this absolute fear then came among me.” (Barbara 1, 2:15-16) 
“…I felt like a robot.  And I was like, this is not living, this is existing and I 
was really in a bad temper.  And I got my plates and I smashed them all 
and then I went… I went up to bed.  I was sleeping in bed and I woke up 
with this… absolutely agonising pain.  And I was like oh my god I’m 
sorry, I’m sorry, I’m sorry.  And the pain went away.” (Barbara 1, 2:32-
37) 
Barbara has experienced extremes of emotional pain.  She was desperate 
and took an overdose, she then felt terror in relation to guilt and the fear of 
retribution and felt the need to atone.  Her atonement behaviours (starving 
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herself, staying in and giving up smoking) made her feel like a ‘robot’ and then 
she became extremely angry.  After smashing her plates she went to bed and 
woke up in agony (she does not elaborate on this so I am unclear if this was 
mental pain of physical pain).  Begging God’s forgiveness released her from 
the pain (and perhaps re-enforces her delusion). 
She describes her ‘messages’ (from God and the Devil) as being emotional in 
nature: 
“I was getting all these messages some from God, some from the devil, 
but mostly…  it was love and fear, like anger, fear.” (Barbara 1, 3:33-34) 
Barbara describes extremes of emotion – from agony to ecstasy – including 
severe physical pain with no readily available explanation: 
“I was in absolute agony.  Really really pure agony.  Boredom, pains in 
my arms, it felt like my arms were broken, pains in my neck, I couldn’t lie 
down, every pain you imagine.  And I was scared.” (Barbara 2, 6:12-15) 
“…when I sit and talk to god I still get high and happy and I’ll smile or I’ll 
cry because I’m quite tear struck when I’m talking… when I’m sitting 
talking to God.  But…  then I get pain, and I cry cos of the pain. Or I get 
bored and I’m fed up and I cry cos of that.” (Barbara 2, 13:32-35) 
“I mean mental pain… it’s worse than a headache. Because you can’t... 
it’s… that… that’s… that’s what the devil does to me.  It’s like a cloud in 
your brain and you can’t do anything through it.” (Barbara 2, 14:3-6) 
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Barbara was high and happy when she talked to God and was in pain 
(physical and mental) when the Devil was involved.  These emotions were 
extreme, intense and unusual.  Although the different emotions come and go 
the persistence of intense emotions of one kind or another is evident.  
Barbara has felt intense sadness (or depression), intense joy, intense fear, 
intense guilt and intense anger.  Over time she comes to associate feeling 
good with interacting with God and feeling bad is associated with interacting 
with the Devil. 
Caroline was traumatised from an early age.  She was bullied by her sister, 
physically abused by her father and grew up in an emotionally cold 
environment.  Emotions were not acknowledged in her family and she grew 
up with an inability to express her emotions through language.  Later, her 
relationship with her partner deteriorated and, whilst she did not recognise it 
at the time she says, with hindsight, that she was trapped and desperate to 
get away from this distressing situation.  Caroline experienced intense 
distress but was unable to acknowledge or articulate this at the time.  She had 
previously felt ‘numb’ or ‘ok’ and, whilst she had been in stressful situations in 
the past, she had been able to negotiate them and, in some sense, manage 
her emotions.  As the distress intensified she was no longer able to do this.  
She started to take overdoses and felt compelled to behave in odd ways for 
which she had no explanation at the time.  She did not or could not allow 
herself to articulate her intense emotional distress.  When talking about being 
in an abusive relationship she says: 
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“I don’t think it was so much that I weren’t feeling it, I was… it’s just the 
fact that you’ve got to bottle it.” (Caroline 1, 9:35-36) 
“…you can’t show it, it doesn’t mean you don’t feel it but you just can’t 
show it.  And… yeah I… think for the start of… it made me upset but by 
the end I was just numb because it just happened so many times.” 
(Caroline 1, 9:40-43) 
“Yeah… you just trap so many emotions inside that you don’t know 
which one to show or which one you’re feeling at the time, that it just 
becomes all numb…  that… I’m not sure… if it’s numb you’re not feeling 
anything or if it’s a numbness you’re feeling everything at once and you 
just can’t process that quickly…” (Caroline 1, 10:8-12) 
When Caroline talks about acknowledging her voice hearing experiences she 
says: 
“I still felt emotions as such.  So I was scared because I didn’t know what 
was going on, fearful of them… um… confused a lot of the time, but 
again it was just one of those… you got to bottle it, you can’t show… that 
it’s a problem, which just added to the fact it become numb on a lot of 
occasions.” (Caroline 2, 12:17-20) 
Caroline experienced intense, distressing emotions for which she had no 
language.  She was unable to articulate what she felt at the time and could 
make no sense of her own behaviour.  Later, when she experienced ‘voices,’ 
this added to her distress and confusion and, at the time when it first 
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happened and for some time afterwards, she was still unable to articulate any 
of this. 
Andrew was bullied at work.  He became fearful and hyper vigilant in relation 
to work colleagues, fellow students and his tutor.  He developed OCD and 
intrusive thoughts.  These problems prevented him from sleeping.  He 
describes the level of distress he was feeling at this time as ‘torture.’  This 
intense emotional response became unbearable.  The ‘torture’ was persistent 
and terrifying.  He did not understand what was happening to start with.  
These intense and distressing feelings went on for months before he sought 
help.   
When he had his delusional experience intense affective states were involved 
here too: 
“Um… now all I know is what happened was is that I was… went on the 
floor, went on my… this was on my lounge floor, went on the floor and it 
just felt like evil was trying to turn me into its thing.” (Andrew 2, 5:9-12) 
Andrew felt he was fighting for his life in a battle of good versus evil.  He had 
to take certain actions to do what he felt was required and this whole 
experience was very frightening.  
5.6 Discussion and Implications 
It is well established that stress is involved in psychosis.  When endogenous 
and/or exogenous stressors exceed a level that is tolerable for a person then 
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psychosis occurs.  The exact nature of the stressors and the levels of intensity 
required for psychosis to develop will be different for different people (Zubin et 
al., 1983).  The literature suggests that some people have a vulnerability to 
stressors and are more likely to become mentally ill than others.  Whilst this 
might be true I suspect that enough stress can make even the most robust 
person ill.  Stress and anxiety can have a number of different effects on eating 
behaviour including reduction in appetite (Macht, 2008).  Stress also has 
different effects on sleep and can prevent a person getting enough sleep.  
This is bi-directional and lack of sleep can, in turn, affect a person’s mood and 
emotional life (Kahn et al., 2013).  Everyday stress is experienced through 
lived experience and is persistent and on-going.  Being human is a process.  
People do not have fixed states.  If a person lives in a stressful environment 
she will respond to this through the process of living through it.  A person’s 
emotional response to an incident might have an affect on what she thinks 
about herself and the world, this might have an impact on how she responds 
to others in her immediate environment and their response to her might have 
a further impact on her emotional life, what she thinks about the world and 
what she thinks and feels about other people – and so it goes on.  In this way 
environmental stress, affect and cognition are intermeshed and therefore 
multi-directional.   
If my understanding of what my research participants have told me and their 
recollection and descriptions are accurate it would seem that, in the cases of 
Alison, Barbara, Andrew and Caroline persistent intense affective, perceptual 
and emotional anomalies are present prior to the formation of their delusions. 
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If delusions form as a result of some kind of affective, perceptual or emotional 
overload related to lived experience then this means that any of us might 
become delusional.  It is of course possible that there are people who are 
more prone to delusions, perhaps due to problems with emotional regulation 
or specific emotion related personality styles as a result of developmental and 
biological or physiological factors.  Two people need not respond in the same 
way to the same lived experience.  However, I want to suggest that whoever 
you are a significantly intense and persistent affective, perceptual or 
emotionally anomalous environment would result in a demand to re-evaluate 
your understanding of the world and this would result in delusion formation.   
If we understand delusion formation in this way then we can no longer think in 
terms of ‘them and us’ when it comes to mental illness.  As I have said in 
chapter 4 gaining this kind on understanding about mental illness and making 
this publically available opens discourse, reduces stigma and might mean that 
people seek help sooner.  
If delusions are understood as arising as a result of persistent and/or intense 
perceptual, affective or emotional anomalies then this has implications for 
research both in cognitive science and in neuroscience.  We might also think 
that a move away from the cognitivist definition of delusion is called for.  
Understanding delusion in terms of affective, perceptual and emotional 
anomalies might also have implications for treatment and novel interventions 
that target perceptual, affective or emotional domains might be developed as 
a result. 
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In the next chapter I look at how delusion formation might perform a short 
term protective role enabling a person to avoid unbearable distress and how 
this is supported by my empirical research.  
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CHAPTER 6 - THE PROTECTIVE NATURE OF 
DELUSION 
______________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Introduction 
Whilst I was not specifically looking for evidence that delusions might be 
protective in some way it became clear to me from the descriptions given by 
my research participants that three out of the four people interviewed had 
delusions that could be described as having a short-term beneficial impact on 
wellbeing.  Taken in context, within the narrative of the individual, the delusion 
provides meaning, protection from despair and perhaps even protection from 
suicide. 
Three of my research participants each gain some of these short-term 
protective benefits through their delusion formation.  In section 6.2 I take each 
person in turn and, using quotes to illustrate the experience, I describe the 
antecedents to the onset of their illness, the way the illness develops and the 
possible protective or beneficial nature of delusion formation.   In section 6.3 I 
explore the implications of this. 
6.2 Empirical Evidence 
There is evidence that sub-clinical delusional optimism about personal 
attributes and abilities as well as future outcomes and relationships is both 
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normal and good for a person’s mental health (Sharot, 2012).  We routinely 
see the world through ‘rose tinted spectacles’ and assume things will turn out 
well for us.  Provided we do not experience too many distressing incidents 
that give us evidence to the contrary we are able to maintain this outlook and 
this gives us a sense of hope for the future (even if the present is difficult) and 
enables us to retain a sense of agency and to retain vital and meaningful 
connection with our environment.  
In cases where a person’s environment threatens this sense of agency, 
meaning and connection life might become unbearable.  Despair ensues and 
a person seeks any means available to them to regain agency, meaning and 
connection.  It is thought that delusions can form to protect a person from 
these (potentially unbearable) losses.  If the environment becomes perplexing 
then forming new ideas or beliefs about the meaning of this environment and 
how a person can relate to it provides relief (Jaspers, 1997; Mishara, 2009).  
Delusion formation then represents a complete reorganisation of the person’s 
experience enabling the person to retain vital connection with that new 
environment (Mishara, 2009) and has been described as an adaptive 
breaking of ‘the doxastic shear pin56’ to preserve ‘more expensive parts of the 
system’ (Mishara and Corlett, 2009).  Delusion might prevent a person from 
acknowledging facts about their circumstances that are unbearable (McKay et 
                                            
56 A shear pin is a mechanical safeguard or safety device designed to shear 
or break in the case of a mechanical overload.  Typically if a piece of 
equipment is used incorrectly or forces are applied that should not be applied 
the shear pin breaks and prevents this incorrect use or force from damaging 
the equipment (only the shear pin is broken) thus saving the rest of the 
equipment.  
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al., 2005) and help to preserve agency in the short term after a crisis 
(Bortolotti, 2016).  There is evidence that persecutory delusions can mask low 
self-esteem (Lyon et al., 1994) and there is some evidence that people with 
delusions find life more meaningful than other (non-delusional) groups tested 
in the same way (Roberts, 1991).  Occasionally delusion formation can be 
positive and can contribute to a person’s flourishing (Fulford and Jackson, 
1997). 
I now examine the ways in which delusion formation might be thought of as 
beneficial for three of my research participants.  Caroline is not included here 
as her delusion(s) did not have any obvious benefits.  
6.2.1 Barbara 
6.2.1.1 Antecedents 
As described in chapter 4 one of the research participants, Barbara, was 
married to a man who was a serial adulterer who had already left or 
threatened to leave her on a number of occasions for other women. When 
they finally split up Barbara became extremely depressed.  
Barbara was desperate for the pain of this separation to go away and she had 
been through this kind of emotional pain on a number of occasions.  While 
she was feeling this misery she took an overdose.  She did not seek 
psychiatric help at this time.  Although there might have been some 
ambivalence about whether she wanted to get back together with her 
husband or not she seemed to be saying that she did not want to go through 
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this distressing and depressing cycle again.  She prayed for resolution and for 
the pain to go away. 
6.2.1.2 Prodromal phase  
Barbara suddenly felt better.  Her depression and mental anguish 
disappeared and she was enjoying life.  She was engaged with the world, 
seeing friends, going out and enjoying herself.  At the time she was relieved, 
pleased and happy but with hindsight she thought this is odd.  As we saw in 
chapter 4 around this time Barbara started to get the sense that she was 
being watched and that songs on the radio were presenting important 
messages to her.   
6.2.1.3 Development of the delusion 
This general feeling that she was being watched and that she was getting 
messages from the radio persisted.  One day she got messages in such a 
way that made her certain her experience was supernatural in some way:  
“….you don’t imagine that it’s going to be something out of this world.  
You believe it’s something in this world and you try and explain 
everything.” (Barbara 1, 1:34-36) 
She suddenly realised it must be God.  At first she was really happy and she 
described this realisation (that God was sending her messages) as ‘really 
lovely.’  This feeling of relief from puzzlement or resolution is a common 
feature at the onset of the formation of a delusional schema (Mishara, 2009; 
Jaspers, 1997).  The world, which Barbara experienced as ‘weird’ and finds 
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difficult to describe suddenly made more sense.  An explanation had been 
found for the sense that she was being watched and for the messages that 
she had been getting.   
A few days later Barbara suddenly got messages about a personal decision 
that she had made a number of years earlier.  She made this decision against 
her better judgement in order to keep her marriage together.  Her husband 
had insisted on it and threatened to leave if she did not do what he asked.  
When she received this message Barbara was overwhelmed by fear and guilt 
and the need to atone.   
As we saw in chapter 4 Barbara also experienced other intense emotion: love 
and anger (as well as fear and guilt).   On the one hand it seemed to her that 
the intense emotions had something to do with God and the Devil and at the 
same time she appeared to recognise that the emotions did not ‘match’ her 
initial attempt at reason giving.  She described her guilt as more akin to the 
kind of guilt a person might feel if they had murdered someone.  This guilt is 
intense57 and perhaps experienced as free floating with no obvious object.  
She attached the guilt to her smoking but this still did not quite make sense to 
her.   
Barbara was sectioned under the Mental Health Act and detained in hospital 
against her will.  While she was in hospital she drew a paper shield, she says: 
                                            
57 A psychodynamic therapist, or perhaps any psychologically minded person 
might think this guilt relates to the past decisions she made against her better 
judgment in order to stay with her husband and that this is unexamined or 
unresolved. 
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“Now, I didn’t make that shield God made it through me and it said all 
nice things about me, that I was beautiful, I was intelligent, I was 
important.  And it felt really good.  I said look what I’ve done look what 
I’ve done, I was really happy.  I was really happy, and… then… as I was 
writing one verse, I seen ‘I am beauty in his sight’, I went to write I am 
beauty in his sight.  And I thought aw no… and God cried, my eye came 
with tears and everything.  God said no that is right you can write that 
down.  So I wrote it down and put God… I am beauty in his sight.” 
(Barbara 1, 6:16-24) 
As I mentioned in chapter 4 at times Barbara’s direct communication from 
God related to positive thoughts about her, she says: 
“…as God was talking to me he was making sure that I knew there was 
nothing wrong with me.  And he’s always there, whether I’m right, 
whether I’m wr… well, he, he says I’m never wrong, God says I’m never 
wrong.” (Barbara 2, 7:15:18) 
“Right, if I say something bad about myself and God will cry and say ‘no 
that’s not right.’” (Barbara 2, 15:1-2) 
“And it doesn’t matter how much bad you do, well, it doesn’t matter what 
I do, he’ll never stop loving me ever.” (Barbara 2, 15:44-45) 
“He wouldn’t let me do…  he wouldn’t let me do anything that would 
damage me… something that I wouldn’t be able to live with (Barbara 2, 
16:1-6) 
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Barbara’s delusion enabled her to feel that she was loved and lovable, that 
she was intelligent, beautiful, important and was forgiven for past actions.  Her 
previous depression, guilt and fear were erased when she realised that God’s 
love was unconditional.  In addition, her tendency to negative self-talk was 
responded to by God, directly, through telepathy.  God told her that the bad 
things she thought about herself were mistaken. 
The content of this delusion might be described as protective.  Barbara was 
protected from feelings of being unloved which relate to her husband leaving, 
she was protected from feelings of guilt relating to decisions she had made in 
the past and she was protected from other negative things she might think 
about herself.  This might prevent a downward spiral of negativity and guilt 
leading to depression and perhaps suicide. 
Eventually God told her she was his child.  She now had an explanation about 
why God did not want her to eat or smoke - she did not need mortal or human 
comforts - God gave her everything she needed: 
“…eventually he told me I was his child, I was his real child just like 
Jesus. I’m God’s first girl.  God’s firstborn girl, he’s never ha… created a 
girl before. God created Jesus and he created me.  And… I was… and it 
was the food… and then I realised the food and drink weren’t because 
he was punishing me.  It’s because I didn’t need them.  Because if God 
creates someone he’ll create them with everything they need to survive. 
Because he loves me that much he would not leave me without 
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something I need to survive. So I actually didn’t need the food and 
drink.” (Barbara 1 9:14-22) 
After a later relapse Barbara described a time of utter bliss.  Songs on the 
radio were all positive and joyful.  God told her that all the songs were for her.   
When God spoke to her she felt euphoric, like a child and full of energy.   
After a period in hospital Barbara’s euphoria had gone.  She hung on to the 
notion that God was with her is order to put up with the anguish and mental 
pain that she was now in which she described as unbearable.  It is completely 
understandable that Barbara preferred being euphoric and talking to God than 
suffering mental anguish.  She tried to retain her connection with God, hoping 
that she could, again, reach the state of bliss that she was in before she was 
hospitalised. 
Barbara said that God had written poems through her which help explain his 
plan and the way the world is.  Barbara said that others would be unable to 
cope with the knowledge of their own mortality:  
“… if everyone knew what I knew… then there’d be mass hysteria, 
everyone would be crying, upset because they know they can’t live, 
there’s no heaven for them. There’s no…  its only… that’s why… I’m the 
o… because I am going to heaven definitely.  It’s set in stone.” (Barbara 
2, 12:14-19) 
It seems that the certainty that she is God’s child and that she is immortal was 
protecting her from the mental anguish associated with the inevitability of 
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death.  Barbara used her delusional schema to help her negotiate all mental 
distress.  On the one hand this might be described as protective or adaptive 
as it prevented her from going into a negative downward spiral.  One could 
argue that the doxastic shear pin designed to break when Barbara’s 
knowledge of the real world threatened to overwhelm her (Mishara and 
Corlett, 2009) enabled her to experience the world differently and thus 
protected her, at least in the short term, from unbearable mental distress – 
mental distress that was so bad she wanted to die.  This might be described 
as adaptive.  However, Barbara did not get help for several months and her 
new way of seeing the world became so entrenched that it might be the cause 
of some of her mental distress.   
6.2.2 Andrew 
6.2.2.1 Antecedents 
As we saw in chapter 4 Andrew joined a ‘job for life’ workplace at a young 
age.  He was probably been being bullied at work and he found this almost 
too distressing to talk about describing his workplace as a ‘hellhole’.  Family 
circumstances meant that he was very much left ‘to his own devices.’  He 
became fixated on work, concerned about doing well in his job and worried 
about the consequences of getting this wrong. 
It seems that he felt utterly powerless in this situation.  He realised that he had 
no choice about what work he was asked to do, who he worked with, how 
management treated him and how the hierarchy worked.   
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He described an incident where he was intimidated by three managers who 
were trying to make him take on more work (work that he did not think he 
would be able to do).  He said, at this stage, he was so distressed that he 
wanted to ‘go nuts’ or smash a chair and it took a great deal of effort to stay 
calm. 
He was fixated on work and fixated on doing a good job from the very 
beginning and the need to do well seemed to become more intense as time 
went on.  Andrew resolved to make things better at work by training in Human 
Resources (HR) so that he could get out of his immediate environment and 
improve the workplace environment for himself and others.   
Andrew’s ability to look after himself deteriorated as he became more fixated 
on work and on his training course.  He realised, with hindsight, that he was 
not getting enough sleep, he was not eating properly and he was becoming 
isolated (prioritising his work and his course over his social life).  At some 
point Andrew became addicted to sleeping tablets because he could not sleep 
as a result of stress, overwork and obsessive or intrusive thoughts.  He 
eventually dealt with his addiction but he still was not sleeping properly or 
looking after himself. 
Andrew started behaving oddly.  He started becoming obsessed with what 
others thought and he describes this as being paranoid.  Andrew’s description 
implies that the workplace was a distressing and unpleasant place and that it 
might be necessary to be concerned about what others thought in order to 
survive.  It is also possible that the ‘dangers’ in the workplace were highly 
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unpredictable requiring extra vigilance to be able to navigate the hostile 
environment.   
Andrew became obsessed with a need to go to the toilet, repeatedly thinking 
about it and finding that this made it increasingly difficult to concentrate on 
other things.  He also developed checking behaviours.  After he had finished 
and passed his training course this problem escalated.  He received a 
diagnosis of OCD about five months later when he eventually sought help.  I 
estimate, based on his description of the build up to this, that his intrusive or 
obsessional thoughts as well as a degree of paranoia where causing 
problems for about six months before his full-blown OCD set in. 
He got to a stage where he felt utter despair and obsession and was finding it 
increasingly difficult to function.   
6.2.2.2 Despair 
For months Andrew was in utter despair.  Work was a hellhole, he was 
obsessed with doing well on his training course, he was obsessed with doing 
well at work, he was frightened of the people in the workplace environment 
and the consequences of doing badly or not doing what was asked of him and 
he was plagued by intrusive thoughts, obsession and paranoid thoughts.  As 
we saw in chapter 4: 
 “…and then it just got worse into total chaos, um… chaos and torture.” 
(Andrew 1, 1:38-39) 
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Andrew became socially isolated, he left work and he stayed at home 
watching ‘hero’ films.  Eventually he had what appears to be a psychotic 
episode.  He sent an email, called the police, called an ambulance and ended 
up as a psychiatric in-patient.   
6.2.2.3 Development of the Delusion 
With regard to delusion when Andrew recounts his story, in the first instance 
he denied experiencing anything that others would call delusional and, at the 
same time, he knew he had experienced strange things and behaved in ways 
that he previously would not have.   
As we saw in chapter 4 Andrew wrote an email about power and injustice 
saying that he was willing to stand up and challenge various global problems.  
He sent this to a lot of people.  He said that, at the time of writing the email, a 
sense of being directly in touch with God and being his messenger was 
overwhelming but has now passed.  However, as he talked about the 
experience he asserted that he was God’s messenger and at the same time 
he wondered if he was mentally ill.  He said the notion that he behaved in this 
way as a result of mental illness seems implausible to him because it did not 
feel ‘medical.’  The feeling of the power that came over him was utterly 
inexplicable and therefore must be supernatural in some way.  As we saw in 
chapter 4 he fell onto the floor, was overwhelmed by a powerful and 
indescribable force and felt that God and the Devil were dong battle over him.  
Ultimately he felt compelled or commanded to write and send an email: 
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 “…but I was compelled… not compelled… commanded to write.  
There’s only one way that I can explain it.  Imagine someone put your 
hands on a piano, and… they play it for you.  That’s exactly what it felt 
like.  And it felt like God was… on my shoulder or over my shoulder, 
however you want to coin it, or… inside me.” (Andrew 2, 6:49-53) 
“I’m a… I’m a full believer because I know what it felt like.  He was with 
me, over my shoulder or… or yeah, he was with me.  It was a force that 
was so powerful I can’t even explain it to you.  (Andrew 2, 11:47-50) 
“I wouldn’t even be able to, it’s futile.” (Andrew 2, 12:1)  
“And I know how powerful OCD is.  What I experienced then uh… was 
like [sighs] …  I don’t know… at least 20 times more powerful than that, 
at least 10 times more powerful than OCD.” (Andrew 2, 12:11-14) 
“The… the power cannot be described.  The only person who could be 
able to… is someone who’s been through it as well.” (Andrew 2, 12: 26-
27) 
One could argue that the powerful feelings saved Andrew from the despair of 
obsession.  He had previously felt utter despair, his life had lost all meaning 
as it used to revolve around work and he no longer had a job.   His ideas 
about the way the world should be (just, fair, kind) had been shattered.  At this 
point he might feel utterly powerless.  He recognised that he found uncertainty 
difficult and sought constant reassurance from other people.  If God had a 
plan for him then this would resolve the tension he felt about not being able to 
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fully explain, understand or negotiate the world.  It also might restore a sense 
of ‘power’ or agency that has been missing whilst he was suffering in the 
workplace and suffering due to his OCD.   
As we saw in chapter 4, he believed that what he had written in the email 
about certain people actually condemned those people to Hell.  This sense of 
power and agency might help him get relief from the despair that he 
previously felt. 
The sense that his life had meaning and he had suffered for a reason 
provided relief from perplexity (Jaspers, 1997, p.98), he now understood why 
he had suffered and why he was overwhelmed by this unusual and 
inexplicable ‘power.’  His delusion gave him a preferred reality (Roberts, 
1991) as he could now experience the world as just (as opposed to unjust).  
The notion that he was God’s messenger and could help to meter out justice 
enabled contact to be maintained with the world whilst incorporating this 
overwhelming and otherwise inexplicable experience (Mishara, 2009) as well 
as, temporarily, restoring power and agency (Bortolotti, 2016). 
After Andrew’s inexplicable and powerful experience he recounted his 
subsequent contact with mental health services in the following way: 
“And then I rang the ambulance. They came round and I showed them 
what I’d sent.”  (Andrew 2, 7:35-37) 
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“So the third test was: are you prepared to… check into a mental 
institute and you might not come back out again, put your faith in me.  
And that one was frightening.” (Andrew 2, 8:6-8) 
“…take a leap of… leap of faith with me you’ve got to do it properly.   
No… there’s no turning back.  It is…  you have a big possibility… of 
never coming out again. That’s how it felt.” (Andrew 2, 8:16-18) 
“I’m the one who’s got the courage to do what is necessary.  If someone 
was to say ‘why were you chos…?’ if it is that you’re chosen?  I’d only 
use one word and it’s courage.”(Andrew 2, 13:39-41) 
It is not clear whether he went to hospital voluntarily or not, although it does 
appear that he phoned for the ambulance himself.  He has now incorporated 
being in the psychiatric ward into his delusional schema and described it as a 
test from God.  He chose to undertake this test because he had courage, he 
was fearless and he was prepared to do ‘all that is necessary’.  If nothing else, 
this helps to preserve his sense of agency (Bortolotti, 2016) and perhaps 
saves him from a worse alternative - despair and powerlessness.  
6.2.3 Alison 
6.2.3.1 Antecedents 
A few years prior to the interview Alison had problems with a neighbour in her 
home town in the Midlands (a teenage neighbour regularly set fire to the bins 
on the street where she lived).  Alison later moved to the North-West of 
England near where her other family members lived.  At this time a family 
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member was falsely accused of sexual assault.  Alison attended court every 
day, became stressed and started to have difficulty sleeping.  The family 
member was found guilty of the crime and subsequently jailed.  Alison moved 
back to the Midlands and started to have problems with her new neighbour 
who accused her of criminal damage and theft as well as accusing her of the 
same crime her relative was found guilty of.  Her neighbour also expressed 
her fears that Alison’s relative would come to visit her and sexually assault her 
children.  Alison previously had a job in the cash office of a supermarket but 
when there was a problem with her pay she left the job.  The neighbour told 
the other people who lived on her street that Alison was sacked from the 
supermarket job because she had been stealing from them. 
Alison’s husband was dismissive of her concerns saying that it was ‘all in her 
head.’  Alison had no one else to talk to.  The persecution from her neighbour 
became unbearable so Alison moved house within the local area to get away 
from these difficulties (organising the move and the finances alone with no 
help from her husband).  She found that the new neighbour was friends with 
the previous neighbour.  On finding this out she took to her bed and stayed 
there for months only getting up when she had to (e.g, for hospital 
appointments or when her children came to visit).  She was probably 
depressed (but this was undiagnosed), she did not seek help and her 
husband looked after her over this time. 
Alison said she had not slept properly for a few years (since her relative was 
first accused of sexual assault).  She also had atrial fibulation which she found 
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distressing and stressful.  This appeared to have both a physical impact on 
her and a psychological one.  She felt panicky when her heart ‘fluttered’ and 
used breathing techniques to try to ameliorate the ‘flutter’.  She was also 
worried about what the heart condition might mean for her long term health.  
She had plaques in a major artery, experienced a severe headache for two 
weeks and lost her sight for a few hours – she did not explain this and I 
suspect she did not fully understand how these things might be related.58  
When she told her cardiologist that she lost her sight for a few hours he 
admitted her to hospital for observation and tests.  She was told that she was 
likely to require some kind of surgical intervention but she did not know what 
this would be.   
At this time her husband was also ill and she was worried about him and 
found this stressful.  Other stressors included moving house, having to 
manage all the household finances herself and not having anyone to talk to 
about her concerns and worries. 
6.2.3.2 Development of the Delusion 
Alison eventually decided that she should go out (she had a hospital 
appointment and a family event that she wanted to attend).  As we saw in 
chapter 4 she then had a number of experiences related to hearing the 
thoughts and conversations of others.    
                                            
58 This is life threatening. Plaques can break off and cause stroke or heart 
attack.  Alison’s temporary blindness is almost certainly due to a blockage in 
the retinal vein. 
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The first time Alison had this experience she recalled thinking there must be 
something wrong with her – perhaps she was ill, perhaps it all was in her 
head.  She said she just let things go on and they got worse.  On the one 
hand, at the onset, she recognised the bizarre nature of the experience but, 
as the experience persisted, it became incorporated into her experience 
enabling her to keep in touch with a (new) form of reality which included her 
ability to read minds and have telepathic conversations (Mishara, 2009).  As 
we saw in chapter 4 when I asked her about what happened when she could 
hear other people’s thoughts and communicate telepathically she vacillates 
between thinking it was a symptom of her ‘breakdown’ and thinking that she 
actually could hear the thoughts of others and communicate telepathically. 
As the ‘voice’ experiences diminished Alison was confused about what might 
have been happening.  As she was no longer having these intense and 
persistent experiences she could see that her explanation about her 
experience was quite odd.  But at the same time, on recalling the experience 
she was adamant that she had had telepathic conversations with others. 
Perhaps this special ability enabled her to temporarily regain a sense of 
agency in a situation where she felt powerless (Bortolotti, 2016).  The 
policeman, visiting her neighbour next door, was not getting Alison’s side of 
the story, but if she could communicate directly with him telepathically then 
she felt heard and it became more likely that justice would be done.  In this 
way she might be spared the feelings of powerlessness, the anger over the 
injustice of the situation and the fear of the consequences of being falsely 
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accused.  This might enable a preferred contact with a just world as opposed 
to despairing and frightening contact with an unjust world. 
It is unclear exactly when it started but at some point Alison developed 
persecutory delusions (she thought her neighbours were doing things that 
seem implausible) and voices and abilities enabled her to ‘hear’ things from 
her neighbour and social services that were persecutory.  On the other hand, 
her voices and delusional schema about her abilities enabled her to redress 
the balance by conversing (telepathically) with the police to tell her side of the 
story.  
6.2.3.3 Despair and suicidal ideation 
Alison was frustrated that her husband was overly worried about her.  As she 
recounted this she told me that she had felt suicidal because of the stress 
relating to the problems with her neighbour.  She said: 
“… whether he thinks I’m going to commit suicide or whether… he thinks 
I’m going to walk off or… that’s the last thing in my head cos I don’t feel 
like that any more…  I certainly don’t feel suicidal.  I did before, I truly 
did. In fact I popped 400 pills on the table” (Alison 2, 3:25-33) 
Alison ‘heard’ a conversation through the wall between her neighbour and a 
policeman.  She told me about this near the beginning of her first interview.  
She said: 
	 216	
“…in the end the night I was… the night I was considering to commit 
suicide she had a phone call from a police officer his name was sergeant 
J.’ (Alison 1, 1:19-21) 
“…he said, I can see something happening here, there’s a picture 
forming, I think you’re trying to frame this lady for something she’s not 
done.  Um… I was laying there listening to this, I’d already popped all 
these pills.” (Alison 1, 1:25-29) 
“Um… and I heard him say to her that um… that they were going to 
watch it and watch the pattern and see how it formed.  She went 
hysterical at him, she was screaming at him ‘arrest her, arrest her, arrest 
her’.  They had a big row and he ended up telling her to f off.  He 
slammed the phone down on her and I ended up thinking well perhaps 
there is someone who believes me.  And that stopped me taking the pills 
and that is the truth.” (Alison 1, 1: 33-39) 
She reiterates and repeats this point later on in the second interview: 
“If that man hadn’t phoned at the police station, had that row with her 
next door, which he did…” (Alison 2, 3:44-46) 
“Because I heard that conversation, him saying um… I think you’re trying 
to set this lady up T, um… I can see a pattern forming here.  They had a 
big row, she was screaming ‘I want her arrested, I want her arrested’ and 
I told you he told her to f off then he slammed the phone down and I 
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thought oh… somebody is on my side, somebody does believe me.  
That’s how I felt…” (Alison 2 3:54-55 & 4:1-4) 
“I scooped all those pills up and put them in the bin, and then I got them 
out the next morning and flushed them down the toilet cos I didn’t want 
anybody to get hold of them”. (Alison 2, 4:8-10) 
It is, of course, possible that she could actually hear her neighbour shouting 
down the phone but she would not have been able to hear the police 
sergeant’s side of the conversation.  There is a real and pragmatic benefit to 
this ‘voice hearing’ experience.  Alison was enormously relieved that someone 
believed her and this prevented her from taking an overdose of prescription 
medication. 
6.2.4 Interim Summary 
 “humankind cannot bear too much reality” (Eliot, 2001). 
Poets and other writers have known for a long time that real life experiences 
can be unbearable.  Barbara, Andrew and Alison all develop delusions that 
have protective elements.  They were all protected from despair in some way 
and Alison cites what appears to be a delusional or hallucinatory ‘voice 
hearing’ type experience as being directly responsible for preventing her from 
taking an overdose of prescription medication.  Andrew regains a sense of 
agency and meaning from his delusional experience and Barbara staves of 
unbearable feelings relating to abandonment and guilt and has a counterpoint 
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to her own negative and highly critical self-talk through her delusional 
schema. 
6.3 Implications and Discussion 
There are different ways in which we might understand how delusions arise. 
There is a tendency for those who do not have mental health problems to 
view those who do as ‘different’ or ‘other’.  People with a mental health 
problems might be viewed as ‘bad’ because the problem is part of who they 
are or part of their personality and this means they are at fault or morally 
blameworthy.   Alternatively, they might be viewed as ‘mad’ because they are 
diminished and transformed by the illness, they are not to be blamed because 
their brain is ‘broken’ or ‘damaged’ in some way.  As I have said in chapter 4, 
the medical model is alleged to reduce stigma yet stigmatising associations 
are still made between psychosis and dangerousness, lack of autonomy and 
chronicity. 
Some strange beliefs with no apparent evidential basis can have grains of 
truth in them and tell a story when understood within the context of a person’s 
lived experience.  In the cases described in this chapter the delusion is not 
just an abstract or nonsensical aberration it is highly significant for the person 
who experiences it and relates to other aspects of his or her life.  At the time, 
when it is first adopted, it relieves the person of some heavy psychological 
burden.   
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In these cases delusion formation can be seen as a short-term adaptive or 
protective response to disruptive and traumatising life events.  If we 
understand delusion in this way it may be a more effective way to break down 
the stigma associated with psychosis than to describe these people as being 
‘bad’ (at fault morally) or ‘mad’ (having broken or damaged brains).  The 
descriptions of the circumstances in each person’s social and physical 
environment that contribute to the onset of mental health problems helps us to 
understand the experience.  As I have said in chapter 4 this might happen to 
anybody who experiences distressing intense or persistent life changes (not 
withstanding the fact that some individuals may be more vulnerable than 
others to developing psychotic symptoms).   
In the three cases presented here, the context also enables us to see that the 
delusion is formed following a long period of distress, despair, or depression.  
If psychiatry is the study of the different factors contributing to mental health 
problems this might gives us more scope for effective care and treatment 
options.  When people are faced with despair, negative emotions, and suicidal 
thoughts, the adoption of beliefs that make sense of their experiences can, at 
least temporarily, reduce or control the threats they encounter.  This process 
might be described as adaptive and can be conceived of in various ways.  
Delusion formation under these circumstances might be thought of as an 
unconscious defence mechanism or as a basic biological response to life 
threatening or unbearable distress. 
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In this context, it makes sense to advocate early intervention (prior to the 
formation of a delusion).  This might take the form of talking therapy helping a 
person come to terms with her despair or distress in a way that is bearable for 
that person.  As I have mentioned in chapter 4 this has wider political or socio-
economic implications, because the distress might be related to a physical or 
relational environment and this might have to change in order for the despair 
or distress to be ameliorated. 
This view has implications for treatment once a delusion has developed.  If a 
person’s delusional schema helps her stave off unbearable feelings, and 
perhaps suicidality, then simply disabusing her of her delusional belief, 
especially at critical times, might bring about a worse outcome than the 
presence of the delusion.  A challenge to a delusion that is performing a 
protective function might be inappropriate and counter-productive.  An 
alternative means to ‘protect’ the person from what might be unbearable 
alternatives must be considered within the therapeutic intervention before any 
attempt at challenging delusions can be made.  An ineffective challenge might 
serve to raise a person’s defences and strengthen the delusion and an 
effective challenge might shatter the delusion but raise other problems that 
are more psychologically distressing and perhaps even life threatening.  
When a delusional belief is challenged, something else would need to be put 
in its place.  Perhaps a response to the person’s crisis that plays the same 
protective function but is less psychologically costly than the delusion would 
be required. 
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Alternatively, in the short term, as a response to a person’s crisis, we might 
think that therapeutic intervention should take the form of acceptance of the 
subjective experience and acceptance of the delusional belief (as opposed to 
challenge) with a view to focus on other areas like relationships and the 
potential to engage with meaningful flourishing despite illness as well as 
exploration of the subjective experience (as opposed to denial or challenge) 
and alternative sense-making.  This approach would have to be person-
specific and tailored to the individual.  Clinically significant delusion is often 
thought to be paradigmatic of mental illness and, given the short term 
protective nature of some delusions, we might think of therapeutic intervention 
in terms of enabling or facilitating continuing to function within this illness.  
Perhaps we just accept that the delusional belief is important and it is thus 
retained until it is no longer needed.  Havi Carel developed the notion of 
health within illness as a response to chronic illness and disability.  She 
suggests that the individual’s capacity for adaptability and creativity should be 
nurtured and a focus on care rather than cure should be adopted (Carel, 
2007).   These aspects might apply equally well in the short term to those 
experiencing protective delusions.  
If healthcare professionals understand that delusions can be adaptive this will 
alter the way we intervene.  If we alter the way we intervene this might also 
change the way people engage with metal health services.  A focus on 
acceptance and care (rather than challenge and pharmacology) in the short 
term might make seeking help a more appealing option. 
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In summary some psychotic symptoms, commonly regarded as marks of 
madness, such as delusions can be construed as adaptive responses to a 
psychological crisis, viewed in the context of a person’s life experiences.  For 
Barbara, Andrew, and Alison the development of delusions and hallucinations 
seems to be a response to a sustained experience of despair and 
powerlessness.  Barbara overcomes unbearable feelings relating to 
abandonment and guilt and counteracts negative self-talk through her 
delusional schema.  Alison cites what appears to be a delusional or 
hallucinatory ‘voice hearing’ or ‘telepathic’ experience as being directly 
responsible for preventing her from taking an overdose of prescription 
medication at a time when she felt nobody believed her.  Andrew regains a 
sense of agency and meaning from his delusional experience feeling 
empowered to restore justice in the world.  In the short term such experiences 
can be considered adaptive.   
However, this experience can be mixed.  In the case of Alison the content of 
the voice hearing experiences were at times persecutory.  If a delusion 
persists and an elaborate schema is developed (as in the case of Barbara in 
particular) then the delusion might add to a person’s psychological distress as 
it becomes increasingly difficult to incorporate experience into the entrenched 
schema.  Andrew’s delusion restored a sense of agency and gave him 
meaning within a preferred reality yet he has also alienated friends, 
colleagues and others by expressing his delusion in an email.   
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An in-depth analysis of first-person accounts of the context in which delusions 
are formed can help us better understand the nature of psychotic symptoms, 
undermine some of the bases for the common stigmatisation of people with 
psychosis, encourage people to seek treatment sooner and also inform 
treatment options. 
In the next chapter I look at the enactive approach and how this relates to an 
understanding of cognition as well as an understanding of mental illness.  I 
also look at empirical evidence that provides some support for the enactive 
approach to cognition. 
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CHAPTER 7 - THE ENACTIVE APPROACH 
______________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction 
Psychiatric practice is concerned with a vast array of human experiences.  If a 
person is mentally ill she might experience peculiar thoughts, feelings or 
perceptual experiences that cause distress and have a detrimental effect on 
her functioning and wellbeing (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.20).  
These experiences can be understood in terms of psychological distress 
(Payton, 2009), problems with living (Szasz, 1960), problems with one’s 
experience of oneself as a self (Sass and Parnas, 2003) or violations of 
epistemic, moral, emotional or social norms (Broome and Bortolotti, 2009).  
However one chooses to conceptualise mental illness it is always identified at 
the person level.  As I have said in chapter 3 people become mentally ill and 
the illness is manifest in behaviours, thoughts and feelings that are identified 
as problematic by the person experiencing them or by others observing them.  
In this chapter firstly l look at the difficulties that psychiatrists have in 
establishing how mental illness has been brought about and how it might be 
treated in any particular individual (section 7.2).  I then look at the enactive 
approach and how symptoms of mental illness might be framed using the 
enactive approach (section 7.3).  Next I look at some of the empirical 
evidence for bodily and environmental influence on experience in general and 
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on mental health in particular (section 7.4), and consider its implications 
(section 7.5). 
7.2 Why Psychiatry is so Hard 
 “Being a psychiatrist means dealing with ambiguity all the time.” (Dew, 
2009, p.16)  
When meeting a person who describes a vague and distressing uneasiness 
psychiatrist Rachel Dew recognises that she could, by asking the right 
questions, identify a past trauma or a current stress.  She finds herself 
developing a sense of whether the problem is more biological or 
psychological, simultaneously questioning her own ‘dualist’ attitude – as if the 
psychological (ie: thoughts and feeling) weren’t also biological.59   In her 
example she goes on to say of the patient that  “…she needs her serotonin 
levels tweaked, that’s why she feels this way.” (ibid)  And yet she 
acknowledges the truth – that she does not really know why the patient feels 
the way she does.  If she thinks the problem is more psychological she will 
refer her for talking therapy, if she thinks it is more biological she will prescribe 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) which make more serotonin 
available to the brain.  She could use either approach or both simultaneously.  
Further, Dew recognises that what she says to the patient about what she 
thinks is wrong will (probably) come to form part of the patient’s self-narrative 
(Dew, 2009). 
                                            
59 I take this to mean that as people are biological organisms and thoughts 
and feelings are properties or experiences that people have they must also be 
biological in nature.  
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Most psychiatrists recognise that physiological processes affect psychological 
processes and vice versa.  They recognise that talking therapy influences 
psychological processes which in turn affect physiological processes and 
medication influences physiological processes which in turn have an impact 
on psychological processes.  Psychiatrists also recognise that a person’s past 
experience and current lived experience have an impact on her mental 
wellbeing.  All of these potential influences are non-linear and there is a 
complex intermeshing which includes feedback loops between the biological, 
the psychological and the environmental.  This looping intermeshed feedback 
comes about through lived experience at person level.  When a person seeks 
psychiatric help it is unlikely that one can identify a single ‘cause’ of that 
person’s problems.60   
There are competing views with regard to what psychiatry is or what it should 
be.  The medical model was challenged by George Engel in the 1970s when 
he introduced the idea of the bio-psycho-social model into physical medicine 
(Engel, 1977) and this is (supposedly) the standard way in which psychiatry is 
now taught and understood and Thomas Szasz described mental health 
problems as ‘problems with living’ (Szasz, 1960).  Psychiatry remains a 
branch of medicine and, as such, this means that the tools available to the 
psychiatrist are predominantly pharmacological.  In a small qualitative study 
on healthcare workers who were given a vignette of a man displaying 
symptoms that would attract a diagnosis of schizophrenia and then asked to 
                                            
60 See Richard Bentall’s open letter on the ‘causes’ of mental illness (Bentall, 
2016) 
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respond to a questionnaire it was shown that 47.5% of social workers showed 
support for the social model whereas 91.3% of the psychiatrists and 60.8% of 
the CPNs (community psychiatric nurses) favoured the medical model 
(Colombo et al., 2003).  Some regard psychiatry as neuroscience (e.g.: 
Tandon et al., 2015) some say it is simply the study of disorders of the brain 
(e.g.: Bargmann and Lieberman, 2014) and some regard psychiatry as a 
much more complex discipline going beyond the biology of the brain and 
involving social, cultural and psychological dimensions (e.g.: Bracken et al., 
2012).   
In the next section, I illustrate the complexity relating to the onset and 
maintenance of mental health problems using some recent case examples. 
7.2.1 Case Examples 
7.2.1.1 Case Example 1 
In psychiatry a clinician’s perspective can change as she acquires knowledge 
about a person.  At a psychiatric outpatient clinic (whilst shadowing a 
psychiatrist) I encountered a person who sought help through psychiatric 
services as a result of significant low mood, constant crying and thoughts of 
suicide.  A history was taken and it was discovered that she had recently been 
bereaved.  It was understood that she had an on-going thyroid problem and, 
in the first instance her levels of thyroxin were checked and were deemed to 
be as they should be.  The patient herself felt that the bereavement did not 
explain the way she was feeling as it was ‘too extreme’.  She was prescribed 
anti-depressants and referred to a bereavement charity for talking therapy.  
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No change was seen in her condition.  Her psychiatrist changed her 
medication twice but she seemed to be getting worse.  Finally she was offered 
ECT (electro convulsive therapy) which she agreed to.  At this stage she was 
desperate and felt that anything was better than continuing to feel the way she 
did.  After several sessions of ECT she attended a routine thyroid check and 
the levels of thyroxin were found to be incorrect.  The thyroxin was adjusted 
accordingly and within a few weeks she was back to her ‘old self’.  
Again, the ambiguity involved in psychiatric practice arises – the psychiatrist is 
forced to make an educated ‘guess’ about what is wrong and this decision 
dictates how she will treat the patient.  A psychiatrist might say that it looked 
like the problem was psychological in the first instance.  The person was 
upset by the death of a loved one.  This in turn might affect a person’s 
physiology.  Talking therapy might help her come to terms with bereavement 
and anti-depressant might alter her physiology.  With hindsight a psychiatrist 
might say that the thyroxin level was the problem all along and she made a 
mistake by identifying other factors as significant.   However, as the patient 
recovered after a number of months and after receiving talking therapy, anti-
depressants, ECT and an adjustment in her thyroxin we cannot be sure which 
of these factors (if any) were significant in her recovery.  This example 
illustrates the complexity of problems that a psychiatrist might face when 
trying to understand what is happening to a person seeking help. 
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7.2.1.2 Case Example 2 
A client recently came to see me after becoming depressed and being 
prescribed anti-depressants by her General Practitioner (GP).61  The client 
had been evicted from her house and was living with her parents.  She did not 
get on well with her parents as they continued to treat her as if she was a 
teenager (she was in her 30s) and she had to conform to ‘house rules’.  The 
consequences of not conforming meant that she was constantly rowing with 
her parents.  She thought that being evicted from her house was evidence 
that she had not ‘grown up’.  Her best friend from school had just bought a flat 
and was moving in with her boyfriend.  She complained of feeling stressed 
and was not sleeping well.  The lack of sleep was affecting her mood.  She 
said she was more irritable than normal and recently had a row with a work 
colleague.  She was ruminating on how her life might have been different if 
she had finished university.  She also regretted splitting up with her boyfriend 
two years ago and wondered whether it was her fault.  Her perceived ‘failures’ 
seemed to be highlighted when her friend got her new flat.   
Whilst one could argue that this client is not, strictly speaking, severely or 
clinically depressed62 because she is still functioning relatively well (going to 
work/spending time with friends etc.) it is clear that both she and her GP 
would described her as depressed.  She uses this language when talking 
about herself and her GP has prescribed antidepressants.  Yet the ‘treatment’ 
                                            
61 This case example is taken from one examined in the proceedings of the 
AISB 2016 conference (Gunn, 2016a). 
62 For clinical criteria see F32/33 Depressive Episodes/Recurrent Depressive 
Disorder (World Health Organization, 1993a). 
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does not seem to address the problems.  Given her narrative it is hard to see 
how the cause of her depression can simply be a problem with her brain 
chemistry.  It is therefore difficult to understand how a pill that increases the 
serotonin available to her brain can be an appropriate treatment.63 
These examples illustrate the difficulties one might have when 
conceptualising a person’s experience in terms of illness as well as the 
difficulties one might have in deciding on appropriate treatment.  This kind of 
ambiguity is often evident in psychiatry and is further exacerbated because, 
as I have said in chapter 3, gaining a full understanding of a person’s 
experience is unlikely so the psychiatrist might have too little information to 
make a decision about what is ‘wrong.’  There is plenty of evidence to suggest 
that our lived environments influence our experience, our development and 
our mental health in ways that are not fully understood and I will return to this 
in section 7.4.   
In the next section I give an overview of the Enactive Approach to cognition in 
which Varela and colleagues convincingly argue that cognition is constituted 
by the person-environment system.  If we take the Enactive Approach 
seriously we will see the environment as constitutive of mental illness.  
                                            
63 In some circles (although not in GP surgeries) it is controversial whether 
SSRIs have a significant effect on people with depression.  Meta-analysis of 
drug trials shows that improvements in wellbeing are sometimes no better 
than placebo (Kirsch, 2009). 
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7.3 The Enactive Approach  
In this section I briefly look at ‘affordances’ and what is known as the 
‘mereological fallacy’, I then briefly outline the enactive approach as set out by 
Varela and colleagues in their 1991 book ‘The embodied mind : cognitive 
science and human experience’ and elaborate on some of those ideas using 
recent events in relation to colour perception and from artificial intelligence.  I 
suggest that the enactive approach enables us to adopt a more accurate 
framework within which to understand cognition in general and mental illness 
in particular. 
7.3.1 Picking Raspberries, Affordances and the Mereological Fallacy 
7.3.1.1 Picking Raspberries 
As I pick raspberries from a bush in my garden my gaze moves around the 
bush, I duck under the canopy of leaves and move the spindly branches out of 
the way with my hand to try to spot the red fruit.  I cannot undertake this task 
without moving and focussing.  Each new perspective reveals new fruit ready 
to pick.  Once located my initial assessment of the ripeness of the fruit is 
based on the colour.  White fruit and green fruit is totally unripe and (probably) 
inedible.  Red fruit is what I’m looking for.  If it is sufficiently dark red in colour 
I reach out to pick it.  As my thumb and first two fingers close around the fruit I 
put a small amount of pressure on it and pull it towards me.  The pressure has 
to be just enough to pull a ripe raspberry away from the hull.  Too much 
pressure and I will squash the ripe raspberry leaving it inedible or I will pull an 
unripe raspberry off the bush, hull intact, snapped off at the stalk.  If the 
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pressure is just right I pull the ripe raspberry off the bush, leaving the hull and 
stalk behind.  I do this without self-conscious thought.  My body knows how to 
look for ripe raspberries, my perceptual system can spot the likely ripe 
candidates and in some sense my body (my thumb and first two fingers) 
seems to know when a raspberry is ripe enough to pick as I (non-self-
consciously) recognise the feel of the ripe fruit.  All of this happens 
seamlessly.  I use my body and my perceptual system in a number of different 
ways as I respond to my environment.  All of these systems are employed in 
order to achieve my goal.   
7.3.1.2 Affordances 
A raspberry bush affords me the possibility of feeding myself.   
Object/environment/people combinations enable affordances.  The term 
‘affordance’ is used to capture all the possible actions relating to a given 
object/environment/person combination (Gibson, 1977).  Affordances are 
dependent on the physical properties of the environment and the capacities of 
a person in any given situation.  It is possible for a person to have the physical 
capacity to realise an affordance but to simply not know that it is a possibility.  
For example a person presented with a square piece of paper might fold it in a 
particular way to make a sailor’s hat.  The possibility of folding the paper to 
make an origami frog also exists (it is physically possible, the paper is the 
right shape and size and the person has the manual dexterity to do it).  If a 
particular person simply does not know how to make an origami frog this 
might be described as a hidden affordance.   A person might also be mistaken 
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about affordances.  For example, a person might take homeopathic medicine 
believing it has an active ingredient that has an impact on her wellbeing.  This 
might be described as a mistaken affordance.   
A person moves through her environment responding to that environment and 
the possibilities it affords.  Her goal directed decision-making arises from her 
history, her capacities and the environment in which she finds herself.  Any 
given person-environment combination affords an enormous number of 
possibilities so how does a person decide which one to pursue?  I return to 
this in chapter 8. 
7.3.1.3 The Merelogical Fallacy 
Mereology is the study of the relationship between the whole and the parts 
that make up that whole as well as the relationship between the parts within 
the whole.  The term ‘mereological fallacy’ is used to capture the tendency (in 
science, medicine, philosophy and elsewhere) of taking a part (for example 
the brain) to stand for the whole (for example the person) (Bennett and 
Hacker, 2003, chap.3).  Advances in neuroscience might even be responsible 
for increasing this tendency.  
The brain has a function within the organism and is an essential part of the 
organism.  So for example, we need a properly functioning motor cortex to 
walk but we do not walk with our brains.  We also need the normal functioning 
of the brain and of our senses in order to acquire empirical knowledge.  We 
know if someone has knowledge about, say, delusion by her ability to respond 
to questions, solve problems and correct errors about delusion.  Knowledge is 
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manifest in this way.  A brain does not have knowledge, a person has 
knowledge.  A person cannot see if her visual cortex is not functioning 
properly.  Still, we do not see with out visual cortex alone we see with our 
eyes.  We also need light as well as the capacity to make sense of what we 
see.  This capacity is learned as demonstrated by Manoj Kumar Yadav who 
was born blind and had his sight restored at the age of 22.  He was initially 
overwhelmed by what he saw and could make no sense of it and it took him 
about 18 months to ‘learn’ to see (Chatterjee, 2015).  A person also needs a 
fully functioning hippocampus to remember something but it is the person that 
remembers not the hippocampus.  A hippocampus in a vat can have no 
memory.  If we look at fMRI studies which show blood oxygen level increases 
in certain areas of the brain under certain conditions we can perhaps identify 
areas of the brain that are necessary for us to be able to think in certain ways 
but we cannot look inside the brain in this way and identify thoughts.  We can 
observe increased blood flow in a person’s legs under certain circumstances 
but increased blood flow is not running, just a necessary condition for running 
to take place (Smit and Hacker, 2014).  Brains don’t have desires, thoughts 
and feelings - people do, or as Smit and Hacker put it: 
“Nothing a brain can do, no matter whether a human or a non-human 
brain, can satisfy the constitutive grounds (the criteria) for saying of it, 
that it sees or is blind, feels pain, or wants to go for a walk.” (Smit and 
Hacker, 2014, p.1081) 
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I suggest that we can go further still with regard to the way in which the parts 
and the whole are related.  I suggest that mental activity is partly constituted 
by the environment in which a person finds herself.   
When I say that the environment is partly ‘constitutive’ of cognition what I 
mean is that the environment is a part of the process from which cognition 
emerges.  Or, to put it another way, cognition is an emergent property of 
people-environment systems.  I am only interested here in human beings and 
I define (human) cognition or mental activity as all the person level and sub-
personal processes involved in human consciousness.  I understand 
consciousness in terms of subjective experience.  A creature that has 
subjective experience where there is ‘something that it is like’ to be that 
creature can be said to be conscious (Nagel, 1979, chap.12). 
‘Constitution’ in the sense that I am using it does not require that we think of 
environments ‘doing thinking’ or ‘doing mental activity.’  Environments are not 
in themselves conscious or thinking in any way, they are not ‘mental’ in 
themselves they are simply involved in the production of mental activity.  In 
this way constitution incorporates the idea that environments, substances or 
objects in the environment can be said to ‘cause’ mental activity in some 
cases.  For example, it seems right (pragmatic/relevant/useful) to say that 
LSD causes hallucinations in human beings.  It is also the case that LSD is 
constituitive (in the technical sense described above) of the hallucination 
experience in the sense that it is the person-LSD system that experiences 
hallucinations.  LSD is a constituitive part of the process from which 
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hallucinations emerge.  Of course individual differences abound and each 
person will have a different hallucinogenic experience which might be 
reflective of her individual patterned history as well as her mood and the 
physical environment in which she finds herself.  Although we might describe 
the hallucination as being caused by LSB I suspect that ‘causal’ relations that 
imply a one-to-one linear (or perhaps single) cause leading to a particular 
mental outcome (or process) are few and far between.  Even in the LSD 
example other factors (such as personal history, current mood and physical 
environment) will make a difference to the experience.  In general, lived 
experience is far more complex.  The complex mereological looping of the 
person-environment system is always at play.  Cognition in the person-
environment system is never static, it is always ‘in process.’ 
In this way the debates about whether mind (cognition or mental activity) is 
extended (see for example Clark and Chalmers, 1998) and whether there is a 
kind of causal/constitution fallacy (see for example Adams and Aizawa, 2001) 
cease to be relevant.  There is nothing to be gained from these debates.  The 
complex interplay of environment and person ‘creates’ mental activity.  We 
might still have something interesting to say about the degree to which 
environments are intermeshed with mental activity in different cases.  I 
suggest that a continuum approach works best and enables us to make sense 
of the person/environment interplay. Transparent use of objects in the 
environment might be an example of a high degree of intermeshing between 
person and environment.  For example, the cochlear implant is used by a 
person to enable hearing.  She does not self-consciously ‘use’ the cochlear 
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implant she is intermeshed with the implant in such a way that it enables 
hearing and ultimately speech recognition (Gunn, 2014).  The cochlear 
implant is constituitive of the mental activity associated with hearing.  The 
experience emerges from the person-cochlear implant system.  Perhaps at 
the other end of the continuum we might say that simply standing still in a 
given environment, say, on a beach, has a less obvious impact on mental 
activity but has an impact nonetheless (simple bodily and mental responses to 
the undulations of the sand and pebbles under foot as well as perhaps 
affective or emotional responses).  The beach is constitutive of the 
experience.  The experience emerges from the person-beach system. 
Supporters of the extended mind thesis (e.g.: Clark and Chalmers, 1998), the 
embedded mind thesis (e.g.: Rupert, 2011) and the scaffolded mind thesis 
(e.g.: Colombetti and Krueger, 2015; Sterelny, 2010) would all agree that the 
environment must be included in an explanation of mind.  My use of the term 
‘constitute’ embraces the notion that the environment must be included in our 
understanding of mind and that cognitive processes or mental activity emerge 
from the person environment system.  What I mean here is that whether an 
aspect of the environment can be said to cause, scaffold or extend mental 
activity these can all be captured by the notion of constitution.  As I have 
defined it (above) the notion that environment is partly constitutive of cognition 
simply means that the environment is a part of the process from which 
cognition emerges then cause, scaffold and extension are simply ways in 
which the environment constitutes mental activity.  We always interact with 
the environment, we cannot do otherwise, the impact this might have on 
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mental activity is dependent on both the environmental factors and on the 
individual person’s patterned history. 
A person interacts with her environment through the process of lived 
experience.  We are never static and neither is our environment as we move 
through it.  A person responds to the world in which she finds herself, she 
cannot do otherwise.  To put it simply, whilst I can imagine picking raspberries 
this involves different mental and bodily activity than actually picking 
raspberries.  The presence of the raspberry bush is a constitutive part of the 
mental activity involved in this process.  
The world, the evolution of a species and the emergence of cognition through 
embodied action in the world are in constant flux and this means that 
cognition cannot be fixed in terms of brain science alone.  This might be seen 
as problematic.  If one cannot fix on identifiable defining characteristics of 
cognition64 then what hope is there for the science of the mind?  I suggest that 
the enactive approach offers hope as a framework for a better (more 
accurate) albeit more complex understanding of cognition. 
I now give a brief overview of the enactive approach according to Varela and 
colleagues. 
                                            
64 Currently the favoured candidate for scientific understanding of the mind is 
neuroscience (as promulgated by the Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience) 
and for some psychiatry is neuroscience (see for example Tandon et al., 
2015).  The kind of evidence that neuroscience gives includes ‘snapshots’ of 
brain processes (usually described as brain states).  Brain processes are 
clearly necessary for (human) cognition but certainly not sufficient. 
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7.3.2 Overview of the enactive approach 
The mereology of the cognising system is critical to the enactive approach.  
The parts are arranged in a particular way.  The relationship of the parts to 
each other is vital for the function of the whole.  The function of the whole is a 
property of the parts arranged in this particular way.  Or, to put it another way: 
The whole entails the arrangements of these parts in this way.  According to 
the enactive approach a mind does not exist in isolation from a person or the 
world that the person inhabits.  Cognition is a property of the embodied 
embedded person and as such is subject to the complex mereology entailed 
in such a system. 
In 1991 Varela, Thompson and Rosch provided a pragmatic guide designed 
to link or synthesise cognitive science with the phenomenology of human 
experience.  For Varela and colleagues a mind does not exist in isolation from 
a person or the world that the person inhabits.  The notion that a person is 
both embodied and embedded in the world is central to their conceptualisation 
of mind.  Varela and colleagues use Merleau-Ponty to inform the enactive 
approach: 
“The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is 
nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the 
world, but from a world which the subject itself projects.” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p.430).  
A person both shapes and is shaped by her environment.  The enactive 
approach posits that we exercise skillful know-how through action which is 
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both embodied and situated and that the person and the world co-emerge 
through these recurrent sensorimotor patterns (Varela et al., 1991). 
A person is born into a world that exists before she does.  This world is 
understood through lived experience.  A person is a subject within the world, 
the world in turn is projected by the person.  A person is thus, in some sense, 
inseparable from the world into which she is born.  Varela and colleagues 
propose the term enactive approach to capture the notion that: 
“…cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven 
mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a 
history of the variety of action that a being in the world performs (ibid, 
p.9). 
In order to study mind or cognition it is clear that the subject matter of this 
study is the person or the self.  This cannot be studied without taking seriously 
the person’s experience.  Without the person level experience the endeavour 
has no subject matter.  At any time we might shift perspective and look at 
different systems within other systems (for example the nervous system might 
be studied separately from the human being as a whole).  When we shift 
perspective we are no longer looking at the same system.  In this chapter I am 
interested in two different systems: 1) the person as an autonomous system 
and 2) the person-environment system (that is, the way in which a person 
might be said to be interacting with her environment).   
In the enactive approach a biological stance is taken.  Cognition is seen as 
sense-making in terms of basic biological drivers such as survival and 
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reproduction.  As a person is dependent on her environment for survival she 
must be able to make sense of that environment.  Cognition is thus 
understood in terms of making sense of one’s environment.  The enactivist 
understands cognition in the following way: 
• Cognition is an activity relating to a person-environment system.  
Cognition is not something that brains do.  It is not something that 
embodied brains (people) do.  Cognition is something that 
encompasses and engages with the whole person and her 
environment.  I will refer to this as the brain/body/world system 
(BBWS)65.  Cognition arises as a result of this BBWS. 
• The properties of the BBWS depend on the parts of the system as they 
relate to each other.  Cognition is thus considered to be an emergent 
property of the BBWS.  The properties of the whole depend on the 
parts as well as their organisational structure.  
• Cognition is biologically grounded in terms of survival and propagation 
of the species.  Cognition is thus understood in terms of sense-making 
in order to maximise outcomes in these (biological) terms.  It entails all 
the elements of the BBWS (such as organisational structure, 
perception, bodily capacities, environment, culture, goals and values). 
                                            
65 The notion of the BBWS was presented at the Artificial Intelligence and 
Simulation of Behaviour (AISB) conference 2016 in a symposium on 
depression (Gunn, 2016a) 
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In order to incorporate this systemic attitude regarding mind and cognition we 
cannot hang on to any strong sense of representationalism.66 There are some 
cognitive capacities that might be representational in nature and that can be 
replicated using computer models.  An example of this kind of activity was 
recently demonstrated by AlphaGo.   
AlphaGo is a computer model that follows rules, can learn within the paradigm 
of the Chinese game of Go and can, in theory67, represent every possible 
outcome in the game of Go.  AlphaGo recently beat the Go world champion 
(Borowiec, 2016).  This system performs extremely well in one field of activity, 
namely the game of Go.  This is clearly a vastly more simplistic task than 
living a full human life.  In the vast majority of human activities things are 
much more complex.  When, for example, we think about driving a car we can 
see that this is much harder to systematise.  We have a background of 
knowledge about the driving experience and as we learn to drive the ‘know-
how’ process becomes automatic and therefore invisible.  In short, a person 
driving does not self-consciously think about the process of driving, to do so 
would make it impossible.  It is unlikely that a person who is driving has a fully 
filled out representation of all possible outcomes in the ‘driving’ situation yet 
we manage to respond to novel situations creatively in the moment.  For 
example, if a zebra stepped in front of the car a driver would (probably) make 
an emergency stop or swerve to avoid the zebra.  The action would be 
                                            
66  Strong representationalism holds that the phenomenal character of a 
mental state is identical to its representational content as instantiated in the 
brain (see for example Dretske, 2003) 
67  The number of combinations in Go are so vast that, given current computer 
processing power, this cannot be done in practice.  
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context dependent (for example, a person would be unlikely to swerve if this 
meant she would hit oncoming traffic).  In this scenario a person’s culturally 
embedded history also informs her.  If swerving to avoid the zebra means that 
she will hit a child standing on the pavement she had better not swerve68.  
The fact that she has never been in exactly that situation before does not 
prevent her from responding appropriately.  If we need this kind of know-how 
to respond to the world and this constitutes cognition then an understanding 
of brain mechanisms alone cannot be sufficient to explain cognition.  This kind 
of know-how is the result of on-going interpretation from our capacities of 
understanding - capacities rooted in embodiment and lived (culturally bound) 
experience.  A person needs an embodied, culturally embedded background 
to know anything and these elements are constitutive of a filled out science of 
the mind.  
Next I briefly describe mind in terms of an embodied dynamic system 
embedded in an environment which is in constant flux (as opposed to a neural 
network in the head).  This system (which is constituted through what I have 
called the BBWS) is unique as it has its own history which is made up of the 
patterned response to previous environments. 
7.3.3 Mind as an Embodied Dynamic System 
Varela and colleagues argue that mind emerges from the coupling of an 
autonomous system with a given environment.  They illustrate how this kind of 
autonomous system might work using their (extremely simple) Bittorio model.  
                                            
68 The fact that this does not seem to require explanation is a property of the 
shared culture of the author and the reader. 
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Bittorio is simply a ring sequence of 0s and 1s dropped into an environment of 
free-floating 0s and 1s.  The 0s and 1s in Bittorio can change state but the 
only possible states are 0 and 1.  Bittorio is organisationally closed as it only 
has the capacity to respond in the way that it does (by changing state from a 1 
to a 0 or vice versa as it encounters the free floating 1s and 0s) and its 
structure just is a ring of 0s and 1s.   It is autonomous in the sense that it is 
self-defined (ie: retains its ring structure).   Bittorio conforms to the rule that 
each 0 and each 1 will change state when it comes into contact with a 0 or a 
1.  This means that odd numbers of encounters with free floating 0s and 1s 
will show a change in Bittorio whereas even numbers of encounters will 
appear invisible as Bittorio will appear unchanged.  Bittorio could thus be 
described as an ‘odd number recogniser’.  Notice that the action of Bittorio 
looks like a regular recognisable pattern, yet it doesn’t know anything - it just 
responds in a particular way.  It is not programmed to recognise odd numbers 
of encounters it simply follows a rule of patterned response in relation to its 
environment.  Regularities constitute Bittorio’s world – it is not designed to 
perform any kind of representation – Bittorio’s ‘behaviour’ is simply enacted 
through a history of structured coupling.  Bittorio responds (or changes) 
because of the environment that it finds itself in.  Patterned responses to the 
environment constitute Bittorio’s world.  The Bittorio model shows us how the 
human mind, although vastly more complex, might work in this way and might 
be described as an emergent autonomous dynamic system constituted of the 
embodied person and the lived environment (Varela et al., 1991).  
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Organisms in general and people in particular display patterns of behaviour 
that require us to see them as autonomous.  The enactive approach posits a 
person is an autonomous agent.  That is, agency and selfhood emerge from 
the autonomous (self-defining or self-determining) system.  Like Bittorio a 
person has a finite range of capacities and is thus operationally limited but not 
operationally closed (it interacts with its environment). In a complex 
autonomous system like a human being the activity of any process within the 
system brings about (at least) the activity of another process within the 
system.  A person is organised as a self-producing and self-maintaining 
network that actively regulates its background or boundary conditions so as to 
remain viable in its environment.  In this way a human being is an 
autonomous system and, in contrast, an automatic cash dispenser is not 
because it cannot function without input from a third party.  Autonomous 
systems are self-governed (as opposed to other governed).  This is not to be 
confused with the use of autonomy in terms of self-conscious agency or free 
will.  An autonomous system need not be self-aware in this sense.  In the 
case of human beings sub-personal internal processes maintain the organism 
even if the organism does not ‘know’ what it is doing. 
The autonomous animal meets the environment on its own sensorimotor 
terms.  It’s nervous system establishes and maintains a sensorimotor cycle so 
that what an animal senses depends directly on how it moves, and how it 
moves depends directly on what it senses.69 The system has semi-permeable 
                                            
69  As illustrated in my (very simple) description of picking raspberries in 
section 3.1.1 of this chapter. 
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boundaries and is constantly seeking and exchanging matter and energy with 
the environment so can never be energetically and materially closed to the 
environment (which, in any case, would be impossible) (Thompson, 2005).   
Our understanding of a living person which allow that the system is 
autonomous and constantly interacting with the environment is best served by 
the notion of organisational closedness and operational openness.  A person 
remains the ‘same’ organisationally – the parts that make up the human being 
are arranged in the way that they are in human beings, they have finite 
capacities and operate in circumscribed ways in relation to the other parts of 
the human being.    A composite unity (like a human being) is the relations 
which realise that unity.  The operation of the (organisationally closed) system 
is open to the environment and can be influenced by its interaction with the 
environment.  Internal states can change but structure and therefore unity 
remains intact (Maturana, 1999).  Maintenance of such a system requires 
input from the environment (such as food and drink) so internal states are 
affected by inputs from outside and internal states are also influenced by a 
myriad of other interactions with the environment (the system is operationally 
open).  In order to retain unity the inter-relations of the parts of a person 
remain structurally intact (the system is organisationally closed)70. 
That a human being is an autonomous system allows that its organisational 
closedness and its operational openness (coupling with the environment) as 
well as its patterned history of responses to its environment determine what 
                                            
70 We can of course replace like with like, so a person who has an artificial 
mechanical heart is still a person. 
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counts as information.  In this way meaningful information as processed by 
the system is completely independent of an observer’s interpretation.  The 
autonomous system is informed because its endogenous dynamics specify 
what makes a difference to the system (Thompson, 2007, chap.3).  A 
difference is made in Bittorio when the 0s and 1s that it is made up of come 
into contact with odd numbers of free floating 0s or 1s.  In some sense then, 
odd numbers of free floating 1s and 0s that interact with Bittorio’s 1s and 0s 
represent information71 for Bittorio.  So a person’s endogenous capacities 
enable meaning to be made through dynamic interaction with her environment 
and this interaction determines what counts as information.  The complex 
history of patterned responses is unique to each person and helps explain 
why we do not all respond in the same way to the same stimulus.  
In the next section I illustrate how cognition is culturally embedded and 
embodied using the example of colour perception and how this is realised 
within different cultures.  I also show how colour perception can differ between 
individuals using a recent ‘viral’72 internet phenomenon. 
7.3.4 Embodied Culturally Embedded Colour Perception 
Varela and colleagues use the example of colour perception to demonstrate 
how the experience is perceptual (recruiting the eye/brain system), cognitive 
(we name colours) and cultural (for example one culture only names two 
colours – approximately corresponding to white-warm and black-cool; another 
                                            
71 Information only in the technical sense – Bittorio has no capacity to interpret 
or make meaning from the free floating 1s and 0s, it just reacts. 
72 An internet phenomenon is described as ‘viral’ when it spreads quickly and 
is seen by many millions of internet users over a short period of time. 
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culture has only one word for what we call green and blue).  Colour naming or 
differentiating between colours in any given culture is understood as relating 
to the visual environment as well as the purposes, meaning or importance that 
that particular culture might associate with this differentiation.  Further, one 
always sees a coloured ‘something’ and the coloured object has surfaces and 
possibilities for use (or affordances) that form part of the perceptual 
experience (Varela et al., 1991). 
The different ways in which colour perception is experienced can be altered 
by environment or context is well illustrated by a viral internet phenomenon.  
In 2015 a photograph of a blue and black dress went viral on the internet and 
was seen by millions of people.  The reason it was so interesting was 
because some people saw it as blue and black and others saw it as white and 
gold.  
The eye-brain combination is not good at judging the absolute colour of 
anything.  However it is very good at comparing colours.  For example one 
can tell whether something is, say, more green (provided one has the 
language to distinguish green) than another colour.  The eye-brain 
combination functions through maintenance of what visual neuroscientists call 
'colour constancy'.  A white sheet of paper simply reflects whatever the 
ambient light colour is.  So it should appear white in bright sunlight and red 
under the red lights of a nightclub.  This change of colour is confusing and the 
brain has evolved colour constancy.  It 'adjusts' or compensates for the 
ambient light so that it still appears to be white.  Colour constancy is a survival 
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advantage.  A red apple always looks the same colour, whether it is in the 
shade, or in sunlight.  What one sees relies on basic human brain-percept 
capacities and a combination of three factors — what the true colour of an 
object is, plus any colours right next to it, plus the overall ambient lighting.  
The particular photo of the ‘viral’ blue/black dress includes no bare skin or 
other dresses so no obvious contrast to help one decide what colour it is.  In 
addition to this the top of the dress has a panel of reflective fabric.  These 
mirror-like reflections on the shiny part of the dress are known as 
specularities.  Specularities on this photo give one the impression that the 
dress is well-illuminated from the front.  If the brain-percept system 
‘assumes’73  that the front of the dress is in shadow (thanks to the bright blurry 
background light), colour constancy is applied and the blueish hue of the 
shadow is removed - the dress appears to be white and gold.  However if the 
brain-percept system ‘assumes’ that the front of the dress is well lit (thanks to 
the shiny reflections on the top panel of the dress) – the dress appears to be 
blue and black.74 We do not know, however, why different people ‘default’ to 
either blue/black or white/gold. The colour that one sees is affected by the 
material one is looking at, the ambient light bouncing off the material and 
some subtle personal differences (Meese, 2015).   
                                            
73 The system ‘assumes’ at a sub-personal level – we do not (and indeed 
cannot) choose how we see the dress. 
74 See also the classic chess board example where shades of grey of different 
squares on a chess board appear to be different when they are in fact the 
same because the chessboard is set up to make it appear that a shadow is 
cast on one of the squares (Brusspup, 2011) 
	 250	
Varela and colleagues use the colour example to demonstrate how a person’s 
cognition is embodied (bodily capacities are evoked in cognition), embedded 
(culture and environment influence cognition) and enacted (action influences 
cognition).  They summarise thus: 
“…cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from 
having a body with various sensorimotor capacities… embedded in a 
more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context… 
sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally 
inseparable in lived cognition.  Indeed the two are not merely 
contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together.” 
(Varela et al., 1991, p.173). 
7.3.5 Interim Summary 
The mind is a culturally embedded embodied emergent property.  It emerges 
from the BBWS through the complex intermeshed mereology of all the parts 
that constitute a person’s lived experience.  Brain science alone cannot 
capture the lived experience so we must look outside the brain towards the 
body and the world (or environment) to understand what constitutes mind and 
cognition.  
In the next section I briefly review some of the empirical evidence that 
suggests that there are feedback loops between brains, bodies and 
environments out of which cognition emerges.  I also look at some of the 
empirical evidence that demonstrates correlations between lived experience 
and poor mental health outcomes. 
	 251	
7.4 Empirical Evidence Relating to the Body and Lived Experience 
In this section I briefly review some evidence that shows how our bodies and 
our environments impact experience and cognition.  I look at evidence from 
neuroscience relating to visual perception and embodiment, evidence relating 
to the experience of eating and drinking and evidence from psychology 
relating to embodiment and emotion.  I also look at the impact of talking 
therapies and anthropological, psychological, epigenetic and psychiatric 
research showing environmental correlations with increased incidence of 
mental health problems. 
7.4.1 Phantom Limbs and Rubber Hands 
The neuroscientists V.S. Ramachandran treated patients with phantom limb 
pain (specifically arm pain resulting from brachial plexus avulsion75 and from 
amputation of the arm) using a ‘mirror box’.76  Each patient placed his or her 
normally functioning arm in a box with a mirror on one side such that the 
reflection (of the good arm) was in the position of the damaged arm.  Whilst 
looking at the reflection the patients were asked to move their good arm.  The 
reflection showed a mirror image of their good arm in the place that their 
damaged or missing arm would be.  All the participants had the sensation that 
their ‘phantom’ (damaged or missing) arm was moving.  Out of the dozen 
patients that Ramachandaran saw half of them experienced a reduction in 
pain (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999).   Ramachandran goes on to 
                                            
75 Brachial plexus avulsion is the severing or detaching of the nerves of the 
arm and hand at or near the spine. 
76 I have referred to the ‘mirror box’ experiment elsewhere as an example of 
extended mind (Gunn, 2014) 
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challenge the notion (popularised by some exponents of artificial intelligence) 
that the brain behaves like a computer with distinct modules performing 
specialised roles.  He argues that his experiments involving phantom limbs 
show that the connections in the brain are...  
“…extraordinarily labile and dynamic. Perceptions emerge as a result of 
reverberations of signals between different levels of sensory hierarchy, 
indeed even across different senses.  The fact that visual input can 
eliminate the spasm of a non-existent arm and then erase the associated 
memory of pain vividly illustrates how extensive and profound these 
interactions can be.” (ibid p.56). 
He goes on to say that his findings (here and elsewhere) show 
“… that your body image… is an entirely transitory internal construct that 
can be profoundly modified with just a few simple tricks.” (ibid p.62). 
Ramachandran’s on-going research in this area includes experiments using a 
rubber hand.  A person’s hand is hidden behind a screen and a rubber hand is 
placed in front of her where her arm might be.  The rubber hand is stroked 
and her real hidden hand is stoked in a synchronous way.  This tricks the 
individual into feeling that the rubber hand is being stroked.   Once the person 
had identified with the rubber hand (that is, she felt that the rubber hand was 
being stroked) if the rubber hand was subsequently hyperextended or 
viciously poked the person had a measurable skin conductance response 
from autonomic arousal.  So, seeing your virtual hand being poked causes a 
bodily (physiological) change (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003).   
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The experiments of Ramachandran and his colleagues have interesting 
applications. Not only do they suggest possible treatments for stroke, 
phantom pain and recovery from painful hand surgery, but they also show us 
that our responses to what we see in the environment can change our 
experience (our felt sense) of pain, change our autonomic (bodily) arousal 
and even change what body parts (real, reflected or rubber) seem to belong to 
us (Ramachandran and Altschuler, 2009).  The way in which a person 
interacts with or responds to visual input relating to her own body is 
highlighted through the use of perceptual tricks. This suggests that these 
processes of looping feedback between a person and her visual environment 
help to create the person’s experience.  A person’s experience of herself and 
her ability to act and respond to the world is thus partly constituted of the 
visual input she receives. 
I now briefly examine some of the literature on eating and drinking which 
demonstrates that multiple senses are intermeshed in these experience and 
our experience can be altered by altering the eating environment. 
7.4.2 Eating and Drinking 
Research into the multi-sensory experience of eating and drinking shows us 
that our experience of taste, flavour and texture can be affected in the lab by 
alterations in colour and sound.  For example, research participants when 
played an amplified or attenuated ‘crunch’ sound while they were eating crisps 
perceived that the crisps where fresher and crunchier than when the sound 
was not altered (Zampini and Spence, 2004); similar findings were reported 
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when attenuated crunch sounds were played when eating apples (Demattè et 
al., 2014).  White wine dyed red with an odourless dye invoked red wine 
descriptors in expert wine tasters (Morrot et al., 2001); cinder toffee tasted 
sweeter when eaten while listening to high pitched piano music and more 
bitter while listening to lower pitched trombone music (Crisinel et al., 2012).  
Diners using heavy cutlery said that food was of better quality and they were 
prepared to pay more for it than those using lighter cutlery (Michel et al., 
2015). 
If our experience of eating and drinking can be changed by alterations to the 
environment (such as adding synchronised ‘crunch’ sounds, playing music, 
altering the colour of a food or giving us heavier cutlery) this again suggest 
that this seemingly subjective or ‘internal’ experience of smell and taste is 
partly constituted by the environment.  
I now turn my attention to some research on how other bodily and 
environmental factors can alter our subjective experience.  
7.4.3 Other Bodily and Environmental Stimuli 
There is plenty of research that demonstrates that changing our facial 
expressions changes how we feel.  Research has shown that if a person 
holds a pen between her teeth in such a way that makes her mimic the facial 
expression of smiling she is more likely to find cartoons funnier than someone 
who holds a pen in her lips (thus not mimicking the facial expression of 
smiling) (Strack et al., 1988).  Further, in controlled conditions a person pulling 
her eyebrows together, thus partially mimicking the facial expression 
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associated with sadness, is more likely to feel more sad than a person who 
does not mimic this expression (Larsen et al., 1992).  Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies show that mirror neuron networks respond 
to both facial mimicry of pain and to facial expression of perceived pain and 
are involved in our understanding of the pain expression of the other (Budell 
et al., 2015, 2010; Vachon-Presseau et al., 2012).  Altering our facial muscles 
actually alters our mental experience which suggests that a person’s 
emotional life is partly constituted by facial expression. 
Other interesting studies show that our emotions and attitudes are affected by 
environmental circumstances.  Experiments where men were approached by 
an attractive woman for a survey showed that those on a scary suspension 
bridge found the woman more attractive than those on a more stable bridge. 
The arousal caused by fear was misinterpreted as attraction for the woman.77  
This supports the notion that bodily arousal can be misinterpreted based on 
the availability of objects or people in the environment that might account for 
that bodily arousal and our (sub-personal) interpretation of the bodily arousal 
(Dutton and Aron, 1974). 
Everyday experience tells us that recalling a happy memory can make us feel 
happy and likewise recalling a sad memory or a shameful memory can make 
us feel sad or shameful. Thinking about the possibility of something 
dangerous can make us feel afraid and thinking about the possibility of 
something wonderful happening can make us feel happy.  It is this fact - that 
                                            
77 This ‘interpretation’ is at a non-self conscious level, the bodily arousal is 
subtle and a person would not be self-consciously aware of it. 
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thinking can change a person’s mood and/or emotional response and hence 
impact behaviour - which has its origins in Stoicism and is the cornerstone of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (Beck, 1989).  When we see a cute video clip 
(such as a kitten or a baby playing) or a beautiful scene (flowers, a rainbow, a 
hillside), we can feel happy (notwithstanding the possibility that a bad mood 
can prevent us from responding in this way).  In sum, thinking about certain 
things, looking at certain objects or environments and imagining certain 
scenarios can change the way we feel.  Thus, how a person feels might be 
partly constituted by the environment or by self-conscious thinking, imagining 
or remembering.  
7.4.4 Interim Summary 
Psychology and neuroscience are beginning to investigate the way in which 
environment and body impact mental experience and they have only begun to 
scratch the surface.  If visual tricks can change our experience of pain; if what 
we see and hear changes our experience of what we taste; if facial 
expressions change how we feel; if bodily arousal alters how attractive we 
think someone is; if thinking about, talking about or imagining scenarios 
changes our mood, all this points towards the complex mereology that the 
enactive approach posits.  I suspect that there are many subtle ways in which 
our environment impacts on our experience and this kind of empirical 
research might, in time, give us more evidence to support the notion that 
experience, and therefore mind, is created by or emerges from the BBWS. 
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I now look at evidence from psychiatric, psychological, epigenetic and 
anthropological research that suggests our environment has an impact on 
mental health outcomes. 
7.4.5 Lived Environment, the Body and Mental Health 
Psychology identifies new correlations between lived experience and mental 
health outcome all the time.  Marius Romme and his colleagues found that 
seventy percent of those who participated in their research on hearing voices 
had suffered trauma and in many cases the content of their ‘voices’ related to 
this trauma (Romme and Escher, 1993; Romme et al., 2009).  Links have 
been made between childhood adversity and psychosis and there is some 
evidence (which requires further investigation) that different kinds of adversity 
lead to different symptoms (Bentall et al., 2014).  Increased urbanicity 
(measured in terms of population density or in population size of place of 
residence) is correlated with increased incidents of diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(Vassos et al., 2012).  There is a correlation between those with a lower 
socio-economic advantage and an increased risk of diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.  Factors used to identify disadvantage include parental 
unemployment, single parent families and size of housing.  The same study 
identified what is called an ‘interaction effect’ where there seems to be an 
increased chance of diagnosis of schizophrenia if there is a possible genetic 
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risk (ie: other family members have a diagnosis of schizophrenia)78 and socio-
economic disadvantage compared to genetic risk alone (Wicks et al., 2010).   
These environmental factors, some relating to upbringing and history and 
some relating to lived experience at the time of onset of illness may have an 
impact on the development of illness in ways that are currently poorly 
understood.  Exactly what these studies are telling us is by no means settled.  
However it is plausible that a person’s environment is a constitutive part of her 
mental wellbeing.  A person experiences her environment on an on-going 
basis through her lived experience and what appears to be her subjective or 
‘internal’ experience is a process which might be partly constituted by the 
environment in which she finds herself. 
Epigenetics informs us that environmental factors can affect whether genes 
are switched on or not and can even alter the biology of an unborn child.  For 
example, female Holocaust survivors with post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) are much more likely to have children with low levels of the stress 
hormone cortisol making them more likely to suffer from anxiety.  Whilst it has 
been argued in the past that this is due to upbringing alone, further studies of 
pregnant women who were present at ‘9/11’ (the destruction of the twin 
towers of the World Trade Centre in New York’s Manhattan) suggest that it is 
more complex.  Women in their second or third trimester at the time of the 
incident were also much more likely to have babies with low levels of cortisol.  
                                            
78 Although there is a familial link (ie people in families where other family 
members have a diagnosis of schizophrenia are at increased risk of acquiring 
this diagnosis) clear genetic markers have not been identified (Farrell et al., 
2015).  
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This was tested when the children were just a few months old so is unlikely to 
relate to upbringing.  The hyper-vigilance associated with low cortisol and 
anxiety is considered to be an adaptive survival mechanism for those born 
into a hostile, dangerous or traumatic environment (Yehuda et al., 2014; 
Brand et al., 2006; McFarlane et al., 2011).  Other physical illnesses are also 
associated with adverse in-utero environments and might persist over more 
than one generation (Harris and Seckl, 2011).  We also know, from the 
tragedy of the Romanian orphans who were not nurtured and were left to cry 
in their cots, that this kind of neglect means that a number of brain regions do 
not develop properly resulting in dysfunction in the operation of those brain 
regions (Chugani et al., 2001).  This leaves these children with a diminished 
ability to be sensitive to others or to manage their own emotions resulting in 
problems with behaviour and with attachment (Chisholm et al., 1995).  
Above I have outlined just a tiny number of studies that provide evidence 
showing that environment and upbringing have an impact on mental health.  If 
taken seriously these data point to the way in which we interact with our 
environment on an on-going basis and that in turn highlights the complexity of 
these processes.  Biology, psychology and environment are not separate 
factors that ‘cause’ mental health problems.  Environment influences 
physiology (eg: stress when pregnant changes base cortisol levels in unborn 
babies), physiology influences psychology (eg: low cortisol is linked to hyper-
vigilance), psychology influences thinking (e.g., hyper-vigilance might mean 
we see more danger in the environment), environment influences thinking and 
behaviour (eg: perceived danger increases vigilance and ‘safety’ behaviours), 
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thinking and behaviour influences physiology (thinking about dangerous 
scenarios raises arousal in terms of increased adrenalin).  It is clear that there 
are looping and feedback effects involved in lived experience.  This points to 
the way in which mental health outcomes are dependent on the complex 
mereology of a person’s lived experience.   
I now give a brief overview of some research on relational factors highlighting 
how our interaction with others might also impact a person’s lived experience 
and thus her mental health. 
7.4.6 Talking Therapies, Relationships and Mental Health 
Connections and relationships with others might also affect one’s mental 
health.  Forms of isolation (including isolation tanks) have been shown to 
induce hallucinations (Levin, 1974) and have more recently also been used 
therapeutically to improve mental health (Suedfeld and Bow, 1999).  
Prolonged isolation is used as torture and is linked to suicide (Heiss, 2015).  
Thus relational factors might impact mental health.  Being around (the right 
kind of) people might be good for a person’s mental health and being isolated 
from others for prolonged periods of time might be bad for a person’s mental 
health. 
The way one relates to others and the way in which one understands oneself 
can also have an impact on one’s wellbeing.  There is evidence that people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, mood disorders and anorexia are more 
likely to relapse if family members display what is known as high expressed 
emotion (HEE) which is measured in terms of criticism, hostility and emotional 
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over involvement (Butzlaff and Hooley, 1998).  There is also evidence that 
family intervention for people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia whose family 
members have high EE scores can reduce incidents of relapse.  In one study, 
interventions which are intended to reduce EE and/or time spent with the 
relative with the psychiatric diagnosis included: 1) education of the family; 2) 
attendance at therapist facilitated relatives meetings where the group was 
made up of a mixture of high EE and low EE families; and 3) facilitated family 
meeting (attended by the high EE family member(s) and the person with the 
psychiatric diagnosis).  The aim of the study (reducing EE and/or time spent) 
was met in 8 out of 11 cases.  None of the 8 relapsed within the 9 month 
follow-up and this was in sharp contrast to a 50% relapse rate in the control 
group (Leff et al., 1982). 
Whilst mindfulness meditation is thought to improve one’s wellbeing, 
outcomes are mixed (Lomas et al., 2015).   Some kinds of intense meditation 
have been linked with mental illness.  The intense act of observing the self 
and one’s mental processes (particularly in isolation from other activity where 
a person engages in meditation for hours at a time over several days) can 
bring on psychotic experiences and intense anxiety and panic attacks 
(Wikholm and Farias, 2015).  Talking therapy helps to improve people’s 
mental health yet we find it difficult to articulate how this works.  For example, 
people with depression are less likely to relapse if they undergo Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (Paykel, 2007).  People talk about ‘coming to 
terms with’ their problems and about feeling relieved that they have been able 
to express their feelings.  In CBT emphasis is placed on changing unhelpful 
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patterns of thinking (Beck, 1989) and, whilst normally reserved for milder 
mental health problems, it has been shown to be helpful for those with 
delusions (Alford and Beck, 1994). 
In psychodynamic therapy (a version of psychoanalysis) emphasis is placed 
on understanding unconscious processes (Howard, 2005).  In Person-Centred 
(Rogerian) therapy a person develops her self-conscious autonomy and her 
actualizing tendency.  The therapist facilities a person’s exploration of her own 
internal world and her goals and desires by creating a therapeutic relationship 
where the person experiences empathy, acceptance and congruence (or 
genuineness) from the therapist (Rogers, 1951).  In focussing therapy the 
therapist seeks to activate a bodily shift in the felt sense associated with a  
psychologically distressing experience (Gendlin, 2003) and in Eye Movement 
Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) a trauma is re-experienced in a 
new way to break the pattern of hallucination and dissociation associated with 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Leer et al., 2014; Schubert et al., 
2011).   
If we can improve our mental health through relationship and through dialogue 
by experiencing (or re-experiencing) emotions, creating new narratives, 
altering patterns of thinking and ‘reprograming’ physiological (somatic or 
bodily responses) this gives us more evidence toward the notion that the 
environment partly constitutes our experience.  In therapy we deliberately set 
out to alter our emotional life and our patterns of thinking.  However, we 
interact with others through dialogue and through physical contact from the 
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day we are born.  If talking therapy can alter a person’s subjective or ‘internal’ 
experience (perhaps by reducing distress, reducing depression or enabling 
flourishing) then it is plausible that ordinary daily dialogical and physical 
interactions with others can also be partly constitutive of mental health 
outcomes. 
7.4.7 Interim summary 
Child development, trauma, current environment, relationships with others, 
learning about ourselves (thinking about thinking) and levels of adrenalin and 
cortisol in utero can all have an impact on a person’s cognition in general and 
on her mental wellbeing in particular.  There are many more examples in the 
literature and the examples above simply serve to illustrate that research 
shows correlations between such factors as lived environment and personal 
wellbeing.  The complexity of these processes is overwhelming and poorly 
understood.  Yet it seems clear that if we want a full understanding of what 
cognition is we cannot ignore the myriad of loops of connectivity between the 
person and all aspects of her environment and her lived experience. 
The brain is plastic and there is no fixed brain state, brains are in constant 
flux.  Psychiatry often emphasises the medical model and treats mental illness 
as ‘brain bound’.  Some believe that: 
“Mental disorders are, fundamentally, disorders of the brain in action, 
and only by observing the brain in action will we find their signatures and 
unravel their secrets.” (Bargmann and Lieberman, 2014, p.1039). 
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Others see the problems of those with mental illnesses as more complex: 
“Psychiatry is not neurology; it is not a medicine of the brain.  Although 
mental health problems undoubtedly have a biological dimension, in their 
very nature they reach beyond the brain to involve social, cultural and 
psychological dimensions.  These cannot always be grasped through the 
epistemology of biomedicine.” (Bracken et al., 2012, p.430) 
If we take too narrow a view of mental illness it then becomes a problem with 
the brain that can be fixed by medical intervention.  In many cases this means 
by pharmacological means.  It is too simplistic to say that people with mental 
health problems either have a physiological (biomedical) problem or a 
psychological problem or an environmental problem.  This implies a dualism 
of sorts.  A person is subject to the merelogical affect of all the significant 
factors relating to her embodied embedded existence in her environment.  
This includes her personal psychology, her history and her values; her 
relationships with others, her lived environment and her biological, 
physiological and genetic make up.  Imagine a person who has an extremely 
isolated life where there are no friends or family and no other relationships of 
any kind.  If we have established that extended isolation contributes to mental 
illness then how can a pill help such a person?  Talking therapy won’t help 
either unless it helps the person to behave differently (and engage in more 
social relationships).  The complexity, mereology and non-linear nature of the 
genesis and maintenance of mental illness, as illustrated in this section make 
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our attempt at a scientific understanding all the more difficult.  However, this 
should not prevent us from the challenge of this endeavour. 
7.5 Implications 
It is well understood in clinical practice that psychiatry is difficult, complex and 
full of ambiguity.  Understanding a person’s mental distress might involve the 
psychological, the environmental and the physiological.  How the psychiatrist 
understands a person’s mental distress will impact the treatment she offers 
and what she tells that person who is seeking help will impact that person’s 
perception of herself.  In section 7.2 I provided some case examples that 
illustrate this.   However, psychiatry is thought of as a branch of medicine and 
the usual or most readily available therapeutic tools are pharmacological.  
Empirical research offers evidence that a person’s personal psychology, 
history and values, her relationships with others, her lived environment and 
her biological, physiological and genetic make-up all impact her mental 
wellbeing.  These influences are complex and are enacted through 
mereological looping within lived experience.  For these reasons it seems that 
the enactive approach better captures the reality of the process of cognition 
and therefore gives us clues about the ways in which cognition can go awry.  
Appeal to the medical model or to mental illness in terms of brain disorders 
hardly captures the complexity of the possible influencing factors involved in 
the onset and development of those psychiatric illnesses. 
If we understand our functioning and our cognition in terms of the BBWS then 
we will be able to fully engage with the possibility that any part of the system 
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might have a profound impact on the functioning of a person and on such 
factors as her mental distress.  This opens up possibilities for other (novel, 
perhaps bodily or environmental) therapeutic interventions as well as broader 
preventative strategies with regard to psychiatric illnesses.  If lived experience 
and therefore cognition is understood through the enactive approach then this 
helps to explain how psychiatric illness comes about and might also have an 
impact on stigma.  Any person might undergo any number of experiences that 
have an impact on her wellbeing. As I have said in chapter 4 difficult, 
distressing, traumatic or isolating environments might be constitutive of 
mental illness and of delusion formation and maintenance and to a large 
extent whether or not a person undergoes these experiences is just a matter 
of luck. 
In the next chapter I look at the notion of affective framing and how this can 
breakdown through endogenous and/or exogenous means.  I argue that a 
breakdown in affective framing can be used to capture the persistent 
perceptual, affective and emotional anomalies that typify the onset of some 
delusional experiences and propose a characterisation of delusion using this 
concept. 
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CHAPTER 8 - AFFECTIVE FRAMING 
______________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Introduction 
As I have shown in chapter 5, delusion formation can be conceptualised as an 
understandable response to affective, perceptual and emotional changes 
which are highly anomalous, extreme and/or unusual and persistent.  I have 
also shown, using empirical evidence from my own research, some further 
evidence to support this idea.  In chapter 7, following the enactive approach, I 
have shown how cognition might be understood as an emergent property of 
the brain/body/world system (BBWS).  Any part of this system might go awry 
in such a way as to bring about a radical alteration in lived experience.  In this 
chapter I suggest that the radical alteration in lived experience leading to 
delusion formation might be understood as a breakdown in affective framing. 
In section 8.2 I briefly revisit what is meant by emotions, affectivity and 
perception.  In section 8.3 I discuss the notion of affective framing as 
proposed by Michelle Maiese and add my own emphasis in terms of 
environment as a constituent part of affective framing.  In section 8.4 I outline 
how Maiese uses the notion of attenuated affective framing to account for 
‘thought insertion’ experiences.  In section 8.5 I extend this notion still further 
and show how a breakdown in affective framing might be used to 
conceptualise the experiences of my research participants and in section 8.6 I 
discuss the implications of this conceptualisation. 
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8.2 Emotions and Affectivity 
As we have seen in chapter 5, emotions, perceptions and affective states are 
difficult to distinguish and include sub-personal bodily or cognitive states that 
are linked to behaviour but cannot be readily articulated from a first-person 
perspective.  In this section I briefly summarise my understanding of emotion 
and affect in order to explain how affective framing is constituted.  
8.2.1 Emotions, Affectivity and Perception 
As I have already said (in chapter 5) I take human emotions to be experience 
that is ‘felt’ and is at once bodily and cognitive and is partly constituted by the 
environment.  An emotion can be (but may not be) recognised and labelled by 
the person experiencing it, a person’s capacity to name an emotion is 
linguistically and culturally determined and the ‘feel’ relating to certain kinds of 
experience is similar enough to other experiences for this to be recognisable 
(eg: fear of tigers feels a bit like fear of snakes). 
I take affectivity to be a term that captures person-level responses to 
pleasure, pain and desire as well as more obvious (recognisable and easy to 
articulate) emotions and moods.  It is not synonymous with emotions but 
includes emotions and involves the bodily and the non-self-consciously 
cognitive.  Affect is partly constituted by environment and might draw a person 
towards a pleasurable object or situation and might also repel a person from 
objects or situations that cause pain or suffering or that prevent a person from 
meeting her wants or desires. 
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I take perception to be the ability to see, hear, smell, taste, feel or become 
aware of something through the senses.  A person’s capacity to perceive 
things in the environment is, to some extent, intermeshed with affective goal-
seeking behaviour (a person ‘notices’ things that are salient).  It is partly 
constituted through the environment (if there is nothing in the environment 
there is nothing to perceive). 
In the next section I look at how affective responses might impact on decision-
making. 
8.2.3 Neuroscience and the Somatic Marker Theory 
There is evidence that brain-body systems involved in cognition overlap with 
systems that are involved with affect.  Antonio Damasio found that decision-
making is impaired when systems relating to affect are impaired.  His somatic 
marker hypothesis holds that a person’s affective capacities originate as 
somatic feelings (pre-reflective bodily responses) and/or certain kinds of 
(emotion related) brain responses at a sub personal level.  These somatic 
markers facilitate reasoning by enabling relevant salient options to become 
available.  Without these somatic markers decision-making is impaired 
(Damasio, 1996).   
In a more recent article on bridging emotion theory and neurobiology Marc D. 
Lewis shows that the neuroscience demonstrates that appraisal processes 
mediate emotional processes simultaneously or at least rapidly interact and 
become integrated with activities that mediate emotional processes.  
Synchronised nonlinear neural interactions give rise to global emotional states 
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which are fundamental to the emergence of whole appraisals and these 
processes evolve simultaneously (Lewis, 2005).  He concludes that: 
“… coherent appraisals are not antecedents of emotions, but emerging 
outcomes of interactions among constituent systems underlying 
appraisal and emotion… emotional and cognitive processes influence 
each other continuously during an emotional episode… ” (ibid, p.193). 
Other research in this area also demonstrates that affective and cognitive 
mechanisms are intermeshed.  Luis Pessoa suggests a network perspective 
fits what we know about the brain and, whilst we might use the terms 
cognition and emotion to denote certain behaviours, processes underpinning 
these behaviours cannot be delineated at the neuronal level (Pessoa, 2015). 
In the next section I consider the myriad of possibilities an environment 
affords. 
8.2.4 Affordances 
People-environment combinations enable affordances.   As we saw in chapter 
7 this term is used to capture all the possible actions relating to a given 
person-environment combination (Gibson, 1977).  Affordances are dependent 
on the physical properties of the environment and the capacities of a person 
in any given situation.  A raspberry bush affords the possibility of feeding 
oneself – but only if one knows that raspberries are edible and one has the 
capacity to distinguish ripe ones from unripe ones as well as the right kind of 
manual dexterity to pick them.  Picking apples requires some similar skills but 
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might require tool use if the apples are too high to reach.  A person has to 
negotiate the world, all the while, exercising her capacities in relation to 
affordances in the environment.  The scope of possible affordances is vast so, 
how do we do this?.   
8.2.5 Interim Summary 
Affectivity captures all sub-personal and personal level valenced responses 
within a given environment and might include bodily feelings and unmediated 
perceptual responses as well as nameable emotions and moods. If 
affordances as presented are all the physical possibilities of a given situation 
how does a person ever decide what action to take?  The possibilities are 
extremely wide ranging.  It is clear that some kind of frame is needed to 
enable goal-orientated decision-making.  This is where affective framing fits 
in. 
In the next section I explain affective framing and extend the notion to 
explicitly encompass all the elements of the BBWS. 
8.3 An Extended Version of Affective Framing 
A person experiences her world as ‘showing up’ in such a way that enables 
effective goal-seeking and decision-making.  Somehow personally ‘important’ 
aspects of a given environment appear in such a way as to enable a person to 
negotiate her way through this environment, make sense of the world in which 
she finds herself, survive, procreate and even flourish.  It is not at all clear, 
however, how this comes about. 
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Maiese’s notion of affective framing is used to understand how a person 
makes sense of her world.   
“…’affective framing’ is the process whereby we interpret persons, 
objects, facts, states of affairs, and situations in terms of embodied 
desiderative feelings.  Just as a conceptual frame is a cognitive shortcut 
that people rely on in order to categorize features of their surroundings, 
an affective frame operates as a feeling-driven shortcut whose 
interpretive focus is targeted and contoured by an individual’s embodied 
desires and cares.  Detection of which aspects of our surroundings are 
relevant typically occurs outside of reflective self-awareness, is non-
algorithmic, and involves bodily attunement and feelings of subjective 
import.” (Maiese, 2015b, p.920) 
Her ideas rely on the claim that emotions and affectivity can be both cognitive-
evaluative and bodily, and are the means by which personally salient 
environmental information is filtered and made available to the individual.  
Evan Thompson and Giovanna Colombetti’s example of a person catching 
site of another person’s angry face illustrate, at least at the phenomenological 
level, that we have reason to think that there are a number of different 
intermeshed or concurrent processes.  These processes include a triggering 
event that can be perceptual, imaginary or both, emotion/appraisal processes 
leading to an affective salience (or a sense of the significance of the event), a 
hedonic tone (which might be understood as a positive or negative valence), 
facial or postural changes and visceral (autonomic-physiological) changes 
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(Colombetti and Thompson, 2005).  On this account it is clear that a number 
of different elements make up a person’s response to this stimulus and that 
there is an affective quality to the experience. 
For Maiese a person has desires and needs in relation to survival and 
procreation and these all have affective components.  A person cares about 
herself and how her needs are met.  She makes decisions about action in the 
world based on her response understood in terms of bodily desiderative 
feelings to positively valenced preferences and negatively valenced objects or 
situations to be avoided.  This enables a person to execute know-how in her 
negotiation of the environment.  For Maiese: 
“…the very way in which the world is disclosed to the subject, including 
what she attends to in perception and thought, and what she strives for 
in action, are shaped and contoured by these feelings of caring.” 
(Maiese, 2014, p.524). 
According to Maiese the person’s affective response to the world is both 
bodily and cognitive and is best described as being distributed through the 
body engaging the brain, cardiovascular, endocrine and musculoskeletal 
systems.  As we are sophisticated animals living in a complex world, sense-
making in terms of affective responses goes beyond survival and procreation.  
A person might want to do well, be creative or negotiate social situations 
(Maiese, 2015).  
I prefer to remain agnostic about the mechanisms underlying affect which, as I 
have said above (in section 8.2.2 this chapter), might include self-conscious 
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cognition, sub-personal cognition or brain processes, bodily 
(endocrine/musculoskeletal) systems and direct (unmediated) perceptual 
responses.  Because we are living organisms in process these systems all 
interact with each other and there is no straightforward linear or hierarchical 
order for these systems to interact.  They are intermeshed.  There are 
feedback and feedforward loops as well as levels of responding.  
Environment, perceptual stimulus and basic or primary emotional brain 
processes can influence cognition and self-conscious cognition can mediate 
basic (primary) brain processes. 
In the next two sections I first discuss the kind of person level responses that 
we are usually self-consciously aware of and then discuss those that are sub-
personal. 
8.3.1 Levels of Responding 
Because human beings are sophisticated organisms we have ‘levels’ of 
thinking and we can alter our emotional state through imagination and 
memory.  Affect and therefore decisions and action might be cognitive first 
and then bodily.   So, I might first self-consciously think about my long-term 
goals in a given situation or deliberately imagine an outcome and thus be 
(perhaps emotionally but at least affectively) drawn towards one goal (and 
therefore the associated action) in preference to another.  
A human being is (perhaps uniquely) able to respond to her situation at a 
number of different ‘levels’.  These ‘levels’ might be described as ‘felt’ somatic 
(or bodily) (Damasio, 2000), cognitive and meta-cognitive (Flavell, 1980).  The 
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somatic or bodily might include direct perceptual responses as well as other 
sub-personal processes.   
For example, if a person sees a bear running towards her she might start to 
run away as a direct result of a somatic fear response (with no self-conscious 
thought about it at all).  She might have a similar fear response and recognise 
it as such (through self-conscious cognition), weigh up the options and decide 
to hide or ‘play dead’ instead of run.  Or, when faced with, for example a 
spider, she might have a bodily fear response, recognise that she has a ‘fear’ 
of spiders, realise that this response is irrational (at a meta-cognitive level 
through thinking about her thinking) and decide to do nothing. 
In these examples the underlying fear response is at least partially bodily.  
One knows what it is to feel this kind of ‘rush’ which relates to fear – the heart 
rate increases (as a result of increased adrenalin in the body), one might 
experience pounding in one’s ears (probably relating to an increase in blood 
pressure), one might feel a bodily compulsion to move away from the source 
of the fear and other objects in the environment might seem to ‘disappear’ as 
a result of one’s focus being on the object of the fear and/or the need to get 
away/take evasive or defensive action of some sort (Cannon, 1953).  A 
person then might become self-consciously aware of this bodily reaction and 
make a judgment about it.  Being self-consciously aware of being afraid and 
having specific thoughts about what it means to be afraid in that particular 
environment might constitute part of the response to a fearful situation.  
However it is entirely possible to be acting (for example running away) before 
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an articulable recognition of the fear ‘shows up’ as a thought.  In this way, 
some responses to our environment are very obviously affective and bodily.79 
8.3.2 Sub-personal Affectivity 
It is difficult to give descriptions of sub-personal level affectivity as to do so 
seems to necessitate language that implies self-conscious thought.  For 
example, I might reach out for a biscuit when presented with a plate with a 
variety of biscuits on it and ‘choose’ a chocolate one.  It is easy to say that I 
had a preference for the chocolate one, this implies self-conscious cognition 
and we routinely infer preference from behaviour.  With hindsight I might say I 
chose it because I preferred it to the others on offer.  On reflection I might say 
I chose it out of habit, to be polite or because it was the nearest one to me 
when the plate was offered.  Perhaps, on reflection, I realise I was not even 
hungry.  Whilst it is, of course, possible to deliberate over this kind of choice I 
suspect that most of us, most of the time, undertake no such deliberation.  
Perhaps it would be better or more accurate to say that the 
person/environment system acts as a result of a sub-personal level process 
which might be best described (in folk psychological terms) as a habit.  This 
kind of process might apply to all sorts of decisions that enable us to negotiate 
the world in a seamless (non-self-consciously deliberative) way. 
                                            
79 We need certain organs or bodily components to experience fear.  Jordy 
Cernik found that he no longer experienced the feeling of fear in dangerous 
situations after having his adrenal glands removed as treatment for Cushing’s 
Syndrome.  He knows that he ‘should be afraid’ but the bodily response he 
used to have simply is not there and he no longer feels fear (McPhee, 2013). 
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This kind of subtle affective response to the world is at play all the time.  If I 
am in a familiar environment most of what is around me fades into the 
background.  Something new in the environment might stand out to me if it is 
personally relevant in terms of my sense making, goal seeking, decision-
making behaviour.  I can, of course, deliberately turn my attention toward 
things in the environment that enable me to meet my goals.  For example, if I 
am thirsty, I might scan the environment for a drinks machine and ’notice’ if 
there is one.  Still, I suggest that most of our affective responses to the 
environment are much more subtle and we are not self-consciously aware of 
them.  Irrelevant things become ‘invisible;’ dangerous things stand out to me 
and I am repelled by them and so avoid them; positive things that enable my 
goal seeking behaviour draw me towards them and I interact with them.  A 
person does not routinely think about these things, to do so would make the 
world impossible to negotiate.  Nevertheless affectivity is our constant 
companion and underpins our interactions with our environment (Damasio, 
2000; Maiese, 2014). 
Without this affectivity towards the world decision-making would become 
impossible.  If a person felt no preference towards anything and was not 
repelled by anything then total passivity would set in.  There would be no 
goal-directed activity of any kind.  The ‘restlessness’ that directs us to act in 
the world comes about as a result of the (often sub-personal level) affectivity 
that emerges from a person-environment combination. 
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Of course, over time this restlessness, which directs action, might relate to 
acting in ways that we have become habituated to.  Nevertheless, I suggest it 
is the (non-self-conscious) affectivity of these habits that directs our action.  
So, for example, if I eat the same thing for breakfast every day I might say, if 
pushed, that I am comforted by this, it feels ‘right’.  There might be a point at 
which I am bored with this breakfast or I just fancy something different or that 
my body is deficient in some mineral or nutrient that the breakfast does not 
contain and thus seek a novel alternative.  Obviously, as I have mentioned 
above, I can make self-conscious reasoned decisions too.  I might decide, 
even though I enjoy my breakfast, that there is not enough protein in it and 
switch to an alternative because I believe it is better for my health.  All of 
these decisions are made because I care (at both the sub-personal and self-
conscious person level) about my experience and about my wellbeing. 
8.3.3 A Preference for Coffee and the Impact of the Environment 
The notion of affective framing can capture the components that constitute 
emotional, affective and perceptual experience.  Maiese emphasises the body 
in her account, however, in keeping with the enactive approach (chapter 7) 
and the empirical evidence (chapters 4 and 6) I propose that we include the 
environment as a constituent part of the affective frame.  Thus the affective 
frame is constituted through the BBWS and hence affective framing (the 
ordinary human capacity to respond to the world in terms of likes and dislikes 
as they relate to goal-orientated decision making) is constituted through the 
BBWS.  
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For example, a person when presented with a cup of coffee will undergo 
bodily arousal: if her sense of smell is intact, if she is familiar with coffee and 
likes it and is, perhaps, addicted to the caffeine-fuelled experience associated 
with coffee her bodily arousal will be different from that of a person who has 
never seen the dark brown odd smelling liquid before.  A person has a 
personal history which makes her unique and explains why we do not all 
respond in the same way in a given environment.  The environment, bodily 
arousal, as well as other sub-personal processes and personal level appraisal 
will determine the action a person undertakes.  The appraisal is also 
dependent on environmental and relational factors (as well as those of 
preference for taste or craving). 
For example, if there is only one cup of coffee left in the pot I might let my 
friend have it.  This is also a (social or pro-social) affective response where 
my desire to care for my friend overrides my desire for coffee.  If I am in a 
teashop I might be more inclined to drink tea because I am surrounded by the 
paraphernalia of tea making, because everyone else is drinking tea and 
because I like the china teacups that it is served in.  I might even feel socially 
embarrassed by asking for a cup of coffee in a teashop.  There are many 
factors that might affect the choice of action, eg: whether a person is thirsty or 
not, what other drinks are available, what time of day it is (perhaps one would 
not want coffee after 4pm if one believed it would prevent one from sleeping), 
previous coffee experiences etc.  This affective bodily arousal, other sub-
personal processes and appraisal combination determine one’s action.  These 
occur in the way that they do because I, with my unique personal history, am 
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presented with a cup of coffee in a particular environment with particular 
relationships to others in that environment.  The 
brain/body/environment/coffee system determines the outcome.  On this 
account it is hard to see how one could act at all without an affective 
component. 
If we think about the consequences of an absence of affectivity they might be 
quite dire.  The absence of a capacity for affectivity would lead to neutral 
indifference to myself and my environment.  I would cease to care about 
anything.  To give an extreme example: if only tea and coffee were available 
and I did not ‘know’ (either self-consciously or sub-personally) that I preferred 
coffee to tea I might not be able to decide what to drink.  I might not drink 
anything and thus die of dehydration.   
8.3.4 Interim Summary 
A person cares about herself and might be described as having a concerned 
point of view.  She is interested in what things in the environment mean for 
her and how action in relation to the environment might meet her needs.  A 
person’s interaction with her environment need not be self-conscious, explicit 
or deliberative.  Rather, she is an embodied agent who interacts with and 
responds to her environment in a flexible and adaptive way.  The feedback 
and feedforward loops between the embodied agent and the environment are 
mediated through an affective response which conveys meaning to the 
individual.  Elements in the environment ‘stand out’ and become relevant 
based on affective significance conveyed in part through the body.  People 
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might have some shared goals, such as survival and procreation, yet each 
has a unique history and therefore the potential for her own unique response 
within her lived environment.  Thus affective framing enables us to negotiate 
the world, survive and thrive.  It is constituted through the on-going process of 
the person/environment interaction. 
In the next section I illustrate how some common (overlapping) symptoms of 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, namely, voice hearing and 
thought insertion can be conceptualised in terms of attenuated affective 
framing. 
8.4 Thought Insertion, Voice Hearing and Attenuated Affective Framing 
Maiese describes thought insertion experiences (Maiese, 2015b) as well as 
other symptoms associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Maiese, 
2015a) as the result of attenuated affective framing.  In this section I briefly 
review her position.  
8.4.1 Thought Insertion 
As I have already mentioned (in chapter 5, section 5.4.4), when someone 
experiences thought insertion (TI) her sense of subjectivity and her sense of 
ownership come apart.  A person experiencing this phenomenon retains her 
subjectivity.  She knows it is she who is having the experience and she retains 
a point of view on the experience.  Yet, at the same time, she denies that she 
owns or generated the thought all the while retaining and acknowledging her 
first-personal (subjective) access to the content of this thought. Maiese 
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accounts for this phenomenon in terms of attenuated affective framing.  That 
is, a person’s ordinary bodily affective responses to certain features of her 
own mental activity have broken down in some way. 
8.4.2 Voice Hearing  
Another symptom, that of voice hearing (known as Auditory Verbal 
Hallucination and often abbreviated to AVH in the clinical literature) is the 
perceptual anomaly that gives a person the experience that her own thoughts 
are being ‘heard’ – as if being spoken to her by a third party outside herself 
and perhaps attenuated by background noise.  She experiences this as a third 
party speaking to her or about her and does not recognise the ‘voice’ as being 
generated or owned by her.  Whilst AVH and TI symptoms are differentiated 
in the clinical literature there is considerable evidence that they are 
overlapping symptoms and that a person experiencing anomalies within her 
own internal (private) mental experience might describe overlapping 
symptoms in various ways including: ‘voices inside my head’, ‘voices outside 
my head’, ‘voices that I hear with my ears’ and ‘voices that I hear with my 
mind’ (Gunn, 2016b).  So, as I mentioned (in chapter 5, section 5.4.4) it is 
likely that some of those describing ‘voices’ and some of those describing 
‘thought insertion’ may be experiencing similar phenomenon.  
8.4.3 Schizophrenia 
Thought insertion and voice hearing are both symptoms of schizophrenia.  For 
those who have a diagnosis of schizophrenia: 
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“…there is a notable discrepancy between the amount of attention 
something deserves and the amount that it receives.” (Maiese, 2015b, 
p.921). 
This might apply to a number of different symptoms associated with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia such as problems with salience, perception, and 
alienation.   These symptoms are sometimes described as part of a Gestalt 
that relates to a loss of the ordinary sense of self (Sass and Parnas, 2003; 
Stanghellini, 2015).  As affective bodily states breakdown there is a 
breakdown in self-experience, objects in the environment seem to lose 
practical significance and a person might lose her perceptual grip on the world 
(Maiese, 2015b). 
8.4.4 Thoughts, Voices and Affective Framing 
When it comes to thinking we do not routinely ask ourselves whose thoughts 
we have first-personal access to because the process of recognising our 
thoughts as our own is transparent.  The bodily or felt sense of ownership of 
our own thoughts is given.  In the thought insertion experience a person 
experiences her thoughts as alien, foreign or free floating (even if the content 
of the thought is mundane) and this is because bodily attunement is 
diminished and affective framing is attenuated resulting in a diminished sense 
of ownership (Maiese, 2015b). 
In the enactive approach cognition is seen as sense-making in terms of basic 
biological drivers.  It is an activity relating to a person-environment system 
which I describe in chapter 7 as the Brain/Body/World System (or BBWS).  
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The properties of the system depend on the parts of the system as they relate 
to each other (in terms of organisational structure) and cognition is an 
emergent property of the system.  Cognition is biologically grounded and 
entails all the elements of the BBWS (organisational structure, perception, 
bodily capacities, affordances, environment, culture, goals and values).  
According to Maiese, affective framing is a human capacity that is both bodily 
and cognitive.  I maintain that affective framing is constituted by the BBWS 
and thus, if any of the constituent parts are significantly altered then the 
capacity of the person to respond appropriately might be compromised.  In 
chapter 7 I argued that cognition is constituted through the BBWS and, 
according to the enactive approach, cognition encapsulates all the sub-
personal and person-level processes related to consciousness.  Therefore 
affective framing is a sub-set of all these process – namely those associated 
with affect.  These processes are constituted through the interaction between 
person and environment.  In other words the affective frame emerges from a 
person-environment system. 
With regard to thought insertion and voice hearing one or more parts of the 
BBWS has failed.  According to Maiese, there is an alteration in affective 
capacities.  The ordinary perceptual or bodily experience of thought as 
belonging to oneself is altered.  A person then attributes this experience to 
some kind of outside force.  This can compromise engagement with the rest 
of the system such as other people and one’s environment in general.  For 
example, thoughts that do not have the ordinary quality of belonging to 
oneself might be experienced as extremely distressing or distracting thus 
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interfering with or preventing one’s capacity to engage in work, hobbies and 
social relationships.  As we have seen in chapter 4, this might have an effect 
in other areas.  For example, if one were to become increasingly socially 
isolated this might lead to further problems such as depression or deeper 
psychosis.   
Thought insertion and voice hearing might both be described as arising as a 
result of a breakdown in affective framing.  Affective framing captures the 
capacities that enable a person’s concerns and interests to underpin her 
experience.   Without this frame the person loses meaningful contact with 
perception, bodily capacities, environment, culture, goals and values.   The 
blurring of ownership of one’s own thoughts means that a person 
experiencing this phenomenon can no longer recognise that the contents of 
her thoughts belong to her – the thoughts have lost their usual affective 
salience and can no longer be understood in terms of personal relevance or 
‘for-me-ness’.  The content of these thoughts might take on a different kind of 
salience but the relevant kind of salience, that of belonging to the person who 
has first-personal access to the content, is lost.   
8.5 Delusion Formation as a Breakdown in Affective Framing 
As already described in chapter 5 and revisited here (section 8.2.1) affectivity 
is a capacity that enables us to interact with our environment in terms of being 
drawn towards those things that are positively valenced and repelled by those 
things that are negatively valenced.  These processes can be sub-personal or 
personal and include emotions and moods.  The affective frame relates to all 
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the components that constitute this capacity and the way in which they are 
interrelated.  So, any part of the process, should it breakdown, can result in a 
breakdown in affective framing.  This means that the breakdown might be 
complex and might have its origins in the endogenous or the exogenous.  In 
the case of endogenous factors a person might have the kind of experiences 
described above which are associated with schizophrenia as a result of 
antibodies associated with encephalitis (Lennox et al., 2017) or she might 
experience, for example, the Capgras delusion as a result of brain injury 
(Edelstyn and Oyebode, 1999).  Alternatively an endogenous factor might 
simply be understood in terms of something that in experienced as ‘internal’ to 
the person (eg: perceptual anomalies associated with a prodromal state).  In 
the case of exogenous processes a person might find herself immersed in an 
environment that she is unable to negotiate.  Any of these factors might result 
in attenuated affective framing, and, as we shall see in the empirical research, 
these factors might be multiple and intermeshed.  When the affective frame is 
compromised this could lead to a person losing her perceptual and/or 
affective grip on the world. 
Each research participant experienced a breakdown in affective framing.  The 
way in which they ordinarily negotiated the world, through goal-directed 
decision making based on know-how relating to their self/environment 
interaction, no longer ‘worked’ for them.  The affective capacity that enabled 
each of them to interact appropriately with their environment was 
compromised.  They each experienced the distress of a radical alteration in 
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environment leaving them unable to exercise their know-how in this new 
setting.  In short, they no longer knew ‘how.’ 
In each case, immersion in this environment lead to a further breakdown in 
affective framing.  We might speculate that, given the intensity and 
persistence of the problems, this is an inevitable cascade.  This resulted in 
altered salience experiences, voice hearing, telepathy experiences and alien 
control experiences.  In altered salience experiences the breakdown in 
affective framing gives importance to previously irrelevant or background 
objects or experiences.  In voice hearing and telepathy experiences the 
breakdown in affective framing results in a person’s own mental activity 
(thoughts or imaginings) losing their sense of for-me-ness.  And in alien 
control experiences a person loses her ordinary sense of ownership of her 
actions and perhaps even her body. 
In this section I briefly revisit each research participant’s experience as it 
emerges from the interview to show how the breakdown in affective framing 
captures what leads to the formation of the delusion.  I speculate that, if we 
can identify a breakdown in affective framing in a person’s experience 
resulting in delusion formation, then this might be an important characteristic 
of the phenomenology of the formation of clinically significant delusions. 
8.5.1 Making Sense of Marriage Breakdown 
Barbara found herself in a new environment.  She was no longer in a loving 
relationship and had no one to share the burden of guilt associated with the 
difficult decisions she had made in order to try and maintain her marriage.  
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She was very young when she met her husband and as an adult the know-
how she had developed in relation to negotiating the world had always 
included the presence of her husband.  She found herself in a world where 
she had compromised her principles for no good reason and this was not a 
world she was able to seamlessly negotiate.  Her world had altered so her 
capacity for know-how experienced through affective goal-orientated decision 
making in that new world was compromised.  Her learned affective capacities 
were no longer fit for purpose in her new world – she was alone, she was 
plagued by guilt and she could not understand her past behaviour in the 
absence of a ‘partner in crime.’ 
8.5.1.1 “And Then the Music Started Talking to Me” 
Barbara started to experience unusual environmental anomalies know as 
delusions of reference (she sees or hears things in the environment and feels 
that they are important to her or intended for her in some way).  This too is a 
breakdown in affective framing.  Things in the environment that were 
previously neutral and had no affect or specialness attached to them become 
important and seem to gain a ‘for-me-ness’ that they did not previously have.  
Prior to the onset of this problem the ordinary affective experience of these 
environmental cues was neutral, they had no special meaning and were not 
seen as significant.  When a person experiences delusions of reference the 
affective frame that enables her to negotiate the world is altered.  The 
‘background’ takes on a whole new meaning: certain things become salient or 
positively valenced and the person is drawn towards them.  When things first 
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start to ‘stand out’ for Barbara as ideas of reference (as opposed to delusions 
of reference) she has no explanation for this.  She does not know why they 
are important to her.  Yet they still are important to her.  This is puzzling and 
requires an explanation.  She concludes that someone or something is 
sending her messages in the songs on the radio. 
8.5.2 Making Sense of Persecution and Injustice 
Alison’s new world is full of persecution and injustice.  Her family member is 
falsely accused and found guilty of a sexual assault.  The police and judicial 
system are no longer reliable.  Despite the fact that she is community minded 
and is a good neighbour she has a number of different problems with different 
neighbours.  She is persecuted by one neighbour in particular and it seems 
that the police support the neighbour’s version of events.  The know-how 
Alison had developed was based on a world where people were kind to their 
neighbours and justice was done.  Her new world was dangerous and she no 
longer knew how to negotiate it.  Her affective capacity was no longer fit for 
purpose, thus her capacity for know-how experienced through affective goal-
orientated decision making in that new world was compromised. 
8.5.2.1 “I Could Hear Long Distance Conversations” 
Alison suddenly found that her own thoughts had lost their ‘given’ sense of 
ownership and she experienced them as alien or coming from outside herself.  
As I have described above (in section 8.4, this chapter) bodily attunement is 
diminished and affective framing is attenuated resulting in this perceptual 
anomaly.  Her own thoughts had lost their usual sense of for-me-ness.  This 
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was a puzzle to Alison to start with but eventually she concluded that she 
could hear the thoughts of other people and have long distance conversations 
with others. 
8.5.3 Making Sense of Bullying at Work 
Andrew’s new world was dangerous.  He might be bullied, humiliated or even 
lose his job and then be unable to pay his mortgage and bills.  The know-how 
that Andrew had developed related to a happy home, good social life and a 
just and pleasant environment where he was treated well did not apply in this 
new environment.  Andrew’s affective frame was compromised, as his 
previously learned affective capacities were no longer fit for purpose in the 
new environment thus his capacity for know-how experienced through 
affective goal-orientated decision making in his new world was compromised - 
he no longer knew how.  
8.5.3.1 “The Power Cannot be Described” 
Andrew experienced a loss of sense of ownership of his actions.  He wrote an 
email expressing views about injustice and how he might help to redress the 
balance but did not experience this as straightforwardly executed by him.  He 
felt he was taken over by an indescribable power and that he was compelled 
by this power to act.  His actions had lost their usual (given or transparent) 
sense of ownership.  Bodily attunement is compromised and affective framing 
is attenuated.  This perceptual anomaly is indescribable.  Andrew concludes 
that the power was so overwhelming that it must have been supernatural. 
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8.5.4 Making Sense of an Abusive Relationship 
Caroline’s new world was one in which she could no longer cope.  Her know-
how included her ability to ignore her emotions and just get on with life.  In her 
new abusive world she became panicky and distressed and could make no 
sense of this.  Her affective frame was altered and her capacity for know-how 
experienced through affective goal-orientated decision making in that new 
world was compromised.  In her everyday life she had become adept at 
ignoring her emotions and this is how she had engaged with the world and 
negotiated difficult or potentially distressing situations in the past.  She had no 
language for psychological distress80 and she did not need one as she was 
not ‘aware’ of any distress, she  ‘just got on with it.’  As the abuse continued 
she could no longer ignore her emotional life, she was unable to ‘switch off’ 
her affective response to the world and was also unable to articulate her 
distress.  In the new environment, one of fear of bullying and violence and a 
sense that she was trapped (she could not leave and she could not stay) her 
old strategy no longer worked.  The affective frame is compromised, as her 
previously learned affective capacities are no longer fit for purpose in the new 
environment. 
8.5.4.1 “Not Me Controlling My Arm” 
Caroline started to behave oddly.  At first she had no explanation at all for her 
behaviour (perhaps all the changes that lead to her behaviour change were 
                                            
80 Feeling as well as symbolisation (usually, although not necessarily) in 
language are all required for self-conscious recognition of and acceptance or 
understanding of emotional states (Rogers, 1961).  
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sub-personal).  She took overdoses of prescription medication and had the 
sense that it was not her that was taking the pills.  Her usual sense of 
ownership of her own actions was lost.  She experienced her own thoughts as 
coming from outside herself and her own actions as not being made by her in 
some sense.  She, nevertheless felt compelled to act and felt compelled to do 
what her voices commanded.  These disownership symptoms demonstrate a 
breakdown in affective framing.  Again, bodily attunement is compromised 
and affective framing is attenuated resulting in a loss in the usual ‘given’ 
sense of the ownership of her thoughts and actions.  She came to the 
conclusion that her voices had something to do with the government and they 
must have done something to her (for example put an electronic chip in her). 
8.6 Discussion and Implications 
Any part of the system that constitutes the affective frame might be altered in 
such a way as to precipitate a breakdown in affective framing.  This might be 
endogenous81 or exogenous, that is, it might be experienced as coming from 
the inside or the outside.  For example, in the case of Caroline the abusive 
relationship is an exogenous (external) factor which impacts the affective 
frame and hearing voices might be described as an endogenous (internal) 
factor.  Both of these factors are involved in Caroline’s experience.  This 
breakdown in affective framing then demands an explanation in order for a 
person to continue to negotiate the world in a meaningful way.  Persistent 
                                            
81 In some cases (but probably not in Caroline’s case) endogenous factors 
may have an identifiable biological aetiology (as already mentioned in section 
8.5). 
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distressing environmental experience and anomalous and persistent affective, 
perceptual and/or emotional experience are incorporated into the affective 
frame.  Negotiating the world becomes much more difficult and new 
explanations are required. 
Personal experience as a psychotherapist tells me that the degree to which 
one understands oneself in terms of narrative and through self-conscious 
cognition is enormously variable.  Further, those that present themselves for 
therapy, being self-selecting, might be more psychologically minded and 
introspective than many people.  That is, they are interested in their own 
mental activity and pay attention to what things mean to them and to what 
they are thinking and feeling.  In addition, the kind of analysis done by 
philosophers and psychologists usually involves people who are articulate, 
psychologically minded and have, at least to some extent, a narrative about 
what they were like before they experienced mental health problems as well 
as a narrative about how that has changed.  We can experience ourselves as 
selves without recourse to detailed narrative.  There is ‘something it is like’ to 
be a person (Nagel, 1979) even if there is nothing to say about the 
experience.  Pre-verbal people (babies) and other animals have a ‘minimal 
self’ (Gallagher, 2000), small children can act and respond appropriately to 
their environment and to others without necessarily being able to verbalise 
how or why this is so (Bruner, 1986) and it is only through the process of 
talking to ourselves about ourselves and what we are doing that we begin to 
think, develop a narrative and are able to introspect (Vygotsky, 1986).  Young 
children have a pre-narrative, embodied first-person-perspective and I 
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suspect that many adults do not have ‘fully filled out’ narratives about 
themselves.  The lived experience of many people might be better described 
as a cluster of habits where a detailed narrative plays little or no part in how 
they experience themselves.  If we understand that affective framing involves 
sub-personal processes as well as person-level processes then this might 
explain the huge difficulty people sometimes have in explaining their 
experience.  A person might be aware of a person-level experience that is 
extremely difficult to explain (as in the cases of Barbara, Alison and Andrew).  
Alternatively a person might not be aware of any person-level experience 
other than behavioural outcome (as in the case of Caroline).  Those who ‘act 
out’ and are themselves flummoxed by their own behaviour may be 
experiencing sub-personal level changes in affective framing.82 
This way of thinking about delusion formation might have implication for what 
we understand a clinically significant delusion to be. 
8.6.1 A Tentative Conceptualisation of Delusion 
As we have seen from the literature on affect, percept and emotion (chapter 
5) and from my empirical research (chapters 4, 5 and 6), clinically significant 
delusion might best be understood in terms that relate to emotions, affect and 
                                            
82 A psychodynamic therapist might say that people always have unconscious 
‘knowledge’ relating to such things as trauma and emotional repression that 
can be brought into conscious awareness and this is what causes 
unexplained behaviour.  Theories relating to defense mechanisms are un-
falsifiable and those who attend therapy are already psychologically minded 
and more likely to ‘go along with’ or make use of these theories.  I speculate 
that these theories might be untrue and the sub-personal mechanisms that 
relate to certain behaviours are simply cognitively impenetrable. 
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percept and therefore affective framing as described in this chapter.  I suggest 
the following conceptualisation: 
A delusion is an emergent property of the person-environment system 
that shares some of the external characteristics of belief, is held with 
extraordinary conviction and is grounded in personal (subjective) 
experience which arise as a result of attenuated affective framing 
understood in terms of persistent and/or anomalous alterations in affect, 
perception, and/or emotions. 
Contra current conceptualisations of delusion (such as the one in DSM 5) 
perhaps we need not insist that a delusion is a belief (we only need to say that 
it shares some external characteristics with belief).  We need not insist that it 
is false: an accidentally true judgement can be incorporated.  What others 
believe ceases to be relevant: a person might still be delusional in relation to a 
cultural norm.  Further, the availability of proof that contradicts the delusion 
also ceases to be relevant (the grounds for forming the belief are subjective 
and personal and others do no have access to this information) and we need 
not worry about rationality or compromised inference processing (this is no 
longer a distinguishing feature of delusion formation). 
As we have already seen (in chapter 2), delusions are a heterogeneous group 
and therefore my conceptualisation might only relate to a subset of them.  I 
have used my empirical research to support my claim but, of course, it does 
not follow that all delusions are of this kind.  I have used idiographic data 
relating to just four people with clinically significant delusions and their 
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account of their experiences cannot be extrapolated to account for all 
delusions.  I have attempted to contextualise each of these accounts, and my 
analysis has drawn out their commonalities of meaning, with the aim of 
allowing the reader to appraise their transferability (rather than making any 
claims regarding their generalisability).  If some delusions are of this kind and 
these can be identified this might have implications for further research, 
prevention, therapeutic intervention and stigma.  Whether this 
conceptualisation turns out to be useful is an empirical question and we need 
more fine grained phenomenology with regard to the delusional experience in 
order to establish if this is so.  As I have already said (in chapter 5), if we 
understand that some delusions arise through problems relating to affect, 
percept and emotion, we might find novel therapeutic interventions.  We might 
also find that not all delusions are ‘the same’ and a more fine-grained 
approach where we differentiate still further might improve strategies for 
prevention, research and therapeutic intervention.  Improving mental health 
literacy by increasing our understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon 
might also help to reduce stigma. 
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION 
9.1 Context 
When I embarked on this study I wanted to gain an understanding of the 
nature of clinically significant delusion.  In the first instance I though this might 
be possible by learning about the external features of delusion.  I soon 
realised that these external features could, as Jaspers points out, only 
vaguely capture this phenomenon.  This is because these external features 
share so much in common with other psychiatric symptoms (eg: overvalued 
ideas) and ordinary beliefs (eg: religious belief or believing in ghosts).  Again, 
as Jaspers points out, the clinical significance lies outside these external 
features and can only be fully grasped through gaining an understanding of 
how a clinically significant delusion is formed (the genesis of the delusion).  I 
am interested in lived experience and I felt that I could only truly attempt to 
comprehend what it is like for people to develop delusions and live through 
that experience if I listened to what they had to say about it.  This form of 
enquiry (detailed phenomenology) is on the decline yet the knowledge to be 
gained is certainly not exhausted.  
Through gaining an understanding of the lived experience of people who have 
clinically significant delusions both prior to and during onset I realised that 
factors that might causally contribute to the development of delusion were 
extremely varied and complex.  Understanding a person’s lived experience 
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through delusion formation highlights the heterogeneity of the experience and 
helps to explain why delusions are so difficult to define.   
In the next section (9.2) I look at the implications and findings of my research.   
I then analyse my research methodology using a quality assessment tool 
developed for use in qualitative research (section 9.3).  I then look at 
implications for future research (section 9.4) and finally I look at the potential 
for policy changes (section 9.5). 
9.2 Implications and Findings 
The implications and findings for this research include: 1) a contribution to the 
theoretical understanding of what delusions might be in terms of the possibility 
of a move towards a different conceptualisation of delusion; 2) the wider 
implication of understanding psychiatry using the enactive approach; 3) the 
possibility of stigma reduction; and 4) an increased understanding that there 
are multiple routes to prevention and intervention. 
9.2.1 Towards a Different Conceptualisation of Delusion 
Whilst investigating delusion I came across the enactive approach as a 
framework for understanding cognition and this seemed to fit with and capture 
the complexity of human experience.  Understanding cognition as an 
emergent property of the person-environment system enables incorporation of 
both endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external/environmental) factors in 
relation to mental distress and psychiatric illness.  A person can be 
understood as an autonomous system with semi-permeable boundaries who 
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is in constant interaction with her environment.  The person responds to her 
environment as a result of endogenous processes which have developed and 
continue to develop through her patterned history and her lived experience.  
There exists in these processes a complex mereology where the parts of the 
person-environment system (or BBWS) are intermeshed and interact with 
reciprocal feedback and feedforward loops.   This means that 1) it does not 
make sense to look for a single cause of delusion formation and 2) the 
complexity allows for multiple routes for prevention, early intervention and 
treatment.   
My empirical research shows that persistent anomalous and/or intense 
affective, perceptual and/or emotional experiences were present at or prior to 
onset of the delusion.  After I had completed my empirical research I came 
across the notion of affective framing (Maiese, 2015a) and this seemed to 
afford a plausible fit with my empirical findings relating to percept, affect and 
emotion.  If problems with percept, affect and emotion are important features 
of some clinically significant delusions then these problems can be captured 
in terms of the notion of attenuated affective framing.  Affective framing 
captures the way in which a person responds to her environment in terms of 
embodied desiderative feelings which have subjective import relating to the 
desires and cares of that individual.  In line with the enactive approach I have 
argued that the affective frame is partly constituted through the environment.  
In this way a breakdown in affective framing is understood in terms of having 
both endogenous and exogenous components which are intermeshed in the 
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complex mereology that encapsulates lived experience.  In an attempt to 
capture this sub-set of delusions I offer this conceptualisation: 
A delusion is an emergent property of the person-environment system 
that shares some of the external characteristics of belief, is held with 
extraordinary conviction and is grounded in personal (subjective) 
experience which arises as a result of attenuated affective framing 
understood in terms of persistent and/or anomalous alterations in affect, 
perception, and/or emotions. 
Despite the heterogeneity of the delusional experience, these features were 
common across all participants in my empirical research.  These features can 
capture what characterises a sub-set of clinically significant delusion without 
recourse to contentious features that lead to a definition that overlaps with 
ordinary beliefs and with other psychiatric symptoms.  These features also 
enable an understanding of delusion that does not require or imply a cognitive 
deficit or problem with inferential processing.  As I have already said (in 
Chapter 8) even if my empirical findings are correct, they only tell us about the 
experience of the four people I interviewed.  Nevertheless, they suggest that, 
within this heterogeneous group there might be some delusions that can be 
conceptualised in this way. 
As Lucy Yardley puts it: 
“Some analyses are important not because they present a complete and 
accurate explanation of a particular body of empirical data, but because 
they draw on empirical material to present a novel, challenging 
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perspective, which opens up new ways of understanding a topic.” 
(Yardley, 2000, p.223) 
9.2.2 Wider Implications for Psychiatry 
Psychiatry might be better served by embracing the enactive approach thus 
enabling the understanding that there is a plurality of factors that causally 
contribute to psychiatric illnesses and therefore a plurality of possible 
approaches to prevention and treatment.  The bio-psycho-social model is 
supposed to be the preferred model for understanding psychiatric illnesses, 
however, in reality psychiatrists tend to practice medicine.  Assuming that all 
psychiatric illnesses can be treated by medical means carries the implicit 
assumption they are biological in origin and there is little evidence to support 
this.  Assuming a biological aetiology is problematic as it shuts down the 
possibility of truly embracing the psychological and the social or 
environmental as significant factors when it comes to prevention and cure.  
Even if we evoke the bio-psycho-social model this still falls short of a fully 
filled out way of accounting for psychiatric illnesses.  It does not fully account 
for the complex mereology involved in the emergence of cognition whereas 
the enactive approach does.  The enactive approach also enables us to link 
cognitive science to everyday experience.  A person is a biological entity who 
is first and foremost a sense-making being.  She engages in know-how 
enabling her to negotiate the world through action and cognition.  In this 
sense we are all ‘doing the best we can’ to make sense of our environment 
and respond in ways that enable survival, procreation and maybe even 
flourishing. 
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Psychiatry might be better served by looking at the mereological relations 
between people and environments rather that just looking at brain states (or 
processes) that have emerged from these mereological interactions.  A brain 
state that correlates with an experience is just that, a correlation.  If a delusion 
forms and is maintained through a process of lived experience then a brain 
state that correlates with the realisation of that (delusional) experience cannot 
be said to cause that experience.  Of course this does not mean that there are 
no brain-based causal contributions to the delusional experience, just that we 
need to be really careful about how we understand what a snapshot of a brain 
state can actually tell us about this. 
9.2.3 Stigma Reduction 
In my empirical research each person had been dealing with a radical 
alteration in lived experience, had suffered a significant period of distress or 
despair and had experienced problems with basic self-care in relation to 
sleep, eating and/or social interactions.  If these features of lived experience 
are understood as potential ‘flags’ prior to the onset of delusional experience 
and this can be communicated to the public at large we might influence 
people to seek help sooner, perhaps before delusion develops.  This might be 
best done through telling people’s stories in ways that are readily understood 
and that people can identify with. 
A better understanding about how delusion might develop can also help to 
reduce stigma.  Life stresses happen to all of us and it might just be a matter 
of luck what stresses come our way.  The nature, degree and persistence 
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(over time) of these life stresses might turn out to be too much to bear for a 
given individual at a given moment.  Prevention might be dependent, to some 
extent, on help-seeking behaviour and if we can reduce stigma perhaps 
people will seek help sooner.  Factors such as mental health literacy play a 
part in help-seeking behaviour so more data like those from my empirical 
research should be made available in the public domain.  Societal stigma, 
self-stigma and structural discrimination all impede help-seeking behaviour 
and this in turn might lead to worse outcomes for individuals.  If a person does 
not seek help until she has developed a florid delusional schema not only has 
she (probably) been through significant (perhaps avoidable) distress, she is 
much less likely to make a full recovery.  Of course, we must have the 
resources to attend to those seeking help which in times of austerity are not 
necessarily readily available.  However it seems a false economy (if economy 
is what the NHS is concerned with) to leave someone untreated until a crisis 
is reached which might result in (costly) hospitalisation and/or prolonged 
outpatient and/or pharmacological treatment (which carries it’s own risks) 
when this might have been prevented. 
9.2.4 Multiple Routes to Prevention, Early Intervention and Treatment 
An understanding of the complex mereology of the factors involved in 
delusion formation also provides us with a number of different routes to 
treatment and prevention.  These might include physical environmental 
factors such as housing and availability of green spaces, relational factors like 
family, childcare and social networks, talking therapy in relation to managing 
emotions or coming to terms with change, bodily therapies (eg: dance, music, 
	 304	
yoga) and other creative interventions including art therapy and using poetry, 
film or literature.  
Novel and creative treatments might be developed and these should be 
individually tailored and collaborative where the therapist and/or psychiatrist 
has a detailed understanding of the nature of a person’s delusional 
experience and a good understanding of what is important to that person.  For 
example, in the case of a person who has developed a delusion that is 
understood to be protective, a care strategy might be indicated involving 
acceptance of the delusion and a focus on (individually) relevant occupational 
therapy and/or creative or bodily therapy and perhaps talking therapy that 
focuses on exploration of the subjective experience with a view to alternative 
meaning or sense-making.   The exact nature of the kinds of therapies 
indicated for any given individual is, of course, an empirical question.  
9.3 Quality Assessment 
Analysis of qualitative data is important because it draws on empirical material 
in such a way as to present a challenging or novel perspective which might 
open up new ways of understanding a particular research area.  We adopt 
qualitative methods because we recognise that our knowledge and 
experience of the world is shaped by our subjective and cultural perspective 
as well as by our (culturally shaped) actions.  In this way reality, truth and 
knowledge are created by the communal construction of meaning. 
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Qualitative researchers recognise the need to establish tentative agreement 
as to the credibility and utility of a piece of research for a certain purpose, 
whilst accepting that there cannot be a universal code of practice for all 
qualitative methods.  How we evaluate qualitative studies is important not just 
for academia; it has practical importance for qualitative researchers, 
quantitative researchers, clinicians and policy makers who may be required to 
evaluate the worth of studies which employ qualitative methods.  Agreement 
on open-ended and flexible ways of assessing quality, which might be applied 
to different qualitative methods, using criteria that are themselves open to 
flexible interpretation, can only help to improve credibility and rigour in the 
field (Yardley, 2000) 
Lucy Yardley’s characteristics for good qualitative research emphasise four 
domains under which a researcher should assess the quality of her work, 
these are: 1) Sensitivity to context; 2) Commitment and rigour; 3) 
Transparency and coherence; and 4) Impact and importance (ibid, p.219). 
Below, I take each of Yardley’s quality criteria in turn and examine how my 
research fairs with regard to those criteria. 
1. Sensitivity to context - I have used IPA and narrative methods to 
understand experience in terms of story and meaning (as explicated in 
chapter 4, section 4.2) and I believe this methodology is well suited to the 
subject I am investigating.  I have surveyed various theories and literature in 
relation to the subject I am studying (as explicated in chapters 2 and 5), 
however, as far as I am aware there is no recent empirical qualitative data 
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relating to delusion specifically (although I am aware of and have briefly 
surveyed some data relating more broadly to psychosis and schizophrenia).  
As a result I have relied, at least to some extent, on the classic 
psychopathology text of Jaspers (1998) to inform my endeavour as well as 
more recent research on the characteristics of delusion (Eg: Garety and 
Hemsley, 2013; Jones and Watson, 1997) and philosophical 
conceptualisation (see chapter 2).  I have recruited and interviewed my 
research participants following ethical guidelines agreed in my research 
protocol (see appendix 1).  All the research participant had active delusions 
and were considered well enough to give informed consent to participate in 
the study.  The tension between an ethical consideration and the validity of 
the data is present here.  Each participant was relatively stable, yet retained 
residual delusions and had vivid memories of what it had been like in the past.  
It could be argued that those in the throws of a florid delusional state might 
make better research participants in some sense as they might have more to 
say about what it is like to be in that state.  However, ethical considerations 
meant that I could not interview anyone who was not able to give informed 
consent.  So, in the end, those that I interviewed were still concerned with 
their delusional beliefs but not as distressed or consumed by them as they 
had been in the past.  They were interviewed on NHS premises and this might 
have influenced the way they talked about themselves.   As an independent 
researcher (non NHS / non-psychiatric staff) and with no other involvement 
with the research participants outside the research itself I believe I may have 
had privileged access to information – for example, all the research 
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participants said they had told me things they had not told their psychiatrist.  I 
speculate that the research participants might therefore disclose information 
to me that others (clinicians) do not believe or do not want to hear or collude 
with.  This might, in part, be because I have no medical or institutional power 
– I cannot prescribe medication or have a person sectioned under the Mental 
Health Act.  This kind of privileged access is vital if we are to expand our 
knowledge about the experience of those who have the kind of anomalous 
experiences (such as delusion) associated with psychiatric illness.  It is also 
vital that this kind of research is undertaken with rigour and with quality control 
in mind.  Most importantly, I hope that I have demonstrated sensitivity to 
context in what I have taken to be ‘relevant data’. In interviewing my 
participants, I was careful to explore their histories and wider concerns, 
alongside their unusual beliefs.  I approached the interviews mindful of the 
risk of focusing too narrowly on the content and form of my research 
participants’ unusual beliefs and I hope that the merits of contextualising the 
participants’ beliefs (as explored in chapters 4, 6 and 8) have been made 
clear. 
2. Commitment and rigour - Prior to embarking on this thesis I have worked 
(and continue to work) as a self-employed psychotherapist and have engaged 
in therapeutic relationships with members of the charity Rethink (previously 
the Schizophrenia Society) for a number of years.  I gained an MSc at the 
Medical School at the University of Warwick in the Philosophy of Ethics and 
Mental Health and wrote a dissertation on Thought Insertion, part of which 
was published in a peer reviewed journal (Gunn, 2016b) and I have 
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undertaken in-depth engagement with the topic (see chapters 2 and 5) with 
regard to literature and other research in this area. 
Whilst I have undertaken some research and training in IPA and narrative 
methods this is my first piece of research of this kind and as such I cannot 
claim to feel fully confident in methodological competence or skill.  I attempted 
to ameliorate this shortcoming through sharing my data and my analysis with 
my academic supervisors, one of whom is an expert in IPA.  I lost some data 
(as explained in chapter 4) however the data I did collect was closely 
analysed using the rigorous recursive methods described in chapter 4. 
3. Transparency and coherence - The full research protocol is included in this 
thesis as is a detailed description of how I analysed the data (see chapter 4).  
The transcripts are not included in order to preserve the anonymity of the 
participants and, whilst this might indicate a lack of complete transparency, 
this is an ethical requirement for this kind of research.  Substantial 
(anonymised) quotes from the transcripts were used to support my analysis 
and the analysis itself is linked to pre-existing theory that has been used to 
conceptualise other aspects of psychiatric illness.  The sample size was small 
(only four participants) but IPA, which focuses on depth and meaning, is 
designed to be undertaken with relatively small samples.   Narrative analysis, 
which focuses on the whole story surrounding a given experience, can be 
integrated with IPA (Smith et al., 2009).  As meaning and narrative are 
important aspects of the delusional experience IPA and narrative analysis are 
a good fit for this research.  Depth might have been increased if I had spent 
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longer interviewing each participants.  This was particularly noticeable in the 
case of Alison whose story was difficult to follow.  It was only after I had 
listened to her interviews a number of times and transcribed and re-read the 
data that I realised there were gaps in the story and in my understanding.  
Because my research protocol specified two interviews of one hour each it 
was not possible to fill those gaps.   
4. Impact and importance - I have outlined in detail the impact that this 
research might have in terms of theoretical understanding of the important 
features of (some) delusions.  I have also highlighted the practical implications 
for further research, prevention and treatment as well as the socio-cultural 
impact in relation to the potential for stigma reduction (see chapters 4 and 5) 
and have summarised that impact in this chapter (above).  In addition my 
research indicates what future research might be useful (see section 9.4) as 
well as the potential for policy change (see section 9.5) 
9.4 Future Research 
I suggest that more fine-grained phenomenological research is required.  Data 
from this kind of research can be used to 1) inform further research – if we 
identify different kinds of delusional experiences with different kinds of 
aetiologies we might study them separately to identify patterns and responses 
to treatment; 2) inform prevention – a detailed understanding of the different 
ways that delusions might form can help us develop preventative strategies; 
3) document and promulgate information about the experience - improving the 
mental health literacy of the general public and of organisations can reduce 
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stigma and structural discrimination; 4) increase help-seeking behaviour – a 
better understanding of these experiences enables a person to identify ‘flags’ 
that might indicate the potential for developing a serious psychiatric illness 
and thus seek help sooner. 
9.5 Policy Changes 
A ‘joined up’ mental health strategy that takes the ideas of the enactive 
approach seriously and understands that cognition, and therefore mental 
health problems, emerge from people-environment systems can only improve 
our understanding and enhance research and intervention. Large-scale 
anthropological studies might also help us to understand more about the 
environmental and relational factors that contribute to poor mental health 
outcomes.  This information at policy level might enable us to do something to 
change and improve environments that we know give rise to poor mental 
health outcomes. 
Understanding the experience of people with mental health problems is the 
starting position to move any of this forward.  In this endeavour, we must see 
that epistemic justice is done, by taking a person’s testimony of her 
experience of mental illness seriously.  If we understand we cannot think a 
person is somehow ‘other,’ ‘different’ or ‘damaged’ in some way.  Perhaps this 
will then mean that attitudes will change and thus public stigma, self-stigma, 
organisational discrimination and public policy will all improve enabling better 
preventative strategies and better outcomes for people with psychiatric 
illnesses. 
	 311	
  
	 312	
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Protocol and Flowchart 
Appendix 2 – Information for Keyworkers 
Appendix 3 – Letter of Invitation 
Appendix 4 – Participant Information Sheet 
Appendix 5 – Consent Form 
Appendix 6 – Consultant Letter 
Appendix 7 – Demographic Questionnaire 
Appendix 8 – Interview Schedule 
 
  
	 313	
Appendix 1 – Protocol and Flowchart 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 15/12/16  Page 1 of 15 
 
 
 
 
Research Protocol 
 
Delusion – a qualitative enquiry 
 
 
Chief investigator:  Rachel Gunn 
 
 
Research Supervisor: Dr Michael Larkin 
 
Sponsor: The University of 
Birmingham 
 
Collaborators: Dr Neel Tambimuttu 
Coventry & Warwickshire 
Mental Health Partnership 
NHS Trust 
Dr Andrew Fox 
Birmingham & Solihull Mental 
Health Foundation Trust 
 
 
  
	 314	
 
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 15/12/16  Page 2 of 15 
 
 
Contents: 
 
1 
 
Brief Summary ………………………. 3 
2 
 
Scientific background and justification ………………………. 3 
3 
 
Objective ………………………. 5 
4 
 
Study design ………………………. 5 
5 
 
Inclusion / exclusion criteria ………………………. 8 
6 
 
Methodology ………………………. 9 
7 
 
Data storage and confidentiality ………………………. 10 
8 
 
Ethical issues ………………………. 11 
9 
 
Potential benefits ………………………. 13 
10 
 
Tasks and timelines ………………………. 14 
11 
 
Dissemination ………………………. 14 
 
 
References ………………………. 15 
 
 
  
	 315	
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 15/12/16  Page 3 of 15 
 
1.Brief Summary 
 
The research aims to examine the experience of those with clinically 
significant delusions.  The study will explore the characteristics of the 
symptom (delusion) and compare these with current literature, historical 
accounts (such as Jaspers, 1963) and clinical definitions, such as the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM5, 2013).   
 
Participants will be recruited from local mental health services and 
approached by the lead professional involved in their care.  The participants 
may have varying diagnoses, but must be experiencing active delusions to 
qualify to participate (see inclusion/exclusion criteria and information sheet for 
full details).  Up to 10 service users, who are able to talk about their 
experiences, will be recruited for the study.  Two separate semi-structured 
interviews will focus on history, onset and characteristics of the symptom.  At 
an initial meeting steps will be taken to gain informed consent, provide the 
right to withdraw and protect participants' identities (see information sheet and 
consent form).  Interviews will be recorded, transcribed and then analysed 
using IPA (interpretive phenomenological analysis) (see Smith, Larkin & 
Flowers, 2009).   
 
The aim of the study is to add to existing literature and increase our 
understanding of the characteristics of the phenomenon (looking at aspects 
such as belief status, conviction, emotional components, falsifiability etc.).  It 
is hoped that the findings will inform the philosophical literature and thus 
therapeutic intervention and future research. 
 
 
2. Scientific Background and Justification 
 
Delusion is defined in historical accounts (such as Jaspers) and the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM5) as follows: 
	 316	
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 15/12/16  Page 4 of 15 
 
 
“A false belief [Jaspers’ – “false judgement(s)”] based on incorrect inference 
about external reality that is firmly sustained [Jaspers’ – “held with 
extraordinary conviction”] despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary [Jaspers’ – “imperviousness to other experiences and compelling 
counter arguments”]. The belief is not ordinarily one accepted by other 
members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of 
religious faith) [Jaspers’ – “…nor can the prolific views of entire nations be 
given the title delusion…”].  When a false belief involves a value judgment, it 
is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy 
credibility.” 
(American Psychiatric Association. DSM-5 Task Force, 2013, p.819). 
 
The symptom approach to mental health problems is adopted here as 
opposed to the diagnostic approach (see Bentall, 2009).   Diagnoses, such as 
schizophrenia, which group together various symptoms give us a 
heterogeneous patient group where it is possible for two people with the same 
diagnosis to have different symptoms.  By taking the participants from the 
patient group who have some form of psychosis (with varying diagnoses - see 
DSM 5) and analysing their symptoms in a more fine-grained way it is hoped 
that the research will illuminate significant features of delusion and perhaps 
differentiate different kinds of delusion.    
 
In recent years there have been a number of qualitative studies where 
participants have been interviewed about their experience of psychosis (see 
McCarthy-Jones et al, 2013; Boydell et al, 2010), so there is precedent for 
interviewing this patient population.    However, these interviews have not 
been about the characteristics of the experience but rather about 
psychological impact and recovery. 
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Detailed qualitative descriptions of first-person experience of delusions are 
hard to come by in the literature.  This makes philosophical questions about 
the nature of delusion difficult to answer and there is on-going debate in the 
literature about the characteristics as defined.  The apparent characteristics 
(such as the belief status of the experience, falseness (and falsifiability), 
imperviousness to counter arguments and cultural normalcy) are by no means 
settled, despite the definition above (for some of the debates see: Bayne and 
Pacherie, 2005; Bortolotti, 2012; Currie and Jureidini, 2001; Frankish, 2012; 
Leeser and O’Donohue, 1999; Maher, 1974). 
 
I hope to shed some light on these problems through detailed recording, 
transcription and analysis of these experiences.  The study hopes to add to 
existing literature and increase our understanding of the phenomenon, thus 
informing therapeutic intervention and future research. 
 
 
3.Objective 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the subjective experience of delusion 
by interviewing participants with clinically significant delusion about their lived 
experience.  This is done in order to better understand the characteristics of 
the phenomenon. 
 
 
4. Study Design 
 
Participants: 
A minimum of 4 and a maximum of 10 participants will be recruited from local 
mental health services.  These participants may have varying diagnoses but 
will all have active delusion(s).  
 
	 318	
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 15/12/16  Page 6 of 15 
 
The sample will be non-random as participants will be approached by their 
lead healthcare professional/keyworker. 
 
The sample size is small to enable detailed phenomenological analysis of the 
participants' lived experiences taking into consideration the embodied, 
situated (cultural and environmental) and relational nature of human 
experience (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009 
 
Recruitment process: 
The lead healthcare professional (keyworker) for each potential participant will 
determine whether he/she is suitable for the study.  The healthcare 
professional will be given information about the study (via the information for 
keyworkers sheet) and will be asked to recommend only those potential 
participants who meet the criteria for the study, are able to give informed 
consent to participate, are interested in talking about their experiences and for 
whom perceived risk of distress is minimal.  
 
The healthcare professional will approach the potential participant and provide 
information about the study (via the letter of invitation to participate) as well as 
the contact details for getting in touch with the researcher (also via the letter 
of invitation). The potential participant can contact the researcher by post or 
email in the first instance and the researcher will phone/email him/her back to 
discuss the next steps. When initial contact is made the research will be 
explained to the potential participant, any questions the participant has will be 
addressed and formal consent will be sought (via the participant consent 
form).  This will be done at a face to face meeting in advance of the first 
research interview.  If the participant agrees he/she will be contacted after 2 
days and an appointment will be arranged for the first interview.  
 
What happens next: 
In most cases there will be 2 interviews per participant (the possibility for 
shorter interviews for those who find a one hour too onerous is also available).  
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The interviews will take place at various local healthcare locations as 
appropriate (to be agreed with the participant and with the lead healthcare 
professional/NHS Trust as appropriate).   
 
The first interview will include history taking and onset of the delusion and will 
take 60 minutes. At the end of the first interview a date will be set for the 
second interview.  The second interview will be a detailed examination of what 
it is like to experience a delusion and will take 60 minutes. Questions will take 
a semi-structured form (ie: some specific questions will be asked with the 
opportunity for the researcher to follow these up as the interview develops - 
see the interview schedule for more information).  All interviews will be audio 
recorded.   
  
The researcher is a qualified counsellor and has experience of interviewing 
people experiencing psychological distress and additional guidance will be 
sought through supervision.  All participants will be given the opportunity to 
talk to a clinical psychologist at the University of Birmingham or their lead 
healthcare professional (keyworker) should they become distressed and feel 
the need to talk to a third party. 
 
The data: 
Personal computerised data (data identifying participants, such as consent 
forms, contact details and audio recordings of interviews) will only be 
seen/heard by the researcher.  Paper data (forms with identifying information) 
will be stored in a sealed envelope in a locked cabinet in the office of the 
research supervisor at the University of Birmingham.  
 
The interviews will be recorded and then transcribed by the interviewer.  The 
transcribed interviews will be altered to remove/replace any personal data that 
would identify the participant.  The results will be analysed using IPA 
(interpretive phenomenological analysis) which aims to analyse how 
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individuals make sense of their subjective experiences.  Some of the 
transcript may also be analysed by the investigator's supervisor.   
 
Anonymised tanscript data may be seen by the research supervisor and other 
members of the research team.  Anonymised data will be used in the final 
thesis and at other academic forums (eg: conferences, workshops, blogs 
etc.).  Anonymised excerpts may be used for teaching or training purposes.   
 
All data will be kept in accordance with confidentiality procedures.  Personal 
data (data identifying participants) will be destroyed/deleted 3 months after 
the end of the research.  Anonymised transcripts of the interviews will be 
archived at the University of Birmingham for 10 years. 
 
 
5. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
Participants must: 
• be a service user within local mental health services 
• have active delusion(s) 
• be able to give informed consent to participate in the study 
• be able to talk about their experiences 
• be at minimal risk (of distress) when talking about their experiences 
• be able to speak English (no translator is provided) 
• be willing to travel to a suitable location to participate in the interview 
 
A participant will be excluded if: 
• the lead healthcare professional believes he/she would be at risk (of 
severe distress or suicide) by participating 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant 
represents a risk to the interviewer 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant is unable 
to give informed consent to participate in the study 
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6. Methodology 
 
Interview questions: 
The interview schedule takes the form of a semi-structured questionnaire and 
is adapted from the Appraisals of Anomalous Experiences Interview, known 
as AANEX (Brett et al 2007).   It has been adapted for relevance and is 
designed to leave scope for freedom of novel participant descriptions of their 
experience. 
 
Recruitment: 
Local mental health services have agreed to recruit participants for this study.  
Lead healthcare professionals/keyworkers at various locations within the Trust 
will be given information about the study as well as inclusion/exclusion criteria 
(via the information for keyworkers sheet).  Healthcare professionals will 
provide the information sheet and contact details of the researcher to potential 
participants.  Potential participants can contact the researcher directly by 
phone or post (the researcher will then call them back to discuss 
participation).  Alternatively the potential participant can ask the lead 
healthcare professional to pass his/her contact details on to the researcher.  
Potential participants will then have the opportunity to discuss the study and 
ask questions without committing themselves to participation (the study is 
voluntary).  Information about the voluntary nature of the study is contained in 
the letter of invitation to participate.  More details about the ability to withdraw 
some or all of the interview material at any time up to 2 weeks after the final 
interview will be provided on the detailed participant information sheet (given 
to participants at the first meeting with the researcher, as part of the 
discussion about the research and consent, prior to the first interview). 
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Consent: 
Once a participant has expressed a desire to participate in the study they will 
be contacted by the researcher to arrange a convenient time and location to 
meet.  Any questions the participant has about the research can be 
addressed at this meeting and, provided the potential participant is happy to 
continue, written informed consent will be obtained at this meeting. 
 
Interviews: (see interview schedule for details of questions) 
• Initial meeting lasting approximately 30 minutes - to explain the 
research, answer questions and obtain consent from the participant. 
• Interview 1 lasting approximately 60 minutes – to take history and 
participant’s experience at the onset of the delusion. 
• Interview 2 lasting approximately 60 minutes – to gain detailed 
information about the participant’s experience of delusion. 
(the possibility for shorter interviews is also available, to be agreed with 
individual participants). 
 
7. Data Storage and Confidentiality 
 
All data stored on computer will be password protected. Any confidential 
paper data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet at the University of 
Birmingham. 
 
Anonymised data: 
A code name or pseudonym will be applied to the transcript (interview) data 
for a given participant.  This will be stored on the researcher's personal laptop 
and on the server at the University of Birmingham.  The data will be password 
protected.  Only the researcher, the supervisor and other appropriate 
members of the research team (including peer researchers) at the University 
of Birmingham will have access to this anonymised data.  Changes will be 
made to the transcribed (interview) data so that participants cannot be 
identified by their location, work or other identifying characteristics.  This 
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anonymised data will be stored at the University of Birmingham for 10 years 
(in line with university research procedures).  The custodian of this data will 
be the research supervisor. 
 
Personal data: 
Personal data, which identifies the participant, will be stored separately from 
anonymised transcript (interview) data.  Only the researcher will have access 
to this data.  Computerised data will be stored on the researcher's personal 
laptop and will be password protected.  Paper data will be stored in a sealed 
envelope in a locked cabinet in the research supervisor's office at the 
University of Birmingham.  This data will be destroyed (shredded/deleted) 
three months after the end of the research study. 
 
 
8. Ethical Issues 
 
Giving informed consent: 
Each potential participant will be provided with an information sheet and a 
consent form.  The details will be discussed with the participant, there will be 
an opportunity for the participant to ask questions and it will be made clear to 
him/her that the study is voluntary, anonymous (no personal details will be 
published in the research) and that he/she can withdraw up to 2 weeks after 
the final interview (for full details see the participant consent form and the 
participant information sheet). 
 
In accordance with the BMA (2008) the researcher will check that each 
participant is able: 
• to understand the information relevant to the decision  
• to retain the information relevant to the decision  
• to use or weigh the information and  
• to communicate the decision  
If the researcher has concerns about the participant's capacity to give 
informed consent after the commencement of the interviews (perhaps due to 
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deterioration in the participant's mental health) the participant will be 
withdrawn from the study.   
 
If a participant discloses intent to seriously harm themselves, harm others or 
undertake a serious criminal activity a third party will be informed (as 
documented in the participant information sheet and discussed at the initial 
meeting with the potential participant). 
 
Potential distress: 
A small possibility of psychological distress exists.  This risk will be mitigated 
to some extent as the possibility of potential distress will be highlighted on the 
information sheet, suitability is assessed by the lead healthcare worker and 
each participant is self-selecting (he/she will decide whether or not to 
participate based on the information given and the initial discussion). The 
informed participant is opting-in to the study. 
 
In the unlikely event that the interview proves to be unexpectedly distressing, 
the interview can be stopped by the participant or the researcher at any time.  
The researcher will then ensure that appropriate support is sought if 
necessary (via the lead healthcare professional (keyworker), GP or clinical 
psychologist - as documented on the participant information sheet). If distress 
occurs outside the interview the participant will be able to talk to any of these 
named individuals (details of available contacts will be provided to the 
participant on the participant information sheet).   
 
Recruitment and Retention: 
Recruitment and retention may be difficult.  Some participants will be in-
patients, some out-patients and some may be in-patients at the information 
giving session and/or the first interview and perhaps have been discharged by 
the time subsequent interview(s) take place. 
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Participants will be seen at different local NHS locations.  The participant will 
be required to attend interviews totalling 2-3 hours.  Out-patients may also be 
required to travel to an appropriate local NHS location on 3 (or perhaps more) 
occasions.  Where possible, participants will be seen at a time that is 
convenient for them.  In the case of in-patients it would be at a suitable 
location and time within the hospital setting.  In the case of out-patients this 
could be done when they are visiting the location in any case (for another 
appointment). If this is not possible, this may mean that the participant is 
visiting a location for the sole purpose of participating in the research, in which 
case travel expenses of up to £20 per person will be offered (provided by the 
University of Birmingham). 
 
Right to Withdraw: 
As well as being given the opportunity to withdraw at any time from any of the 
interviews the participant will be able to withdraw entirely from the study up to 
2 weeks after completion of the interviews.  A participant may also choose to 
withdraw individual statements that they have made during the interview up to 
2 weeks after the completion of the interviews without withdrawing entirely 
from the study.  The ability to withdraw is documented in the information sheet 
and on the consent form.  In addition the participant will be reminded of this at 
each interview. 
 
 
9. Potential Benefits 
 
There is no direct benefit to participants.  However, participants may find 
discussing the history, onset and experience of their delusion illuminating and 
perhaps therapeutic. 
 
The data will be used to inform a philosophical thesis about the nature of 
delusion.  It is hoped that this thesis will improve understanding of this 
phenomenon and inform on-going research and treatment. 
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10. Tasks and Timelines 
 
Total duration for research:  03/11/14 – 01/02/17 
 
Details: (see also flowchart) 
• October-December 2014 - IRAS completed and submitted 
• January-March 2015 - necessary changes made  
• April 2015-March 2017 - recruitment, data collection, transcription and 
analysis of data 
• October 2015-December 2017 - use of analysis to inform philosophical 
work and write up of final PhD. 
• March 2018- destroy/delete all personal data 
 
 
11. Dissemination 
 
A summary sheet will be made available to participants, keyworkers and other 
interested parties. 
 
The PhD write up will be available electronically to all those who have 
appropriate university library access. 
 
Articles may be published in peer reviewed academic journals.   
 
Items may also be published online on academic websites and blogs. 
 
Data and findings may be presented at conferences and workshops or in a 
book. 
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02/11/15 
 
To: Keyworkers and lead mental health healthcare professionals  
 
Research Opportunity 
I am a PhD student conducting a research study to look at the experience of 
individuals who have thoughts and feelings that others do not understand and 
that might be described as delusional by healthcare providers and others.  This is 
symptom-based research and the diagnosis (or lack of diagnosis) is not 
significant for this research. 
 
I would like you to help me find participants for this study.  The inclusion/exclusion 
criteria are as follows: 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Participants must: 
• be a service user within local mental health services  
• have active delusion(s) 
• be able to give informed consent to participate in the study 
• be able to talk about their experiences 
• be at minimal risk (of distress) when talking about their experiences 
• be able to speak English (no translator is provided) 
• be willing to travel to a suitable NHS location to participate in the interview  
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A participant will be excluded if: 
• the lead healthcare professional believes he/she would be at risk (of severe 
distress or suicide) by participating 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant represents a risk 
to the interviewer 
• the lead healthcare professional believes that the participant is unable to give 
informed consent to participate in the study 
 
There will be an initial meeting with each potential participant to answer questions 
and gain consent and then there will be two further interviews lasting about one hour 
each.  The interviews will take place in a suitable NHS location (local and convenient 
to the participant). 
 
The interviews will take the form of a conversation between me (the researcher) and 
the participant, where the participant talks about his/her experiences.  The 
participant will also be asked to fill in a very short questionnaire (taking 1 or 2 
minutes only). 
 
I will ask questions about: 
• How the difficulties started 
• Aspects of personal history that might have precipitated or had an effect on 
the experience 
• What the experience is like (how it feels and what meaning it may have) 
 
What to do if you identify a possible candidate: 
• In the first instance ask him/her if he/she is interested in participating in the 
research. 
• If he/she is interested give him/her the letter of invitation provided. 
• At this stage the potential participant may contact me direct via email or post. 
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• An additional contact option is to ask a member of staff to contact me on 
his/her behalf.  If a potential participant asks you to do this please ask him/her 
to complete the form on the information sheet and provide this information to 
me (via phone or email – see contact details below).  (Please retain the form 
and I will collect it from you in due course). 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this research project. 
 
My contact details (chief investigator for this research project) are: 
 
Rachel Gunn  Tel:   
Email:   
 
	 332	
Appendix 3 – Letter of Invitation 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 3: 29/05/15  Page 1 of 3 
 
NHS Trust logo header here…………. 
 
 
Title of Project: What is it like to experience thoughts and feelings that others might 
describe as delusional?  
 
To: Service users  
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust 
 
Research Opportunity – letter of invitation 
This research is being conducted as part of a program of study at the University of 
Birmingham.  The purpose of the research is to look at the experience of individuals 
who have thoughts and feelings that others do not understand and that might 
be described as delusional by healthcare providers and others.  This is symptom-
based research and the diagnosis (or lack of diagnosis) is not significant for 
this research. 
 
Your keyworker has given you this invitation/information sheet because he/she 
believes you may be able to contribute to the research. 
 
If you would like to talk about your experiences and can commit to giving about two 
and a half hours of your time to meet with me and answer questions please contact 
me using one of the methods detailed below.  I will then get in touch with you to 
discuss how we proceed. 
 
If you are interested you will have an initial meeting with me, of about half an hour, 
where I will answer any questions you may have and provide you with a detailed 
information sheet about the research.  The research is entirely voluntary and if you 
choose to proceed, I will then ask you to give written consent for your involvement.  
There will be two further interviews lasting about one hour each.  The interviews will 
take place in a suitable NHS location (local and convenient to you). 
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The interviews will take the form of a conversation between you and me, where you 
tell me about your experiences.  
 
I will ask questions about: 
• How your difficulties started 
• Aspects of personal history that might have had an effect on the experience 
• What the experience is like (how it feels and what meaning it may have) 
 
You will also be asked to complete a very short questionnaire (eight questions) about 
yourself.  This questionnaire will take no more than one or two minutes to complete. 
 
 
If you are interested in participating in this research there are 3 options for contact: 
 
1. Fill in the ‘agreement to be contacted’ form and hand it to your keyworker 
  
2. Fill in the form and send it (in the envelope provided) to: 
 
  
 
 
 
3. Email me direct at  with your request to be contacted, your 
name, your contact number and any additional information that you feel is relevant.  
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Agreement to be contacted 
 
Title of Project: What is it like to experience thoughts and feelings that others might 
describe as delusional?  
 
Name of Researcher: Rachel Gunn 
 
I agree to be contacted by the researcher regarding this project (please tick) 

Name:   _________________________________________________ 
Contact phone number: __________________________________ 
Special requirements for contact/meeting, please specify: 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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NHS	Trust	logo	here…………	
 
Title of Project: What is it like to experience thoughts and 
feelings that others might describe as delusional? 
  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
(given to potential participants at the initial meeting with the researcher) 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research is being conducted as part of a program of study at the University of 
Birmingham.  The purpose of the research is to look at the experience of individuals 
who have thoughts and feelings that others do not understand and that might be 
described as delusional by healthcare providers and others. 
 
The interviews will take the form of a conversation between you and me, where you 
tell me about your experiences.  You will also be asked to complete a very short 
questionnaire (eight questions) about yourself.  This questionnaire will take no more 
than one or two minutes to complete. 
 
I will ask you questions about: 
• How your difficulties started 
• Aspects of your personal history that might have had an affect on you 
• What your experience is like (how it feels and what meaning it may have for 
you) 
 
Why have you been chosen? 
I am interested in talking to you as currently there is only a limited amount known 
about what these experiences are like. It is hoped that the information provided by 
participants will help to identify important aspects of the experience.  This in turn may 
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lead to a better understanding of the difficulties associated with these experiences 
and therefore have implications for better support. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part.  It is up to you to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part.  The decision to participate is completely voluntary.   
 
If, 48 hours after our initial discussion, you are still interested in participating in this 
study, I will contact you to make an appointment, at a time of your convenience, to 
come and interview you about your experiences.   The interviews will take place on 
NHS premises. 
 
Remember, if you decide to take part, you will still be free to withdraw at any time.   
Withdrawing will not affect any current or future NHS treatment. 
 
What will happen to you if you take part? 
If, after consideration, you agree to take part an appointment will be arranged at an 
appropriate NHS location at a time of your convenience. 
 
During the first research session, you will take part in an interview and I will ask you 
about your personal history and your experiences at the onset of your difficulties. I 
will also ask you to describe what it is like to have thoughts and feelings that others 
find difficult to understand.  This will take about one hour to complete.   At the 
second session I will ask you about your experience in detail as well as how this 
compares with other (ordinary) experiences and past experiences.  The second 
session will take about one hour.  If necessary we can agree to make the interviews 
shorter (if an hour seems to long). 
 
The research will be carried out wherever is most suitable for you. It can be either 
organised at your nearest NHS support centre or at some other NHS location if this 
is more convenient. 
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Your total involvement in the research will be about two and a half hours (the first 
half hour meeting will be to discuss participation, ask questions and give consent).  
 
Expenses 
Expenses for travel to the research interview location can be claimed in cash from 
the researcher by presenting relevant travel documents (such as a bus ticket or taxi 
receipt) or by a mileage calculation (if traveling by car) at 45p per mile travelled. 
 
The maximum that can be claimed by each participant will be £20 for attending each 
meeting. 
 
What do I have to do? 
You will need to be able to talk about your experiences. The total interview time 
would be two hours.  This is could be done at two separate one hour interviews or at 
several shorter interviews if preferred (details to be agreed on an individual basis).  
 
This study will NOT involve drugs or any other medical procedures. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no risks involved.   However, if you become distressed as a result of your 
participation, please let me know, either at the time or using the contact details 
below.  In the first instance I will discuss any difficulties that have arisen.   If you 
require professional help, I will discuss this with you first and perhaps suggest that 
you contact your keyworker, GP, or other appropriate professional.  If necessary, 
there is also the possibility of contacting a clinical psychologist at the University of 
Birmingham.  This can be done by asking the researcher (Rachel Gunn) to make 
contact on your behalf in the first instance. 
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If the answers that you give to the questionnaires cause me concern about your own 
well-being, I will discuss this with you and may suggest that you contact your 
keyworker, GP or other appropriate professional for further advice.  
 
In addition if you disclose any serious illegal activities or intent of harm to yourself or 
others this will be reported to an appropriate third party.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits in taking part in the study, although you may find talking 
about your experiences therapeutic.  It is hoped that the information provided by 
participants will increase the knowledge of health professionals and have direct 
implications for better support.  
 
What if something goes wrong? 
Once again, if participating in this research project distresses you, you should let me 
know.  In the first instance, I will discuss your difficulties with you.  If you need 
professional help, I will speak to you about this and you may then want to contact 
your keyworker, GP or other appropriate professional.   
 
There are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed due to 
someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action but you may 
have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns 
about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course 
of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be 
available to you. 
 
What if I have special needs? 
I will make every effort to ensure that there are no barriers for you if you wish to take 
part.  If you have communication problems such as difficulties with reading, I may be 
able to offer you more time to complete the study and will assist you in reading the 
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information and consent forms.  If you envisage any other problems, please let me 
know and every effort will be made to make things easier for you.  
 
 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Your participation in the study will be kept confidential.  Consent will be sought for 
audiotaping and for anonymised quotes to be used in the final output of the research.  
 
Personal data – your name and other personal details 
The signed consent form and personal data that identifies you will only be seen by 
the researcher (Rachel Gunn).  The research supervisor will keep paper data in a 
sealed envelope in a locked cabinet in his office at the University of Birmingham.  He 
will not look at the personal data.  This paper data will be kept in a locked cabinet 
until the end of the research project.  It will be destroyed by the researcher 3 months 
after the end of the project.  No personal information (information that identifies you 
specifically) will be kept on any computers.   
 
Your contribution – recordings of the research interviews 
The recordings of the interviews will be saved on the researcher’s personal computer 
and will be password protected.  This data will be deleted 3 months after the end of 
he research. 
 
Your contribution – transcription of the research interviews 
The interviews will be transcribed by the researcher (Rachel Gunn).  This means that 
everything you say and everything the researcher says will be typed up and saved 
on the researcher’s personal computer.  These computerised documents will be 
password protected and anonymised (no personal information will be on these files). 
At the end of the research these computerised files will be given to the designated 
University of Birmingham custodian.  These anonymised files will be kept for 10 
years and may be used for teaching and training within the department. 
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Please be aware that, although your information will be confidential if anything illegal 
is disclosed it will be reported to the appropriate authorities.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
On completion, the results of this study may be sent for publication in a scientific 
journal.   Parts of the research may also appear in a book (or books), on academic 
blogs or websites and be presented at academic conferences.  You will not be 
personally identifiable in any of these publications.  Each participant will be informed 
about the results of the study.  If you are interested in the outcome of the research, I 
can send you a short report of the findings. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is being undertaken as part of a PhD in philosophy and psychology 
and is therefore organised and funded by the School of Psychology and the School 
of Philosophy and Theology at the University of Birmingham.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the local NHS ethics committee 
according to local regulations. 
 
 
Contact for Further Information: 
If you have any matters that concern you or further questions, you may contact the 
researcher in charge of this project or the supervisor for this research: 
 
• Rachel Gunn, researcher: email:  
• Dr. Michael Larkin, research supervisor, School of Psychology: 
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You could also contact: 
 
  
 
 
Telephone:    
                       
Email:            
or 
Research Support Office, 65 Davies Street, London, W1K 5DA,  
Telephone: 020 7514 6262 who can provide independent advice. 
or 
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) who publish a leaflet with advice 
for people considering taking part in research, and looks at some questions 
you may want to ask. A copy may be obtained from CERES, PO Box 1365, 
London, N16 0BW. 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO READ THIS 
INFORMATION. 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
(2 x signed copies required: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file) 
Title of Project: What is it like to experience thoughts and feelings that others might describe 
as delusional?  
Name of Researcher: Rachel Gunn 
         Please initial box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet.   
  
I have had the opportunity to ask questions and had them answered.   
  
I understand that my participation is voluntary.   
  
I understand I am free to withdraw some or all of my interview material at any time during 
the research process and up to 2 weeks after my final interview with the researcher without 
giving a reason. 
 
  
I give consent for the interview to be audio taped.   
  
I give consent for anonymised quotations to be used.   
  
I understand that my consultant and my keyworker will be informed that I am taking part in 
the research but they will not be told anything about what I talk about. 
 
  
I understand if I tell the researcher something that means I am at risk of suicide, harm to 
others or serious criminal activity that the researcher may inform a third party.  
 
  
I agree to participate in this research.   
 
 
Name of Patient:     Signature:    date: 
 
Person taking consent:  Rachel Gunn Signature    date: 
 
Pseudonym / code number for this research: ____________________ 
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…..address…. 
 
…..date…. 
 
 
Dear Dr.  ……………. 
 
Your patient  ……. insert name…… will be taking part in a qualitative research 
project in the next few weeks.  He/she will be asked about his/her recent 
thoughts and feelings in relation to experiences that others might describe as 
delusional. 
 
If you have any queries about this research please feel free to contact me by 
phone or email. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rachel Gunn 
Postgraduate Researcher 
School of Philosophy 
University of Birmingham 
 
Tel:   
Email:   
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Questionnaire  
(basic demographic description – questions will only be asked if they are not 
spontaneously offered over the course of the interviews) 
 
 
 
Code/pseudonym  _____________________ 
 
 
 
Date of interview  _____________________ 
 
 
 
Age range  
 
 
Sex  M  /  F 
 
 
Diagnosis  ______________________________________________ 
 
 
How long in mental health services? _____________________________ 
 
 
How long experiencing symptoms? ____________________________ 
 
 
Ethnic group (self describe)  _____________________________ 
 
 
In Work  /  in education  /  unemployed? 
 
 
Who do you live with/who’s in the household? ________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
18-25 35-45 25-35 55-65 45-55 65-75 
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Interview Schedule 
 
Project title: Delusion – a qualitative enquiry 
 
(This interview schedule is adapted and developed from AANEX - Brett et al., 2007) 
 
 
Interview 1 – 60 minutes 
 
Context of onset: 
 
1. Thinking back to the first time you came to mental health services for help, 
can you tell me what things were like for you at the time? 
 
Additional questions to be asked if not spontaneously included in descriptive answer 
to question 1: 
 
1.1 Can you tell me what your life was like when you this happened? 
 
1.2 What kind of living situation were you in? 
 
1.3 Were there any particularly difficult or exciting events happening to you at the 
time? 
 
1.4 How were you feeling emotionally at the time? 
 
 
History: 
 
2. Can you tell me about any significant events in your history that you feel 
might have contributed to this experience? 
 
 
Describing the delusional experience: 
 
3. Can you tell me what is it that you experience that other people, such as 
healthcare providers or your friends and family, would describe as a delusion? 
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Interview 2 – 60 minutes 
 
Thoughts and feelings about the experience: 
 
4. Last time we met you talked about [the experience described at the end of 
the previous interview].  When you have [that experience], what do you think 
has happened/is going on? 
 
Additional questions to be asked if not spontaneously included in descriptive answer 
to question 4: 
 
4.1 Are you still experiencing (use participants previous descriptors, eg: 
thinking/feeling/believing) that?  If yes - Can you tell me more about that?  
 
4.2 If no – Can you tell me about what has changed? 
 
(If delusion is no longer there, continue to ask participant about what it was like, ie: 
following questions in past tense) 
 
4.3  
If EXPERIENCE described: 
What sense do/did you make of it? 
Do you think there is an explanation for it? 
 
If BELIEF described: 
What do you experience that leads you to think that? 
 
Similar questions to be asked if the experience is described differently (eg: as 
KNOWLEDGE or FEEL or INTUITION or other descriptors) – care to be taken to use 
the participant’s language. 
 
4.4 Can you tell me if you are convinced that what you [experience / feel / know / 
believe / intuit etc…] is true? 
 
4.5 If yes - Do you always think that?  Can you tell me about how that conviction 
varies? 
 
4.6 If always true - Can you tell me if you can think of anything that would remove / 
reduce the certainty?   
 
4.7 Before you first experienced this what would you have thought if someone told 
you this was going to happen?  
 
4.8 Is [describe experience as explained by participant] always the same?  If no – In 
what way(s) does it change? 
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Emotional Response: 
 
5. How do you feel when [this] happens? 
 
Additional questions to be asked if not spontaneously included in descriptive answer 
to question 5: 
 
5.1 Do you feel very surprised, puzzled or curious? 
 
5.2 Do you have any bad feelings, worries, or fears? 
 
5.3 Do you have any good feelings at all? 
 
Other possible questions – if not already given in previous descriptions 
 
Cognitive Response: 
 
6. So, you’ve told me [reflect participant’s description of actual occurrence of 
experience, e.g. most recent].  I’m interested in what you think about that 
experience.  Can you tell me about it? 
 
 
Behavioural Response: 
 
7. Does [the experience] cause you to behave differently than how you would 
normally or how you’ve behaved in the past?  Can you tell me about it? 
 
 
Effect of self / relationships with others: 
 
8. What effect has this experience had on how you see yourself? 
 
 
Control: 
 
9 Can you stop the experience when you want, or do you deliberately elicit it / 
bring it on?  Can you tell me about that? 
 
 
Understanding / awareness: 
 
10. Were you aware that these experiences could occur before it happened to 
you?  Can you tell me about it? 
 
 
Alternative Interpretations: 
	 348	
 
 
 
 
Refs: 167001 
          ERN_13_1132 
          RG_14-251 
 
Version 1: 15/12/14  Page 4 of 4 
 
11. Do you think there are other ways of explaining what you experience?  Can 
you tell me about them? 
 
 
Open section: 
12 Are there any other aspects of your experience, which you feel are important, 
which you’d like to tell me about? 
 
 
 
Reference: 
 
Supplementary material from Brett, C.M.C., Peters, E.P., Johns, L.C., et al. (2007) 
Appraisals of Anomalous Experiences Interview (AANEX): a multidimensional 
measure of psychological responses to anomalies associated with psychosis. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 191 (51): 23–30,  
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